Germany's Great Problem: To Arm Or Not To Arm?

Wanganui Chronicle, 4 November 1950, Page 5

Germany's Great Problem: To

Arm Or Not To Arm?

An Explosive Issue Which Is Causing Split Among The People

. LONDON, Nov. 3 (Re<>. 6 pm).—The explosive issue of German rearmament is now coming to the fore again, only five years after the Second World War ami is threatening a major split among the people of West Germany, reports Reuter, from Frankfurt.

A growing body of public' opinion seems prepared to accept the full implications of a German contribution to West European defence against feared Soviet aggression. But a powerful minority want nothing to do with new armies and new wars, in any circumstances. The people in West Germany are between two fires. A desire to see Russia beaten and humiliated, in revenge for the complete defeat inflicted on the Nazi armies, infects most Gorman minds; but the evidence of what war means still stands everywhere, a forbidding warning. Today, the Wes* Orman Right Wing Coalition Government, led by Ur. Adenauer, the Chancellor, backed by strong American support, are in effect campaigning to prepare German public opinion Io accept a German armed contribution to West European tlefeme. Dr. Adenaur is believed to be ready to accept an American suggestion for about 10 German divisions. Dr. Schumacher, leader of the

powerful Opposition SodTal Democratic Party, wants new general elections to the Bundcrsiag before any decisions are taken on the rearmament issue. He has issued repeated warnings that the Socialists oppose remilitarisation unless Western Powers give West Germany full equality and international sovereignty and accept the same “risks” as Germany. Carlo Schmid, Ihp Socialist DeputyPresident of the Bundestag, made the Social Democrat, position dear when he told a recent meeting at Munich: “About 200 Russian divisions are faced by about 15 West European divisions. Should we agree to contribute another six or eight we might, perhaps, succeed in delaying the Russian arrival on ihe Atlantic coast, for two weeks. We prefer uninjured people being Bolshcvised, in undamaged homes to their living as cripples in bomb-holes under ruins. There is only one way out. The United States must concentrate her greatest possible power in Europe—half-way measures will not guarantee half protection, but will result in ten-fold destruction.'*