GALLIPOLI ADVENTURE.

Wanganui Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 15977, 20 November 1919, Page 2

GALLIPOLI ADVENTURE.

SOME DRASTIC CRITICISM. BETELATIONS OF IKCAPACITI. NEGLECT . AND MUDDLE.

Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. LONDON, November 19.-, Following is a precis of the second report of the Gallipoli Commission. In a general review, the report says: —From ,the outset the risks of failure of the expedition outweighed the chances of success. The problem was never fully investigated by competent experts. No correct appreciation of the difficulties was arrived .at. The Commission considered that Wolfe Murray should have prepared a general plan, and it was the duty of the Secretary pf War to ensure that this was done. The naval operations in November, 1914, and February and 'March, 1915, naturally led to a great strengthening of the Turkish position. There was undue delay, considering the situation after the first landing, while the plan of attack from Suva and Anzac in the beginning of August were open to criticism. The attack at Suvla was not pressed as it should have been. Orders given by General Hammersley were confused, and his staff work defective. General Sitwell, the senor brigade commander, did not show sufficient energy and decision. General Stopford djd not take suffificient means to inform himself of the progress of operations. He and his staff were partly responsible for the failure to supply the troops with water. The Commission is of opinion that Stopford’s difficulties were increased by Sir lan Hamilton’s intervention. Whilst recognising Sir Jan Hamilton’s personal gallantry and energy he should have examined the situation disclosed by the first landings more critically and weighed the probabilities of success and failure more impartially having regard to the resources at his disposal, and submitted a comprehensive statement to the Secretary of War for and against the continuance of the operations. After Sir Charles Munro’s advice to evacuate had been confirmed by Lord Kitchener, more prompt decision should have been taken by the War -Cabinet. A considerable amount of artillery was available in Egypt ana Mudros for the Suvla operation, but was not utilised. The Commission finds that on _ the whole the food supply was satisfactory, hut provision for the evacuation of wounded, especially hospital ships, was insufficient. This was due to the want of a general plan. The supply of medical requisites was on the whole adequate, except in the case of Australians and New Zealanders, who were short of ordinary medicine, especially castor oil, and the variety of food for sick men. WHAT WERE LORD KITCHENER’S PLANS. The Gallipoli narrative shows that Lord Kitchener’s death made, the Commission’s task difficult, as owing to his secretiveness regarding military matters, reasons for various actions are unknown. Early in 1915 Lord Kitchener thought the Dardanelles a suitable objective, probably requiring 160,000 men< He had in view possible stalemate on the western front and the necessity for providing another theatre of operations. The War Council subscribed to the latter view if a stalemate occurred in the spring. Without, however, specifying the Dardanelles, the general opinion seemed that either the Dardanelles or Servia was most suitable. NAVAL AND MILITARY ACTION. The question of joint naval and military action was not considered, because months must elapse before the troops were available. Mr Churchill, at the AVar Council on May 14th, stated that -if he had known three months before that an army of 80,000 or 100,000 would be available in May, the attack by the Navy alone would never have been undertaken. Towards the end of January diplomatic efforts to secure the cooperation of Greece and Servia failed, and attention was turned to the Dardanelles, but anxiety as to a possible German offensive on the West front delayed the departure of troops until March. There was a diplomatic side to the proposed expedition. The Commission’s interim report indicated that Russia wanted relief from Turkish pressure in the Caucasus, while in addition there was hope that success at the Dardanelles would unite the Balkans against the Central Powers. The disastrous effect of' possible failure was not altogether absent from the minds of vthe War Council. On the military side there was doubt as to the fleet’s ability to guarantee a landing, and in view of this risk the General Staff was not prepared to recommend the attempt. The Director of Naval Intelligence, while generally in agreement with the General Staff, and fully concurring in the great risks involved in the joint enterprise, thought the staff under-rated the value of the fleet’s heavy covering fire at the disembarkation point. . The War Council did not think tire staff’s opinion was not wholly applicable to existing conditions. The fall of the Namur and Liege forts led to“ the .conclusion that permanent works were easily dealt with by lon-range guns, while the value of naval bombardment was greatly advanced by aircraft observation, also the development of submarines encouraged the hope that the Turkish communications with Gallipoli through the Sea of Marmora would be very vulnerable. The question of the appointment of a commander was discussed in Sir W. Birdwocd’s name was first considered, but as the scope of the operations became enlarged it was thought advisable to select an officer of higher rank and greater experience. Sir lan Hamilton was chosen. General Bird wood went., to the Dardanelles and .made a reconnaisance, and the telegrams which passed between him and Lord Kitchener showed teat tec latter intended >tho troops to be used in a minor capacity only, while General Birdwood fully appreciated the formidable character of the peninsular defences and anticipated that large military operations would be necessary. General Maxwell telegraphed Lord Kitchener on February 24th that Gallipoli was practically a fort, against which attack from any quarter without heavy guns would be hazardous. He advised Lord Kitchener of the recommendation of Colonel Maucorps, formerly French military attache at Constantinople, wherein .the latter suggested an attack on the Asiatic side as Hie least

