NOTES ON THE WAR

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXI, Issue 8836, 23 October 1942, Page 3

NOTES ON THE WAR

“STRATEGIC' BOMBING” CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS SOME PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED At the moment when it seems as if' the only feasible “second front” to relieve pressure on Russia and pave the way to victory is the Allied “strategic bombing” of Nazi Europe, the questions are still asked: What percentage of the bombing effort is effective? How much of the stuff dropped hits the vital target? What is the wastage of personnel and of aircraft to be reckoned in the balance results? What, in short, are the conditions of success? “Navator,” in Oliver Stewart’s magazine “Aeronautics,” discusses the .whole problem frankly. Some raids, he says, are admitted on all hands to be outstandingly successful. He might add now the. latest raid on on the Renault factory near (Paris, and on Lubeck, Rostock and Cologne. H emight add now the latest raid oil the Schneider armament works at Le Creusot. Of Cologne he says: Firstly, it was undiluted ‘‘blitzbombing”—that is, bombing of an area and not a point. Secondly, it was achieved by weight of enormous numbers, made possible by the aircraft factory workers of iGreat Britain who made the aeroplanes and by the workmen who made the innumerable aerodromes necessary for the simultaneous operation of so many machines. Determination was provided in plenty by the grand young crews who manned the aircraft. The weather was good, and the moon brilliant. Cologne, not too far away and standing on a river, would obviously be easy to find. Under such conditions the raid was an unqualified success in area bombing. Some Failures

Then he comes to Essen, bombed two nights later, again by over a thousand planes. This raid was not so Successful and the same target had to be tackled again almost immediately. The reason the writer gives is that Essen lies in the heart of the industrial Ruhr, which, like industrial areas in 'Britain, is subject to thick industrial haze. Essen has no distinguishing landmark as a guide to recognition. Rostock, too, had to be revisited more than once, but Lubeck was better. The raid on the Renault works was made under excellent conditions and was highly successful. On the opposite hand is the classic example of bombing effort 00 per cent. wasted—Brest. Here for months the R.A.F. attacked the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, but failed to destroy them.

' "Navator” adds: ‘'But look at tho losses. The published figures show that an enormous number of aircraft were reported missing in Brest raids, and in addition there must have been many incidental crashes. The most significant feature of the failure of the Brest bombing is that it was an attempt at precision bombing, not area bombing. Bombing Methods IBlitz-ibombing alone, declares “Navator,” can never win the war for us. Many small but vital targets must be destroyed in order to cripple Germany’s production of war materials and thereby to reduce her ability to wage war. f Small targets require precision bombing of some satisfactory soit. The writer lists the methods used: 1. Very high, sub-stratosphere, day bombing. 2. High, or medium high, day bombing with fighter protection. 3. High, or medium high, day bombing without fighter protection. 4. Low level day bombing. 5. Very low level day bombing. 6. High or medium high, night bombing.

7. Low level night bombing. No. 1 method depends on perfect weather —to see the target at 35,000 feet—and such weather is rare in 'Western Europe. Special high altitude equipment must be carried, reducing the bomb load and impeding the aircraft crew. He condemns the method as “possible, but not profitable.” Incidentally, the Americans with their bomb-sights prefer the method. Method No.'2 can only be used within the range of fighter protecting aircraft, which is distinctly limited. There is also the necessity at times to take evasive action against enemy fighters and this affects bombing accuracy. The writer says: “The chance of success is rather small and the risk fairly high.” Method No. 3 is even more risky Method No. 4 is the most expensive of all and "may be regarded as impossible if the defences of the choser target are really intense.” The fifth method, that employed ir the raids on Augsburg and Le Creu sot, “Navator” considers has far bet ter prospects of both success an< safety, -but “not without specialisatioi both in aircraft and in training. Of the sixth method, the metho< most used by the Bomber Command “mainly because the percentage o losses is not too high,” “Navator says: The results are good only agains area targets, and only occasionall • j n good conditions and wit light opposition—against precis ion targets. The difficulties are anti-aircraJ fire, night-fighters and blindin searchlights. With the last methc of low-level night bombing the risk go up enormously.

Up to the “Heads” The quickest road to victory under the present circumstances, says “Navator,” would be to “make the .German army in the field suffer a

shortage of essential war supplies by effective precision bombing of appropriate targets.” He believes it can be done, but does not state how. -But he does suggest that the men who determine the bombing policy the men "higher up”-should go on raids to see the conditions for themselves, and he commends the example of Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin, who did go out to find out for himself. He says of the Augsburg low-level day raid that it achieved results which night raids could only have accomplished with probably double the losses.