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The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1950. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

qJENERAL MacArthur’s statement stressing the importance of retaining Formosa against the Communist forces in China for the sake of strengthening American national defensives has been the subject of a reprimand from the President. He in his turn has not wished to magnify the incident although he has told the General to withdraw his statement. The instruction is Gilbcrtian. for the spoken word can never be recalled. The world knows what MacArthur thinks concerning Formosa, its importance in the Pacific area defence of the United States of America, and its potentiality for dangerous adventure by those who are so minded. Why then has the President asked for a withdrawal of the statement’ Asking for the impossible has never been good politics. The basis for the Presidential objection seems to lie in the fact that MacArthur has stressed the defence benefit tn the Fnited States instead of playing up the need of the United Nations. He has pulled the wrong stop out of the organ. Put did it need MacArthur to point out that Formosa is like a wedge thrust into an are? Obviously not; for that simple fact is patent to anyone who will look at the map of Asia. Formosa is not part of China. The Formosans have maintained their isolation for centuries and both ethnically and politically they arc not akin to the Chinese. The Chinese are present in large numbers in Formosa, but that country remains an island off-continent. It is for that geographical reason that it it potentially dangerous. The United States of America is a peace-loving nation. Indeed, it seems to be capable of engaging in war only with the greatest difficulty. It is a member, indeed today it is the chief member. o. f the United Nations Organisations, nnd it has just as much right as any other nation to engage in defensive action of an anticipatory kind. -There is no reason why a peace-seeking nation should be compelled to stand immobile wliile a predatory nation crouches prior to making its spring for the kill. The thesis that the aggressor nation must have the whole of the initiative in a prebellum period is unsound and unacceptable. The householder may not be accused of provoking the burglarious classes simply because he bolts his front door and instals an alarm system on his window frames. The holding of Formosa by the United States at the present time does not constitute any menace to the Communist Government of the Kremlin, nor does it constitute any inconvenience to the Communist regime at Peking. The holding of this terrain is not an act of aggression. The very fact that in a time when any Chinese Government should be completely absorbed in organising the internal economy of the country to avoid the recurrence of famines and flood and when, as in the past, great aid could reach China from the United States, Formosa, becomes a bone of contention and raises the presumption that the apprehensions of MacArthur are justified. . The setting alight of China and the thrusting of her millions against the West has been the dream of adventurous minds for a long time. Could these masses of people struggling to sustain themselves in an overcrowded land be moved they would constitute a grave menace to other communities, but as Napoleon averred, an armv marches on its stomach. It is the inability to feed a mass of men when they are removed from their own food providing occupations which anchors down the vast masses of Asia. Further, there is no particular unity among Asiatics as is io be seen in the condition of India today. . . ~ .„ MacArthur’s visualising of the defence problem m the Pacific is of a comprehensive kind. He evidently has in mind that a global war cannot be waged by a group of nations that has previously been denied the resources of a considerable portion of the world’ To secure control of Indonesia and of Malaya would give to the Communist adventurers a large supply field which has been equipped bv the West and brought to a high stage of produetnity. This field would supply rubber, tin, rice, and hardwoods as well as oil South East Asia is also rich in those rare metals that are in demand for modern high-speed moving machinery parts and would aid the war potential of the adventurers to a considerable degree Not onlv that, it would make more difficult for the American forces 'to establish a base on the Asiatic side of the Pacific should a shooting war start on a large scale It will be remembered that the direct bridge across the Pacific by way ot Guam Island was destroyed by the Japanese m the recent vai and that compelled MacArthur to move by way of the second brid e across the Pacific, which included Samoa and Guadalcanal. Had that bridge also gone the task of carrying the war to the enemy territory would have been very, very difficult indeed Austral a and New Zealand would then have been brought into the fiun„ line The holding of Formosa gainst the Communists docs much to ensure the maintenance of a Pacific Bridge of a dneet kind The foregoing considerations must be present in the mind o anv studeni of the situation in the Pacific today. The Presidential ’ nt-' Mae Arthur has therefore, an air of futility about it. Thathis censurfi should have been seized upon by the Re a a campaign point for the forthcommg elections is doubly u - today divided™ STmoS’ff Bnn peopled any adventure is likely to prove to be an easy task.

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Bibliographic details

Wanganui Chronicle, 1 September 1950, Page 4

Word Count
943

The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1950. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA Wanganui Chronicle, 1 September 1950, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1950. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA Wanganui Chronicle, 1 September 1950, Page 4