ROYAL COMMISSION’S REPORT.

difficult. Colonel Maucorps regarded a landing on Gallipoli as extremely hazardous. The Commission is satisfied that no general lan was evolved, andfail to see why it should not have been done, and thus put the problem more clearly before the 'War Council. The naval authorities in March were satisfied that ■it would be necessary to clear the enemy’s artillery on Gallipoli before the fleet could make the straits safe for transports. Lord Kitchener thereupon thought no operations should take place before the arrival of the 29th Division. Sir lan Hamilton’s evidence showed that he was given clearly to understand that his force was merely a second string, that the navy could force the Dardanelles on its own, and that the military must not chip in unless the admiral definitely chucked up the sponge. Sir lan Hamilton added that he could obtain practically no information regarding the position before ho left, and was not supplied with the information prepared by the General Staff in 1906, nor was Colonel Maucorps’ view communicated to him. The War Office’s information on tee whole subject was of the most meagre character. He received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that occupation of the Asiatic side was strongly to be deprecated. Sir lan Hamilton, after arrival, conferred with Admiral de Robeok. The latter said the War Office was too sanguine in thinking the navy’s guns could prevent a Turkish lodgment on the peninsula. The Germans had grappled with the situation, and had got troops scientifically disposed and heavily entrenched. The enemy had nothing to fear, owing to the flat trajectory of naval guns. Sir lan Hamilton, in a private letter to Lord Kitchener, said; “Gallipoli on the spot looks a tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your/ office.” Sir lan Hamilton, after witnessing the naval bombardment, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: “Reluctantly driven to the ooncluion that tee Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by the navy than once seemed probable, and if the army participates it will not assume the subsidiary form hitherto anticipated,” To this Lord Kitchener replied: “You know my views that tee Dardanelles must be forced. If a large military operation is necessary it must be undertaken and carried through,” Sir lan Hamilton stated at the conference aboard the Queen Elizabeth that Admiral de Robeck said it was quite clear that they could not get through without the help of troops. Admiral Wemyss concurred, and no voice was raised to question this momentous decision. Admiral de Robeck, reporting to the First Lord, said the assumption that the forts could be destroyed by naval fire had been conclusively disproved. The analogy of the Belgian, forts-was quite misleading, ns these were destroyed by howitzer fire. After thjs Mr Churchill saw clearly that a combined operation, was essential,., instead of his original plan of achieving it without involving the army. Sir lan Hamilton on April 4th told Lord Kitchener he had not enough ammunition to destroy the entanglements by field guns and howitzers, and therefore must rely on other methods. The Commission is unable to ascertain the precise date whereon, after the failure of the naval attack, military operations were decided upon. When the decision was taken much ineptitude was displayed in loading transports whreby men, material, and stores were shipped in different vessels, resulting in delay. Much unnecssary material was also taken. On May 14th the War Council discussed the situation. There were insistent demands for men for- France, while we were saddled with requirements*''in Egypt and elsewhere. The Council had therefore to consider the wisdom of continuing the Dardanelles campaign. There was a tendency to send more reinforcements, but nothing was immediately done beyond Lord Kitchener asking Sir lan Hamilton hew many men were required to ensure success. He replied that if the present situation was unchanged he would need an additional army corps. Sir lam Hamilton reckoned he could advance with half the loss of life if he had a liberal supply of guns and munition, especially high explosives. Lord Kitchener replied on May 18th, expressing disappointment that his preconceived views as to the conquest of positions necessary to support the troops on land were miscalculated, and it now became a question bo could support a twofold operation, draining our resources. The intervention of a political crisis blocked decision on Sir lan Hamilton’s request for twenty-four days, and in Mr Churchill’s opinion the crisis prevented an unbroken stream of reinforcements. Provision was made to send two divisions. Then Lord Kitchener changed his mind and sent only one. Mr Asquith agreed that the political situation, caused delay, but thought there was a shortage of available troops. The Commission, however, thought the crisis was the main cause. When the new Cabinet was oontituted, several new members had to be convinced that the expedition was justifiable. DISCUSSION 0 PBYACUATTON. Lord Kitchener, at the end of May, informed the Dardanelles Committee that the difficulties of the enterprise had proved more formidable than was anticipated, and that much greater effort than originally bargained for was now required, and for the first time there ,was a hint of evacuation heard. Lord Kitchener prepared a . memorandum on May 28th. He submitted • three solutions (1) Withdrawal; (2) To seek, if possible, an immediate military decision; (3) Continue to push and make what progress was possible. In regard to the withdrawal Lord Kitchener declared that the disadvantages were so great that it. could only be justified in order to avoid great disaster, and-Tie threw his weight in favour of the third solution, because it avoided a blow to our prestige »fid kept the door open to the Balkans’ intervention and ensnre a strategical position preventing active Turkish operations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus. Early in June Russian reverses relieved the Turkish position. Sir lan Hamilton telegraphed that he foresaw this might enable the Turks to throw i quarter of a million against him, and urged that some equivalent to the Russian co-operation was not vitally

