JURIES AND COSTS.

Wairarapa Daily Times, Volume LXV, Issue 11786, 24 September 1913, Page 4

JURIES AND COSTS.

The circumstance that the Supreme Court sessions are at present being held in Mastertou lends seasonable interest to a discussion which has recently been proceeding in England upon the virtues and defects of the jury system. A month or two ago a special committee under the presidency of Lord Mersey, which had been set up by the Government to report upon the law and practice of the jury system, presented its report, a very lengthy document running into some hundreds of clauses, and embodying a whole series of recommendations. This gave rise to a newspaper correspondence covering the whole subject, but undoubtedly one of the most interesting and, at the same time, most important of the various topics raised from a public point of view was that of the relation of juries to the question of the costs in the actions which they are empanelled to try. There is always a disposition on the part of juries to concern themselves with matters which they ought not to take into consideration at all in arriving at their verdicts, and nothing is more common in the jury room than a discussion as to the effect which U verdict may have upon the costs. The question of costs has nothing whatever to do with the jury, and it is improper that they should allow their verdict to be influenced in any way by that question. Nevertheless," they often do so, and it is interesting, therefore, to note the juryman's point of view as stated in a letter to "The Times," printed by that paper on July 31st. The writer — a Mr Adams —said: —

"I quite understand that the determination as to costs does not rest with the jury, and that the Court may properly resent any trivial intrusion upon tho rights of the Judge; but surely, Sir, the object of both Judge and jury should be to ensure justice to litigants whoso cases are brought before them, and I venture to say that when a jury return to Court before giving their verdict to ask for guidance at least they might bo helped by the Judge in this matter. The cause to which I refer was a breach of promise, to marry, and the jury elected me their foreman, so I have reason to remember details. The jury on the merits of the evidence unanimously thought the defendant ought to pay from £30 to £40, taking into account His financial position, and that at worst he had only behaved foolishly, but to add to such a su i the cost of the action would have been an excessive penalty. We therefore came back into the Court to explain to the Judge our view, and to enquire if a farthing damages would under the* circumstances carry the costs, as if so the jury thought the gentleman would be adequately punished. The only reply vouchsafed by the Judge was to the effect that we "must"confine ourselves to our proper sphere, and not meddle with higher

concerns. We therefore returned, a verdict of a farthing damages, but whether the defendant got off scot-free or not wo never know. Why not?"

This line of argument elicited a reply from a well-known, firm o£ London solicitors which clearly showed its fallacy:—

'-•••' Mr Adams' letter,'' they saidj '' is noteworthy as illustrating the injustice which may be done by juries taking into consideration the question of costs in their deliberations upon , '"a verdict. Lti Mr Adams' case he was foreman of a, jury in an action for breach of promise of marriage, in which the jury unanimously thought that the defendant ought to pay from £30 to £40. Apparently, however, they did not wish him in addition to pay the costs, and therefore returned a verdict for a farthing damages, after having been instructed by the Judge that the question of costs was not for them. By their adopting this course the unfortunato plaintiff lost the damages to which she was entitled, and possibly was also deprived of the costs on the ground of the iarthing verdict. Supposing a jury were to have any voice in the question of costs, in the case in point they might have found a verdict for £40, exclusive of costs, and the plaintiff have been , considerably out of pocket after obtaining a verdict for a comparatively substantial amount.''

This reply clinches the matter, and shows very clearly the danger involved in the tendency of juries to meddle with matters which do not concern them. It is the business of a jury to deal with the facts presented to them, and that of the Judge to determine the costs of the trial. The province of either is well defined, and, as "The Times" remarks in an article on the subject, '' things are apt to go wrong when there is any tendency on the part of the former to' deal with matters belonging to the latter or to shape their verdict in any way with reference to costs. They cease to give their minds exclusively to the question whether the plaintiff was assaulted or defamed, whether he was seriously injured, or whether he only nominally suffered, if'they are thinking of the lawyers' bills or are speculating as to the verdict which will, or will not, curry costs," and to that extent are not discharging the duty for which they were empanelled. The warning is one which is not unnecessary in New Zealand.