THE WORLD’S PEACE.

Waimate Daily Advertiser, Volume XXIII, 25 May 1922, Page 2

THE WORLD’S PEACE.

MR LLOYD GEORGE S 1919 MEMORANDUM.

A few weeks ago mention was mi.de in the cable news of a memorandum presented' by Mr Lloyd George to (he Peace Conference at Versailles on March 25th, 1919. This memorandum was first made pulic in Signor Nitti’s book, “Peaceless Europe.” Except the few lines quoted in the cable messages, no part of this document has yet been printed in New Zealand, and we expect the following extracts from the memorandum will be read with interest at this juncture:—

What is difficult is to draw up a

peace which will net provoke a fresh struggle. The peace of 1871 was believed by Germany to ensure not only her security, but her permanent supremacy. The facts have shown exactly the contrary. France itself has demonstrated that those who say you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hit back are utterly wrong. You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force, and her navy to that of a fifth-rate Power; all the same, in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. I am therefore strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of small States, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable Government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamoring for reunion with their native land.

I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that, as far as is humanly possible, the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications, which can usually be adjusted by other means. Secondly, I would say that the duration for the payments of reparation ought to disappear, if possible, with the generation which made the war.

But there is a consideration if i favor of a long-sighted peace which influences me even more than the desire to leave no cause justifying a fresh outbreak 30 years hence. . . The extreme figures of the Terror are still in command in Russia. The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep senae not only of discontent but of anger and revolt among the workmen against prewar conditions. The whole existing order in its political, social, and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other. The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with: Bolshevism, and place her resources, her brains, her vast- organising power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the werld for Bolshevism by force of arms'. If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism.

I would, therefore, put it in the forefront of the peace that once she accepts. our terms, especially reparation, we will open to her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms with ourselves, 'and will do everything possible to enable the German people to get upon their legs again. We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay. Finally, we must offer terms which a responsible Government in Germany can expect to be able to carry out. If we present terms to Germany which are unjust or excessively onerous no responsible Government will sign them, certainly the present weak Administration will not. . . . We should, therefore, be driven back on the policy of blockading the country. That would inevitably mean Spartaefem from the Ural?'to the Rhine, with its inevitable consequence of a huge Red army- attempting to cross the Rhine. As a matter of fact, I am doubtful whether public opinion would allow us deliberately to starve Germany. From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me that we ought to endeavor to draw up a peace settlement as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war. This settlement ought to have three ends in yiew. First of all, it must do justice to the Allies by taking into account Germany’s responsibility for the origin of the war and for the way in which it was fought. Secondly, it must be a settlement, which a response German Government can sign in the belief that it can fulfil the obli- . itions it incurs. Thirdly, it must

be a settlement which will contain in itself no provocations for future wars, and which will! constitute an alternative to Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all 1 reasonable opinion as a fair settlement of the European problem.

It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and far-sighted peace with Germany. If we are to offer Europe an alternative to Bolshevism we must make the League of Nations into something which will be both a safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair dealing with their neighbors, and a menace to those who would trespass on the rights- of their neighbors, whether they are imperialist empires or imperialist Bolsheviks. An essential element, therefore, in the peace settlement is the constitution ®f the League of Nations as the effective guardian of international right and international liberty throughout the world.

If this, is to happen the first thing to do is that the leading members of the League of Nations should arrive at an understanding between themselves in regard to armaments. To my mind it is idle to endeavor to impose a permanent limitation of armaments upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose a limitation upon ourselves. I recognise that until Gen many has settled down and given practical proof that she has abandoned her imperialist ambitions, and until Russia had also given proof that she does not intend to embark upon a military crusade against her neighbors, it is essential that the leading members of tne League of Nations should maintain considerable forces, both by land and sea, in order to preserve liberty in the world.

But the first condition of success for the League of Nations is a firm understanding between the British Empire and the United States of America and France and Italy that there will be no competitive building up of fleets or armies between them. Unless this is arrived at before the Covenant is signed the League of Nations will be a sham and a mockery,

I should like to ask why Germany, if she accepts the terms we consider just and fair, should not be admitted! to the League of Nations, at any rate, as soon as she has established a stable and democratic Government? Would it not be an inducement to her both to sign the terms and to resist Bolshevism? Might it not be safer that she should be inside the League than that she should be outside it?

Finally, I believe that until the authority and effectiveness of the League of Nations has been demonstrated fhe British Empire and the United States ought to give France a guarantee against the possibility of a new German aggression. If, however, the Peace Conference is really a secure peace and proves to the world a complete plan of settlement which ail reasonable men will recognise as an alternative preferable to anarchy, it must deal with the Russian situation. Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the States on Russia’s borders. It- threatens the whole of Asia, and is as near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think that the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace it may have arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as it is to-day. I do not propose, however, complicate the question of the peace with Germany by introducing a discussion of the Russian problem. I mention it simply in order to remind ourselves of the importance of dealing with it as soon as possible.