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U.S.A. BLITZMAKER

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT CAUGHT AXIS UNPREPARED VENTURE IN NORTH AFRICA His name is Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and .'Navy of the United States, and his mastery of the art of surprise has been vividly shown in recent military events. As the full story unfolds, Franklin D. ' roosevelt’s feat in outguessing the dictators becomes more and more spectacular. The North African venture, which caught the Axis totally unprepared, stamps the President as the equal, if not the master, of Hitler and his associates in the use of the psychological blitz.

No less an authority than Prime Minister Winston Churchill has said that Mr Roosevelt himself was the “author” of the North African expedition, and this is ample evidence that the President is, in fact as well as name, what the Constitution says he shall be—“Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service, of the United States.”

Just how much of a role the President plays is suggested shrdl cmfwyp dent plays in suggesting original strategy is a subject on which none of the informed people in Washington will talk. They are cognisant of the criticism of the President in some quarters for taking any part in military decisions. Yet they point out that he cannot turn over the complete conduct of the war to some military authority because his constitutional obligation to be'Commander-in-Chief in time of war is inescapable.

It can be set down as certain, therefore, that the President keeps on top of every military move all over the world. No important American operation is started, or planned, without his complete approval. He has his own original ideas on the conduct of the war, some of them extending even to details, and he does not hesitate to express them. No Major Rift History, in the final analysis, will give him the credit or the blame for the outcome of the war. If he is to have the responsibility, he feels, therefore, that he should play a role in the planning-. This he is doing with the fullest possible collaboration of his military, naval and air advisers. If there has been a major rift between them on any importan war policy since America entered the struggle, it has not leaked out in this most gossipy town, Washington.

To the job of war strategist, both military and psychological, the President brings an unusual combination of traits. He is daring and impatient; he has a vest foe combat and an inclination to be intolenant of old-fashioned ways. As a layman, he is not, in the words of Wendell L. Willkie, too convinced of the infallibility of the judgment of military men on all subjects. He is not above taking a risk when the stake is victory.

In calling attention to his natural impatience, it must be pointed out, however, that he demonstrated a degree of patience, remarkable for him, in the North African campaign. That expedition was agreed upon by himself and Prime Minister Churchill as long ago as last June; the date for it was set in August, but the actual landings could not begin until November 7.

Yet his impatience reflects itself again and again. When the military leaders to whom a plan of campaign has been referred report that it cannot be carried out in less than four months, our Commander-in-Chief always asks why it cannot be done in three months. As they relate the difficulties, and cit the arms requirements or the shipping tonnage required, he is apt to take out his pencil and add them up himself.

Above all, the Commander-in-Chief is confident but realistic. He sees the defeat of the Axis as “final and inevitable,” but he knows that the road ahead is long and the going will be

hard. He knows that we cannot win every battle. He knows that the casualty lists will be large and he has four sons in the service. None the less, he feels tha these are battles that must be fought and won if America and democracy are to survive. Every Dispatch Seen

It is difficult to reconstruct the scenes as Mr Roosevelt prepares for

war, because secrecy is, naturally, essential to the conduct of war. None but the highest and most trustworthy officials sit with him in his oval executive office, in the White House map room or in the Presidential study as the plans of battle are discussed and developed. Every dispatch of importance from ships at sea or fighting commanders on land comes to his desk. The maps in the White House show hourly the disposition of ships and land forces on every front around the world. His conferences ■with General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Com-mander-in-Chief; Harry L. Hopkins, Presidential assistant, and others are so numerous and so often off the record that no good estimate of their number per month can be obtained.

Mr Roosevelt takes an active interest not only in the actual fighting on land, on sea and in the air, but as well in the weapons with which the battles must be fought. His meetings with Donald N. Nelson, WFB chairman and with the Army and Navy planners are frequent as he attempts to key war production more closely to strategical considerations. It has been his decision in many instances to place greater emphasis on the production of long-range, four-engined bombers, for example, even if it meant that his numerical goals in airplane production had to be sacrificed. Psychological Warfare

On the psychological warfare front the President’s participation has been more evident. It was doubtless his idea that he should employ his own knowledge of French to broadcast in their native language to the people of Continental France and of the French North African colonies and give them a message of friendship and a promise of freedom at the time that American troops were swarming ashore from landing barges.

There was something satisfying to the American people in the knowledge that our leaders were not too moral to resort to the use of gold and trickery in war if that course was necessary to win victory over a foe who violates every rule of civilised warfare.

The amazing expedition of MajorGeneral Mark W. Clark (since promoted to Lieutenant-General) doubtless had the President’s personal approval. Not only did General Clark go to the North African colonies three weeks in advance of the invasion and return with pledges of support from French officers supposedly loyal to Vichy, and with plans of the fortifications our landing troops would face, but he told a story of losing 18,000 dollars in gold when his boat overturned. That indicated we were not above bribing those who could be induced to support us by such means.

Mr Roosevelt’s approval of the air raid on Tokyo led by Brigadier-Gen-eral James H. Doolittle, in which the war was brought home for the first time to millions of Japanese and of the surprise assault on Makin Island by marines, in which his son, Major James Roosevelt, was second-in-com-mand, were prime examples of his psychological warfare.

While the President’s job as Com-mander-in-Chief is difficult to define, it can be said in general that it consists in large part of reviewing the military operations planned by others, questioning them, if necessary, and finally giving Ins approval. Professional military men usually agree when they submit plans of operations to the President, and it is believed that most of these get his ready assent. But when the Army and Navy, for example, disagree, it is his job, with the advice of Chief-of-Staff Leahy, and after hearing both sides, to take a decision. Knowledge of Geography The President’s knowledge of geography is world-wide and surprisingly great, doubtless aided by a lifelong habit of collecting stamps and study-

ing the country of their origin, and tiffs knowledge adds to his confidence when he sits down with his military

men to plan a move in some far-off cornel' of the world. In the initial talks there are times when he knows more about the terrains, the harbours and the climates than they do. His experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the last war also stands him in good stead.

Just being president in peace-time is a man-killing job; adding the duties of Commander-in-Chief in time of war greatly increases the pressure on the man who holds the office. But after two terms and nearly half of an. other, the President, at GO, remains in good health.

Just before the African landings began an air of tenseness was evident

to those close to him. But he showed the tension only by smoking more and talking less. Once the initial successes were apparent lie was exuberant and talkative again. Those who know the President well say that he wages war affirmatively. Even as the American Army smashes forward in North Africa he probably is turning over in his mind, a plan, originated by himself or submitted by his military chieftains, to cause Hitler or Tojo or both lots of trouble at some totally unexpected]) place some six months from now.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WHDT19430217.2.17

Bibliographic details

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXII, Issue 8873, 17 February 1943, Page 4

Word Count
1,551

U.S.A. BLITZMAKER Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXII, Issue 8873, 17 February 1943, Page 4

U.S.A. BLITZMAKER Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXII, Issue 8873, 17 February 1943, Page 4