OFFENSIVE IN KOREA

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XLIX, Issue 9729, 11 August 1950, Page 2

OFFENSIVE IN KOREA

INITIATIVE CHANGING HANDS - • ENCOURAGING SIGNS STRENGTH OF THE FOOTHOLD Although the warning is given that it is still too soon to expect tho launching; of a full-scale American offensive in Korea, the fact that a limited offensive can be mounted will come as a relief to a world, awaiting a change in fortune on the battle-front. So far, by maintaining unrelenting pressure the Korean Communists have been able <o call the tune and the defenders have had to fight as the enemy demanded. To gain the initiative will be of incalculable advantage to the American forces. Even if the initiative cannot yet be seized, the counter-offensive will t.rve the purpose of disorganising wl at the enemy hoped would be the final drive to push the defenders into the sea. Thus valuable time will be gained to bring up reinforcements and prepare for the decisive battles. The United Nations force* could not afford to have their manoeuvring room much more restricted. They equally could not afford to leave undisturbed the enemy’s preparation for a final effort to overwhelm the defenders’ remaining foothold. So they have struck out in an attack which is inflicting heavy losses and at least postponing further Communist offensives in the dangerous area of Masan. That the Americans had the strength available for this venture lends substance to the claim that the foothold in Korea will be held firmly. Some further adjustments in the line in the north-east sector may become necessary unless considerably more defensive strength can be deployed. Here the enemy is attacking fiercely and making some headway, probably as a divex’sionary action against the counter-offensive in the south-west. Another danger i,.; that communications between Taegu and the supply port of Fusan may be cut, compelling an extensive American withdrawal and making more difficult the eventual task of rolling the Communists back. When the break comes it may be found that the Communists have stretched themselves unduly in their confidence that they could drive the Americans out of Korea. Their communications have taken heavy punishment. The terrain leaves the enemy open to landings on the coast well behind the present front, but such initiatives of course depend upon the availability of large numbers of men and quantities of supplies which might not yet be forthcoming. The necessity of retreat would present the Communists with a terrifying prospect, and it is possible they have not given sufficient forethought to it. Only a quick -decision could be contemplated by the Communists. Their “deadline” or the final “liberation” of South Korea is due within a week. But for the intervention of the United Nations they probably would have succeeded within the time limit set. A long campaign was against their interests, and it may be that there is not much subsance behind the tough “crust” which they have created on the fighting" front. These matters will be put to the test when the time comes for the full-scale - counteroffensive