The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1947. THE SUEZ CANAL

Wanganui Chronicle, 3 October 1947, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1947. THE SUEZ CANAL

■pHE British withdrawal from Egypt was undertaken with the object of appeasing Nationalist sentiment in Egypt. Objection was taken to the presence of British troops in Cairo. The retention of troops in the Canal Zone was in accordance with the 1936 AngloEgyptian treaty and did not constitute occupation. But Egyptian sentiment seems to be still aiiti-British and the memories of the Mussolini danger which then made the 1936 treaty so attractive to the Egyptians is being looked upon as something to be got rid of as soon as possible. Egyptians want to forget Mussclini and to disremember the services Britain has rendered to their country. On the western side of the Canal Zone there is no support for Britain.

Now that Britain has determined to give up the mandate to Palestine British influence on the eastern side of the Suez Canal will be weakened and it may disappear altogether. All Britain has got out of the effort to bring about law and order in the Middle East is to become a. unpopular as a creditor who has compounded a debt. He suffers loss and gets no thanks. With no satisfactory backing or support for Britain on either side of the Canal what is going to be the future of that important waterway. The Egyptian Government will be charged with the task of keeping it open. It can be expected to call upon any likely helper' if aggression lowers over the land of the Pharoahs, but will the Egyptian Army be sufficiently strong and technically able to undertake the task in any case under any circumstances? The probability is that it will not be.

If the British Commonwealth is to be called upon for the third time within living memory to defend the Canal zone it is more than likely that it will have to fend off a sudden attack, but it will be denied the opportunities for making appropriate preparations for the task. This handicap gives to any attacker a considerable measure of advantage. Under the possible conditions here envisaged what is likely to happen to the Canal as an international waterway? Will.it go out of commission for a time? If so, what then will be the situation facing Australia and New Zealand? India may not provide ports of call in the next war. Ceylon may not be available as a seat of naval and military operations. Added to these adverse factors the Canal may be closed at least temporarily and possibly permanently during the conflict. Should the Eastern Mediterranean again become an important scene of conflict the loss of a means of entry by the eastern route will be a serious handicap to any British effort in Southern Europe, in the Levant or in North Africa. The whole situation has changed so radically that there is reason for believing that Britain would have to forsake altogether turning towards the east and concentrate her attention upon the west. It will bs remembered that prior to Japan entering the war she endeavoured to send through the Panama Canal ships laden with cement. There is no need to guess what would have happened aad they been permitted to enter the Canal. They would have been sunk in the various locks thereby putting the Canal out of commission before the blow was delivered against the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour. In any futur world war the attacks upon the Panama and Suez Canals would be launched immediately. The United States is fortunately ensuring control over the Panama, but it is questionable whether any form of defence can yet be claimed to be in being to-day for the defence of the Suez route. The new situation is certainly disquieting for Australia and New Zealand.