NOTES ON THE WAR

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXI, Issue 8834, 19 October 1942, Page 3

NOTES ON THE WAR

U.S.A. VERSUS JAPAN WAR IN THE PACIFIC THE SHORTAGE OP STEEL Temporarily, the great battle of Stalingrad haß come down to relatively minor operations. It is now several days since the German announcement was made that no more infantry attacks 1 would' be made and that the conquest would be completed by aerial and artillery bombardment—a declaration that can be read two ways. Since then there has been a marked reduction in the ferocity of the battle. The prolonged battle, which has been consistently described as of extreme ferocity, has made great inroads on the strength and resources of both sides, and the restricted area over which it has raged must have been reduced to an appalling condition, calculated to enforce a reduction of'activity. The battle has no aspect of comfort except that the Germans have so far been cheated of the victory they expected long ago.

“War.of Spearheads”

Mr Hanson ’Baldwin, in the New York Times, reviewing the war in the Pacific, gives a very interesting picture of the general shape of the conflict which now exists primarily between the United States and Japan.

It is a war of spearheads; So huge is the arena that the forces which it is possible to use in combat are not only spread out over a vast area, but are small in“numbers; and the great expenditure of effort is not in the fighting, but in maintaining the small fighting forces. In a campaign fought over comparatively small terrain, with large combatant forces, the problem of supply is far greater than the layman readily appreciates. When the battle areas, whatever the size of the forces, are thousands of miles from home, it is even greater. Not only must supplies and reinforcements be carried; the supply routes must be protected. This aggravated trouble is one of the “headaches” which have plagued the con’duct of the war in the Middle East; it is worse still in the Pacific.

Air power has shown its enormous influence within areas measurable by hundreds of miles, but it is, at this date, futile when the hundreds run into big figures, and the commissariat service of far-flung forces, including air forces, is thrown back upon the Navy and the Merchant Marine. Recent events have indicated that, in the Pacific, Japan’s air power is being rapidly overcome. It was to its advantage in the air that Japan owed most of its early successes, and possibly air power may, step by step, play a great part in driving Japanese forces from some of their more advanced positions. But ultimately Japanese occupations rely upon sea communications, which in months of immunity, have been endowing the advanced garrisons with heavy stores. . It will be for the naval forces of the United Nations to cut off these garrisons from their home bases, and force them to live upon what they have accumulated in the meantime; and this will be a long and difficult task, requiring first that the Japanese navy shall be reduced to impotence. So far it has carefully avoided risk of such r^fluction. U.S. Steel Paradox

Among the real puzzles of recent months is the paradox of steel in the United 'States—an entirely new case of poverty in the midst of plenty. Everyone knows that the United States was the greatest producer of steel in the world before the war. It is now turning out at least 50 per cent, more than before the war. Yet in all directions there is a grave lack of steel, and programmes for the production of vital war supplies have been cut right and left, even to the extent of threatening unemployment in the shipbuilding industry, The solution of this pretty puzzle is given, at much too great length to quote, in an article by 'Harold Fleming in the “Christian Science Monitor.’’

An industry which produces, say, 100 units a month, must have a certain reserve stock, say, enough for 200 units of material to draw upon. If it expands suddenly to a production of 300 units a month, it must acquire a reserve'of material for 600 units. It requires, therefore, its original current supply of 100 units plus the 200 in reserve to meet the new demand, and must acquire 300' units for the next month, plus 600 for reserve.

Thus, where it formerly bought 100 units a month, it must buy 300 for actual production, and also, for the first expanded month, 600 for reserve —making eight times the foimei monthly purchase. The supplying industry cannot possibly meet such a huge temporary demand. This is an extreme, hypothetical case, but the principle is correct. Another difficulty arises from the fact that the speed of the increase m the ability of industry to utilise law material has passed expectations, and this has resulted in shortages in certain essential lines. There may, for example, be a fully adequate output of steel plates for the hulls of ships, but a relative shortage of angle-irons and other parts, or of boiler-tubes, or engines, even of rivets. It appears that the production of steel plates is more than sufficient; but inability to match this output with all the other elements that go into a ship have produced a “steel shortage’’ in the shipbuilding industry. It is not that there is not enougji steel; the steel is not available because it is not all in the right shape. The same principle operates, or may operate, in all categories of war production. In a rapidly expanding construction programme, “ bottlenecks” appear inevitably.