necessary. Three fresh divisions were despatched. When they arrived a mistake -was apparently made in employing them at Suvla without an admixture of seasoned troops. Moreover, their officers, were, generally speaking, inexperienced and the, failure which followed was the precursor of evacuation. Eventually Sir Charles Munro went to Gallipoli to report. He came to the conclusion, that with the exception of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps], the troops on the Peninsula were unequal to sustained effort owing to inexperience, officers' want of training and defective staff work. General Birdwood agreed with Sir Charles Munro regarding the difficulty of making progress, but opposed evacuation, considering the Turks would view it as a complete victory which would exert a bad effect an Mahommetans in Egypt, India, and Persia. Purtier, the lateness of the season and the probability of bad weather would hake the withdrawal dangerous. Generals Byng and Davies agreed with Sir Charles Munro in regard to evacuation. Lord Kitchener, on November 3rd, wired General Birdwood: I am coming to see you, I believe the Admiralty will agree to force the Straits. We must do what we can to assist them. Examine the best landings at the head of the Gulf of Saros. We may, perhaps, have to evacuate Suvla. All the best fighting men that can be spared, including your Anzac boys, and everyone I can sweep up in Egypt, might be concentrated at Mudros ready for the enterprise. You will have command of the whole force. Munro will go to Salonika. Please work out plans. We must do it right this time. I absolutely refused to sign an order for evacuation which would be the gravest disaster and condemn a large percentage of« men to death or imprisonment. It appears that Admiral Robeck, Wemyss and Keyes held strongly that the fleet should attempt the Strait in order to relieve the army, but bettween November 3rd and 4th Lord Kitchener's proposal to seize the Bulair Isthmus' was adversely criticised by the Admiralty and General Birdwood. Therefore, Lord Kitchener on November 4th telegraphed General Birdwood that naval operations might not be renewed, "The more I look at the problem the less I see a way through, so you had better quietly v and secretly work out any scheme to remove the troops." On the 22nd, Lord Kitchener telegraphed the Prime Minister, "As German assistance to the Turks is now practically available, our position is untenable.' Evacuation seems inevitable." Lord Kitchener on the 15th had reported to the Prime Minister the result of his personal inspection, and said, "the country is more difficult than I imagined. The gain that we hold has been a most remarkable feat of arms. Everyone has done wonders both on sea and land." The fact that the base at Mudros was too detached from the field force and the impossibility of proper lines of communication was the main difficulty in the way of successful operations. Telegrams which passed between the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener show that the latter was greatly concerned about defending Egypt in the event of evacuation. He advocated i landing at Ayas Bay, near Alexandretta, to cut the Turkish railway communications. This project necessitated the withdrawal of forces from Salonika and Prance as well as diverting Indian divisions on the way to Mesopotamia. The General Staff did not support it, and it r*as ultimately rejected at a joint' conference,at Paris between the French and English Governments. Cabinet discussed the evacuation on November 23rd. Lord Curzon, on behalf of several colleagues, ■elaborated a case against evacuation, whereto Mr Bonar Law replied that every military expert favoured evacuation. Mr Bonar Law/ in a memorandum, shows that the Prime - Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty opposed evacuation, but the military advisers' advice was accepted. Meanwhile a blizzard during the last days of (November aggravated the condition of the troops. Two hundred and eighty men were drowned in the trenches at Suvla, and many were frozen to death as they stood, while. 