THE ALLIES' TASK.

Wanganui Herald, Volume L, Issue 14698, 1 September 1915, Page 5

THE ALLIES' TASK.

“THE KEY OF THE OCEAN.” , GETTING AT KIUO BAHR. ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE 'PROBLEM. (Post.) With a fairly good map of the portion of the peninsula involved in the canipaign and an ordinary map showing its relationship to the rest of Turkey) it is very easy to grasp the j nature of the Allies’ task. The campaign is, in fact, far the simplest of all in progress to follow, because it is.-upon so small a scale in the geographical sense. The final object is the defeat of Turkey as a military Power. It is frequently expressed as being the forcing of the Dardanelles. ’’ That alone is merely a stage in the whole process, but it is the key to the rest. Tt is the most difficult operation, and it will bring all the other problems far nearer to solution, even if they do not immediately disappear by the end of Turkish opposition. The Dardanelles is tho only sea route to Constantinople; and it is thus the actual doorway to the political heart of Turkey. The strait- is heavily fortified, and the forts are the lock - onthe door. Not having a key with which ■to undo tho lock without a fuss, the Allies tried to smash it from the front with tho guns from their ships! This has proved impossible. They are therefore trying to wreck the stubborn fastenings, not by smashing them, but by breaking up tho structure that supports them, namely, the land communications. Reduced to its elements, the present campaign is neither more not less in intention than an attempt to besiege the, . fortified area that commands tho narrowest part of the Dardanelles. It has been concluded that the couquer- ’• ing of tlie forts on the peninsula will enable the Allies to destroy or at least -Treatlv reduce the defences on the Asiatic shore without a great land campaign there; and in any case, the peninsula | must for various reasons be dealt with ■ first. THE KILID BAHR STRONGHOLD. . All the most important operations have been carried, out in tho southern quarter of the peninsula, ' The extremity of this remarkable tongue of land is shaped, as Sir lan Hamilton, has said in one of.his despatches, like; a badly worn boot,- and the description is apt for Explanatory purposes. Applying it tovthe map, it -will be seen that right at the heel of the boot is Kilid Bahr, and 1 this old fortress .is well named, for it means “key of the Ocean.” About it are grouped' a number of very powerful forts, armpd with many heavy guns. ' This small area, two, or three miles square, is more than the heel ot an Imaginary boot; if it is pierced, it will be a heel of Achilles for Turkey. There are two pure methods of .subjugating a fortress—bv djyect attack, aiming at. smashing it into impotence, or by indirect, through the stomachs of its garrison. 1 The two a-e usually combined 1 in an actual ’siege. Tlie first stage is .to .gel the besieging troops into position", either to batter the stronghold, or to encircle it and keep the supplies out and the hungry in. ; . The Kilid Bahr stronghold could have been brought into g state of siege if the

Allies could at any point north of it hate stretched, a line of troops across the Peninsula, at the samp time by some means . preventing supplies from being carried, across the straits. '■ ,1 , the inner defences, ;, . The second barrier, which awaift northern and southern forces alike, is the , rampart of elopes surrounding the piateai called Pasha Dagh, a peculiarly-shapec feature, which, is a little below the ankh of the boot, and, aa can bo seen from the map, could not have been more con- . vonieutly placed as a defence for Kilid Bah,'. 1 From just south of Gnba Tepe to Maidos there runs a valley, which would lx a splendid lino of-advance for a besieg J-; ihg army if it were not commanded by j' hills, which are, of course, gun-positions- ■ both north and south. On the south i‘ ' the Pasha. Dagh; on the north the spun of the Sari Bair hill group. It is again?' the Sari Bair position .that, tho Austra lasian Amy has been operating, became if it could bo taken it. wonld enable an army to move right across the ‘ narrow parti of tho peninsula, to Maidos nudeproper protection, and to cut tho Kilb Bahr garrisons off completely from the mainland. But, just ns Acbi Baba bar stopped tho southern armies, so the Sari Bair hills have, so far proved too tongl a proposition tor the colonials, in spitr of gallantry, and vigour which have , per-. . haps never been surpassed in British, his tory. " “ “ ri; SUCCESS. NOT YET. To put the thing bluntly, tho attacks' on tho Turkish hill-positions have, for tho present, failed, and the prospect of an early success against them, without a different development, has been small. The fighting fronts have been small, and . the defenders- aro so numerpus that they 1 can easily answer, raven mote than man for man, the strength brought against them. The necessary; new . development i is the Suvla Bay lauding, which may yet I be followed by others not leas important. H As the map shows, Suvla Bay is at the . edge of a considerable plain; and an advance across, it gets oyer the obstacle of Sari Bair to some extent, by going, j round it—right across the top' of the | imaginary boot. But it is perhaps fill if the advance can be carried across the Peninsula from, here, because it is verv much wider than in the south, and j is hillier as one goes east. Consequent-;) ly the new disposition is to be regarded | as’ a more elaborate upon. . Bari ; Bair itself. • The Australasians,, have worked north along the coast' from An7,ac, and the British, south from , Suvlp, , Bay across the Anafarta plain, and they■’ have joined hands, so that the whole extent, of the;western':.slopes,;,of- tho Sqri.i Bair hills are-now ■'looking'upon a. ho??;' tile army. Toe next development, will be to extend the line, northward along the coast, so as to -allow the-;.centre- of the line, now eight or ten miles long, to bulge eastward without' becoming .' too curved. By this means the Sari Bair hills will be attacked both on the west 1 and'the north, and may . be conquered. Ultimately, with the logical development of this plain, the Allies’ forces will force their way right across in an ever-grow-ing curve, until they reach the coast of ! the strait. The position will then be ■ that while one portion of-the forces faces to the north, fighting off any attacks intended to break the cordon, the rest-will face the south, to -carry. on the siege of :. Kilid Bahr .stronghold-' Even before this

i point is rear hod, all ,'lqnd communications will .have .been cut, , for. road? aro few and poor.', By. the completion of the advance, the Allies' gain also sufficient control oyer the, straits; t# wipe out practically thp , whole of the Turkish facilities for water transports, and the besiegemeuit will be complete. MODIFYING FACTORS. ; These are the Clements: of the strategical scheme suggested by. the. operations now iii 'progress, and 'some' such description as this, with the least, possible geography introduced' into what sis peed-;, Tiarly a question of geography,, ’.-is perhaps the best means of explaining,.them.; Whether they will bo fully wdriked out ; depends upon various One is the possibility, not neceldariiy as great aa recent messages have' suggested, that. the Turk? will “throw up the sponge.” A nation .is likely, to think .oyer such a step for, a very - long tinia before « it' actually, takes it. . Another . i« the possibility—exceedingly improbable that . the. Germans .may ha- able to assist the Turks. - This is almost mac(e impossible by the probability that Tnr- : key, will, have' some of her, Balkan, neighbours to fight soon, to say nothing of’ Italy—a complication which, might easily result in an immediate suit for peace. )A,. third is the possibility that the AUiea may , make still another landing, on Or j near the Peninsula; but this.; likelihood is lessened by the very fact of the new attack froin' Snyla Bay having keen launch-; ed. It would not be, of any great advantage, for instance, if a successful attack on the Bulair ■ Isthmus could he made.