The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1950. KOREA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Wanganui Chronicle, 6 September 1950, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1950. KOREA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

has presented the world with implications difficult to assess. It can l»? taken for granted that, given the necessary time, the United Nations forces will build to a strength sufficient to drive the invaders back to where they came from. But the kernel of the whole problem of Korea lies in what happens after that. At the beginning of the campaign it was expected that the United Nations would find the task of holding the invaders a stiff one. and that time had to be made to enable a sufficiently strong force to be mobilised and sent into action. Something of the magnitude of raising such a force is emphasised by noting how long it takes New Zealand to mobilise, train and equip a relatively small unit to the standard necessary for such a mission. It is easy to say mobilise, but it is not possible to accomplish that in a day. There are signs now that the United Nations’ strength is mobilising at great tempo and that in due course an attack will be launched that is to dear South Korea of its invaders. Confronted by that rather obvious outlook, what has been the reaction of the forces behind the North Koreans? What would be the reaction of the Western Nations were they to see their own bridgeheads crumbling? The Western world may take it for granted that in the Kremlin all the possibilities and probabilities have been well studied. What stands out dearly at the moment is that unless the North Korean forces can dear the United Nations out of Korea before the end of this month their task of accomplishing that, or of holding them at bay in their surge north, will have gone. So it can be expected that within the next week or so, some sign will be given as to what attitude those sponsoring the North'will adopt. If they keep on attacking as they have been doing, and are held from their objective, they can reasonably expect to lose their initiative and be pushed back. What then? A battle lost against the West! Will that be allowed to pass unnoticed in those quarters where opposition to the West is paramount? Supposing, also, that the United Nations, once they force the invader back beyond the 38th parallel, go beyond that line, what will be the reaction in the East? With China poised for war—battalion upon battalion—the atmosphere round Korea is not only “sticky” in the sense that the soldier understands the word “sticky,” it is “sticky” politically and internationally. One false move on the part of the West, one step along a road that can be interpreted as a step towards “aggression” and the excuse, if excuse is needed, is provided for the East to flare into war. That may have to come in time. It is to be hoped not, and that within the walls of diplomacy and justice, across the tables of mediation and discussion, wise counsels will prevail. If they fail, the result will be inevitable! If they fail tomorrow the West will find the task of meeting the problem difficult ; but there is the saving grace that if they fail when sufficient strength has been mobilised to meet whatever onslaught may come, and no matter where it comes, then the West will have achieved the purpose behind its present rearmament scheme. Twice before in history the West has been placed in a position of being green in the ways of war when a ripened force struck- with sickening thoroughness. Korea is the focal point at the moment, but what is happening there is perhaps not quite so important as what will happen after Korea has become a rather bitter memory. Will the West be ready; or should it be put this way: “Has the West the will to be leady ”