16,000 were frost-bitten. Sir Charles Munro then telegraphed Lord Kitchener pressing for a decision. Prom November 25th to December Bth, Admiral Womyss, with remarkable pertinacity, advocated a renewal of the naval attack, but Admiral de Robeck, who was then in England, placed his views before the Council, and as a result of a War Cabinet meeting on December 22nd, Lord Kitchener telegraphed Sir Charles Munro, "Owing to political consequences, there is a strong feeling against evacuation. If the Salonika troops are placed at your disposal, could you -.make Suvla retainable? Navy would also take %e offensive." Sir Charles Munro replied that he did not think there was any reasonable chance of success, as the naval guns could not search the .Turkish positions. On December 7th Cabinet, mainly on Lord Kitchener's advice, decided to evacuate. Admiral Wemyss again telegraphed on learning the decision urging renewal of the offensive. He added: "I am convinced the time' is ripe for a vigorous offensive. I am confident of success," but the Admiralty declined. Lord Fisher appends a memo, regretting that official duties precluded his°attendance at the sittings. He is, therefore, unjustified in attaching his name to the report. SIR THOMAS MACKENZIE'S YIEWS. SCATHING COMMENTS. LONDON, November IS. Sir Thomas MaoKcnzie supplies a supplementary report. Tie regrets that the evidence is not published, making the narrative inadequate. While substantially agreeing with the finding he holds stronger views i.pon certain of them. Ho believes the forcing- of the Dardanelles was practicable had the authorities approached the problem adequately and should only have launched a combined attack after proper preparation. Whether Sir la/i Hamilton was the right man to command can never be answered because he was hurriedly despatched, imperfectly instructed, and inadequately . equipped. Though. Wolfe Murray attended, the War Council he expressed no opinion, tendered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a,decision was arrived at to prepare a nanrai. attack, , When Murray

was asked why he had not prepared a plan, he replied (that he was overshadowed by Kitchener. Sir Thomas MacKenzie believes the vital period for determining 1 success or failure was between August 6th and 10th, when General Stopford and Ids officers threw away a golden opportunity and gave the Turks time to reinforce. The failure at Snyla was not duo to the opposition of the-Turks, but to General Stopford’s failure to provide water for the troops. Sir Thomas Mackenzie directs attention* to the evidence of several witnesses as tto the frittering away of life through General HunterWeston’s repeated frontal attacks and quotes Colonel Wilson’s evidence that lives had to be sacrificed almost with futility. Ho also quotes Sir lan Hamilton’s admission to Lord Nicholson thait lives were used instead of shells. Regarding the treatment of wounded, Sir Thomas MacKenzie quotes Howse’s mailrared opinion “that he would recommend his Government when the war was over, under no conceivable conditions to trust the Imperial authorities with medical arrangements for tjie care of Australian sick and wounded.”