THE WAIPUKURAU PRESS MONDAY, AUGUST 19, 1935. “WIN FOR GERMANY.”

Waipukurau Press, Volume XXX, Issue 189, 19 August 1935, Page 4

THE WAIPUKURAU PRESS MONDAY, AUGUST 19, 1935. “WIN FOR GERMANY.”

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement has made a profound impression upon Soviet officials .(writes Harold Denny from Moscow to the “New (York Times”). It is interpreted as a letting-down of France—and indirectly of the Soviet Union—by Great Britain; as a signal for a renewed and intensified naval armament race in which even the United States must in time join, and as a firstrate diplomatic victory for Chancellor Hitler. Coming so soon after Japan’s new aggressions in North China, which are held to embody an eventual threat to the Soviet Far East, the agreement has increased Russia’s disquietude over the current trend in world affairs. Inquiry among Soviet officials develops some uncertainty as to what were Britain’s motives in sanctioning Germany’s naval re-arm-ing on a ratio of 35 to Britain’s 100. It is generally felt, however, that it is a result of opinion in certain British circles that it is best to try to turn the German menace eastward by placating Germany in the West. This, of course, is considered here to be a very dangerous course for Britain because it would, be difficult to isolate any

storm. Secondly, it is believed Britain has taken an opportunistic course with the object of getting into a position to demand revision of the Washington Naval Agreement. Soviet officials, while deploring Britain’s unwillingness to stay put, admire her diplomacy as clever and realistic. Britain’s consent to German naval arming is interpreted

further as showing that Britain believes the German Navy would be a problem for Russia before it would be such for Britain. But some Soviet observers are puzzled at Britain’s allowing Germany to build submarines in the ratio of 45 to 100. They calculate that this concession enables Germany to build twenty-five to thirty medium-sized submarines or forty small ones. But submarines, these observers argue, are far more dangerous to the British Isles, which such vessels of war threatened to starve out in the World War, than to Russia, which cannot be blockaded. Submarines would be of little use in a war against the Soviet Union, starting, say, with the seizure of Memel, on the Baltic coast. It is surface ships, specially cruisers, that would be most valuable to Germany in such an operation. Lastly. Soviet observers are asking themselves what leads Britain to think she is putting a limit on Germany’s possible naval expansion by signing a ratio agreement with her. For when, the Russians ask, did Germany ever abide by any agreement when it suited her to break it? Meanwhile the Soviet Government is watching concentrations of Japanese troops in North China, but can do nothing about it except hope that Britain and the United States will take some action. We have quoted the foregoing comment as supporting earlier adverse comment by the “Press anent the agreement. —