WAR OR PEACE IN EUROPE.

West Coast Times, Issue 907, 19 August 1868, Page 4

WAR OR PEACE IN EUROPE.

(fhom the Tiair.s, may 22.) The debate in the French Legislative Body on the commercial policy of the Empire was closed on Tuesday- last, after a long and able speech by M. Eouber, in which he triumphantly disposed of the statements made by the Protectionist Deputies, and showed the signal advantages reaped by France from those liberal treaties with England and other States which marked the first steps in the direction of Free Trade. The discussion, which originally turned on purely economical subjects, could not, however, fail to be diverted to matters of general political importance, and in these the Government had not so easy a victory as they obtained in demolishing their adversaries' statistics. Indeed, there was one point to which some of the orators of the Opposition had stronglyadvcrted, andto which M. Rouber did not vouchsafe even a passing allusion, though doubtless, it is there that the general interest centres, and that is the question of Peace and War. There is distress in Franco, it is universally admitted — distress in a country endowed most liberally with tho best gifts of nature, and with all the skill and energy required to turn such blessings to profitable purposes. What, then, are the causes of distress ? As many have been alleged as there were orators heard in the Assembly; some pointed to tho unprotected state of native industry ; some complained of the moral cowardice which would not venture more than half-way upon the path of commercial reform ; some were clamorous for the abolition of Treaties ; others limited their demands to a revision of tho Customs' tariffs. All, however, more or less explicitly, concurred in M. Emile Ollivier's conclusion, that " tho real motive of the crises must be sought in the apprehension of war, and in the absence -of security resulting from it for the whole world." There is upon this point no divergence of opinion between Protectionists and Free-traders, no essential difference between the supporters and the opponents of the Imperial Government — nay, no real dissension between the partisans of war and the advocates of reace themselves. The dissatisfaction is just as strong among tho friends of Marshal Niel as among those of M. Bouher ; for the real evil is uncertainty — an evil equally pressing on hope and fear, upsetting the plans and baffling the calculations of all parties, throwing trouble and division among the very members of the Imperial Cabinet. Independently of Generals longing for a Marshal's baton, and Marshals eager for their promotion to a Dukedom, we have no doubt there exist men in Franco who conscientiously look upon a war as a necessity; politicians who think their country has au affair of honor to settle with Prussia, and that France c nnot surrender the supremacy she arrogates among nations without being called upon to make good her position by an immediate appeal to arms. Js the Emperor bent upon humoring these adventurous advisers, or does he think, with other men, that war would be as great a blunder as it would be a crime ? There might be policy in giving the rein to martial ardor ; there might be wisdom in listening to moderate counsels. The error lies in a perpetual oscillation between the two. Hesitation between conflicting principles deprived the Emperor of his ascendancy at Rome. Indecision as to war or disarmament is taking from him the ascendancy over his own Cabinet. We know full well that the Emperor Napoleon has no wish for war ; that he has every possible reason to shun it; that the most complete victory could bring no gain either to himself or his dynasty ; that a disaster, however slight, might overwhelm both in irreparable ruin. But what avails his goodwill, or tho faith that some men may have in it ? Who can feel sure there are not agencies at work about him stronger than all his lesolution? His voice, it' would be vain to deny it, has lost some of its authority. All his declarations that he wishes for peace, and that* nothing threatens the world's tranquillity, fall flat among a people who seventeen years received the Bordeaux Proclamation as a pledge of Providence. The Emperor speaks, and his assurances do not raise the public funds by a single centime. The truth is that words cannot withstand the shock of stubborn facts. " With such a military establishment as France keeps up," observes M, Emjje Ollmer, "it is

impossible to diivc. from the people's mind the suspicion of some secret design of war." There is no question of the Sovereign's veracity, or of the uprightness of his intentions. The doubt does not arise as to his will, but as to his power. What remains to bo decided is whether the issues of peace or war lie in his hauds or in those of his marshals. However much tho Emperor's mind iray allow itself to be swayed by other minds, the actual declaration of hostilities must come from his lips, and, os we have said,, it seems impossible that he can so far forget what he owes to himself as to venture on the cast of such a terrible die. But he plays with edged tools to very desperate extremes ; he hovers with unspeakable rashness on the brink of the precipice. He should no forget how frequently, of late, he has allowed events to outstrip him. He should bear in mind that neither was Mentaua fought nor M. Rouher's " Never " spoken at his spontaneous suggestion* It is possible that his indecision may for a long time spare France the worst extremities of actual warfare. Indeed, it is by no means unlikely ihat war may be put off till it; be ultimately prevented by the utter exhaustion of the country. But we do not see what thanks France will owe her master for a policy which may render war impossible by the exaggeration of warlike preparations. It is rather an expensive way of following the old maxim, '• to insure peace by making ready for war." Without a disarmament, and on a very large scale, it is impossible for the Emperor to revive public confidence — impossible to bring into light the millions in gold buried in the Bank of France — impossible to engage capital in any venture in which the future is to be taken into account. And it would be vain for France to hope to wear out her adversaries. Prussia, also, it is true, is playing at soldiers at a very heavy cost. Her military budget has been doubled, though her population has only increased by onefourth, and, while she till lately boasted of a yearly surplus, she has now been brought into faniilar acquaintance with deficits. But Prussia's extravagance dates from a late period. She only armod for Sadowa,and she would have been disarmed on the very morrow after Sadowa. Nothing but the threats and denunciations of France, nothing but the infirmity of purpose of the Emperor Napoleon, prevents even now the return of Prussia to her original system of a small army with extensive reserves. But on whichever side may lie the blame, the sin brings its own punishment; whichever may have the stait, both countries are running the same race on the road to ruin, and it can be little satisfaction for either to know that the other is not much better off than itself. They are in the condition of two mortal enemies both embarked on a sinking ship, watching one another as they sit at the two opposite ends of the vessel, wondering whether it is by the head or by the stern that she will first go down, wondering which of them may have to rejoice at the other's fate, fully aware that the same fate awaits the survivor.