WAVELL’S REPORT ON WAR IN PACIFIC

Wanganui Chronicle, 25 February 1948, Page 5

WAVELL’S REPORT ON WAR IN PACIFIC

JAPANESE MOVED TOO FAST (N.Z. P. A. —Reuter—Copyright.) London, Feb. 23 “The main reason for the British •ailure in Malaya was that our enemies moved too quickly on a simple effective plan and never gave us time to collect our forces necessary to remedy our initial weakness," said Field-Mar-shal Lord Wavell in a dispatch published by His Majesty’s Stationery Office today as a booklet in which he tells of 41 days, six years ago when he was supreme- commander of the A.B.D.A. (American, British, Dutch and Australian) area in the SouthvVest Pacific. Written in August, 1942 six months after Field-Marshal Wavell’s command ended—the dispatch is now published two days before the date set for the publication of the dispatch by Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival on the Malaya campaign. AIR A VITAL FACTOR Field-Marshal Wavell said air was a vital factor, though the effect of enemy superiority on land operations, apart from the moral effect, was greatly exaggerated. As the result of a number ot factors, the Allied air force instead of increasing In strength, "wasted with gradually increasing intensity and was finally completely destroyed.” Land reinforcements arrived too late to save the situation. Field-Marshal Wavell was the final arbiter of strategy for the Malaya campaign from the date his headquarters began to operate on January 15 until Singapore fell exactly a month later. It is clear he gave his instructions to Lieut-General Percival to fight on as long as it was physically possible, so as to gain time for his own plans which included a counterstroke in Malaya as soon as he could muster sufficient resources.