HOW BRITAIN WILL FIGHT HER NEXT WAR.

Western Star, 14 October 1938, Page 3

HOW BRITAIN WILL FIGHT HER NEXT WAR.

Britain is unlikely ever again to send a great expeditionary force to the European mainland in the event of war; nor will she tako part in a gigantic land campaign like that of 1914-18. Her whole military policy has undergone a change in recent years, saya the London 'Times' military correspondent. The -role of tho British army in future hostilities was officially laid down recently as, first, that of home defence, including air defence, air-raid precautions and coastal defence; secondly, defence of overseas possessions and communications and discharge of treaty obligations; and, thirdly, the formation of a "strategic reserve" both for internal security and for co-operation with Britain's allies.

Undoubtedly, Britain's security is more than ever linked with that ot France. Because of the range of modern aircraft, as well as the increased jeopardy of her sea approaches, Britain cannot afford to run the risk of her Channel-side neighbour being overthrown. The necessity of giving her all possible support in the air, and at the quickest possible moment, is unmistakable. Help in safeguarding her at sea is likewise indicated.

The point that is more open to question is the need, and if so th e form, of an army contribution.

When account is taken of the power of modern defence, the limited strength of the Franco-German frontier in relation to the size of the French' Army, and the strength of the fortifications there, it is not easy t 0 imagine that any assault upon it coufa have much chance of success. The best chance would lie in an initial surprise; but England's present field force could hardly be on the scene in time to help in parrying this.

Once the. French Army had mobilised, the field force, in which infantry predominate, would add but a trifle to French strength. Its value there might be much legs than the risk of us being drawn by degrees into a fresh masseffort on land that would offer less prospect of result and more of exhaustion than even in the ]ast war. The same reasons which cast doubt on the practicability of a German attack against tho French frontier apply at least equally to a French move in tho opposite direction. Yet German action elsewhere might make it more difficult for Fiance to abstain.

It is an unfortunate aspect of the present situation that, if Czechoslovakia were attacked, the French could not give direct help in reinforcing her, def«a«.

There are three reasons why France might desire a contribution of land force in addition to the utmost possible air and sea help. One is of dubious wisdom, from the point of view of grand strategy; the other two more justifiable. The first is seen as a means of drawing the bulk of Britain's resources into this narrow cockpit, which would entail neglect of wider issues and a repetition -j.' the fallacious strategy of 1914-18. The second is to give their people the kind of evidence of British support which appeals t 0 their psychology, and so would act as a moral tonic. The third is to. ensure that they would have on the spot the kind of force best fitted to deal with any sudden breach in their defence.

Those needs could be met, were it considered advisable to do so, by arranging fo r dispatoh of a couple of handysized mechanised divisions, which could be formed from the present cumbrous mobile division, supplemented by the rest of the mechanised cavalry regiment*

Britain would be wis e . t 0 insist on its being taken as an emergency insurance rather than as an indefinite land commitment.

The British, infantry divisions— paw termed, but still to be fully, equipped as, motorised divisions based' on the light machine-gun— might wisely bo reserved for contingencies to which they are Nmore suited and fop which, it is essential that England should have forces available. One of these; contingencies is a fresh violation of the neutrality of Belgium; another is an invasion of Holland. .England, as well as the Belgians, paid 60 heavily fox- the failure to give prompt support to the defence of 1914, by reason of her participation in the French plan, that she should have learnt by this hard experience.

Other contingencies might be presented in or. nea r the. Iberian peninsula, which can exercise a vital effect on British sea communications. To leave Britain without means by sending all we have to one quarter would be loolish.

Until war comes any marked increase u the Army's present scale, in'addition to fulfilling the prior needs of the other is regarded as imposing too great a burden on the national finances, and even in v war could not be carried nearly as far as in 1914-18 without detracting from strength in more essential spheres.