Enemy Tanks Superior To The British

Wanganui Chronicle, 17 January 1948, Page 5

Enemy Tanks Superior To The British

MORE OF AUCHINLECK’S STORY OF THE DESERT Special N.Z.P.A. Correspondent i Recd. 6 p.m. London, Jan. 16 J General Sir Claude Auchin-, leek, Commander of the British ' forces in North Africa from November, 1941, to August, 1942, in • his despatches, makes frequent • references to the superiority of ( German armour and to the les-; sons both in tank warfare and design which this superiority imposed on the British forces during the desert fighting in November and December, 1941. Referring to battles round Tobruk,l he says: '’Judging by the results it, was obvious that not only were all our tanks outgunned by the German ! cruiser tanks, but that our tanks were mechanically inferior under battle conditions. Though American light tanks, as fighting machines, could not compare with our own or the German medium tanks, they were mechanically far more reliable than the British medium tanks. The inferior armament and mechanical unreliability of our tanks was aggravated by our great shortage of antitank weapons compared with the Germans.”

Dealing with British tank tactics at this stage in the war, General Auchinleck says: “It also was ob-

vious that the standard of leadership and tactical handling of our armoured forces must be improved. Our tank tactics were inferior to those of the Germans because we failed adequately to co-ordinate the i action of tanks, infantry and artilI lery on the battlefield. The three arms must associate much more conI tinuously and closely in training and l in battle." , General Auchinleck also pays trib- ■ ute to a section of Italian armour. “The Italian Mark 13 tanks which, as the result of experiences in the : previous campaign, we had been ini clined to dismiss as valueless, fought well, and had an appreciable effect on the battle,” he wrote. “There is I little doubt the presence of German i troops had stiffened the Italian morale.” Summarising his impressions of this stage of the desert warfare, General Auchinleck concludes: “In the open desert country of Cyre- | naica superiority in armour in my opinion is essential to any offensive. ITo achieve this we needed at least ' half as many tanks again as the ’ enemy, taking Into account the relai tive efficiency of the German tanks and our own. Over and above that we needed a reserve equal to at least 25 per cent, of the number deployed with the units.”