AN ENGLISH OPINION.

Wanganui Herald, Volume XLVII, Issue 13701, 7 June 1912, Page 4

AN ENGLISH OPINION.

Discussing the naval situation in the Mediterranean, the London Daily Tclegrap a couple of months ago pointed out, when it was reported that all the British battleships were to be withdrawn, that:

(1.) Germany has become the second naval Power of the world, and nil her armoured ships, except two, practically all her cruisers, and every one of her torpedo craft, trained and held in instant readiness in the Baltic and North rfea. Her licet is still growing, and as it grows it will continue to be concent rated, a? to the newest and most powerful ships, in the North Sea, and as to the older and less powerful in the Baltic, the two sections being joined by the enlarged Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.

(2.) Tire most cordial relations have been cemented between Great Britain nnd Prance, with the result that Franco has withdrawn practically all her battleships of military value from the English Channel, which has become virtually an ‘'English lake,” save for the presence of a few French cruisers and torpedo Hot ilia. (3.) In The English Channel and Mediis not represented by a single ,man-o’-war, but her allies— Austria and Italy—are developing their fleets at a heavy cost, and three years hence will have completed eight battleships of the new all-big-gun typo, commonly known as Dreadnoughts, besidts large flotillas of torpedo craft. (4.) The Admiralty have the assurance that in 1915 —and it takes three years to design, order, and build a battleship Germany will have twenty-throe Dreadnoughts completed, Italy four, and Austria-Hungary four, or a total of thirtyone for the Triple Alliance; while at that date we shall have in European waters only twenty-nine, plus the ships laid down under the forthcoming estimates.

From this short survey it is apparent that the naval problem which confronts the Admiralty hinges on the size of the naval force which shall be hept in the Mediterranean. There are throe policies, each of which could be supported by cogent arguments. The first and most obvious is to continue to keep a large detached battle force in the Mediterranean at at present, increasing the number of units as may bo considered essential in order to ensure the “open i‘oad” to India and the East. The second choice is to abandon the Mediterranean, trusting to the French fleet—which, even in 191,5, will ho stronger than the forces of Italy and Austria if those two countries combined—to protect the position there. The Admiralty might determine to strengthen the present cruiser squadron .in the Mediterranean and attach the Mediterranean battleships to the Atlantic fleet. This is the pivot force in European waters. H was invented by Lord Fisher seven years ago in order to meet our naval needs in northern and southern waters, provided they do not dcvolon at once and the same time. Wherever' there is the greatest pressure, there the Atlantic fleet can ho at very short notice. From a strategic point of view, much might he said in favour of the latter scheme. But in the distribution cf the fleet tho Admiralty cannot ignore the broad political issue. What conclusion would Europe draw from such a step/ Would it be regarded as a statesmanlike measure by a strong Power, determined to utilise its strength to the best advantage, or would it be looked upon as a .sign of weakness by a Power feeling aciueU tiro strain of foreign naval rivalry i H H impossible to consider the scheme a’ art from its political influence. It would Ivan error of the first order to make any change in the distribution of British men-o’-war which would give rise to the behel on the Continent that we are tiring 01 the competition in naval armaments, because nothing would lie more calculated to encourage a recrudescence of shipbuilder activity abroad. On the (fiber hand, B would he no less an error if, in a spirit of amour propre. Hie nation endeavourr to prevent the Admiralty making such strategic disposition of our naval strength as is, in the judgments of the Sea Lords, best suited to the situation.