The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 1941 THE UNPREDICTABLE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 88, Issue 59, 10 March 1944, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 1941 THE UNPREDICTABLE

JT was held in military circles before the Japanese came into the present war that when their military machine was going forward it was good, but that when it was compelled to go into reverse it would reveal its inherent weaknesses. As yet this has not been proved, (hi the whole, however, the chances are the near future will establish the truth of this belief. The belief grew up as a result of the Japanese relying upon forward planning down to small details. Plans must in their nature have co-ordinated parts, and until one unit has fulfilled its task the others cannot undertake theirs. This point needs no elaboration. It follows then that in a closely planned campaign each commander must conform to the schedule, otherwise he will throw the whole machine out of gear. Herein lies the reason for the persistence in attack against, overwhelming odds and despite heavy casualties which has marked many Japanese actions. \\ hen a holding campaign is called for each commander must of necessity have the right to meet conditions as they arise; but as instructions are given downward from the High Command they become more and still more rigid. The flexibility which is essential to modern defence can only be attained by leaving the individual commanders comparatively free to exercise their initiative. When a defensive plan breaks down, as break it must at given points, the defenders must make the'best of a deteriorating situation and no previous planning, except concerted withdrawal, is of any avail. I’he Japanese have been vacillating between a purely stand-pat policy and a general withdrawal. The result has been, in company with the over-organising of the defence, an incomprehensible line of battle conduct pursued by the enemy, resulting in his future conduct in the battle area being unpredictable. The Japanese does not think along different lines from Europeans, nor has he a logic of his own. His difficulty lies in this war in not being in a condition to move from one plan to another. His organisation is too centralised, which, while advantageous against a -very weak foe, is a heavy burden against one that has the upper hand, at least m some respects. M hen the Japanese moved southward they did so with commendable efficiency but against a weak opposition. To-day they lad to pursue advantages, they fail to avoid difficulties and they refuse to cut their losses when further losses are to be suffered without any advantage being gained. This does not make an impressive picture, and as this occurs when the attack has not been launched on a large scale Premier To,jo has a right to be concerned about the results that will follow when the Japanese have to face advances in Burma, in China and in the Pacific Islands nearer the mainland, say the Philippines. It has been said that the Japanese have not put their best troops into the extended fighting area, reserving the pick of the aimy for Manchuria. But while these troops are committed to that aiea fhey cannot be used elsewhere, and they are not sufficient to withstand the Allies fighting on all fronts. It is, therefore, improbable that the best troops will be used as stiffening to the ordinary run of conscript troops that are opposed to the Americans and the British in the South-western Pacific. It is a fair assumption that, as the pressure increases on the Japanese extended periphery, their conduct will be< •onie even more unpredictable than it is at the present time. When the military machine goes into reverse instructions from headquarters may not be available, and even though they are, the absence of precise co-ordination will put the movements out of gear. Unless the Japanese display greater individual initiative in the field, as hitherto they have not done—whieli is something quite apart from individual bravery—the test of the Japanese army under defeat is likely to be a severe one. It will also be a new experience for the Japanese soldiery and it has yet to be discovered how thev will act under this new’ kind of strain.

The Japanese have shown a willingness on occasions to fight to the death. They have also shown an unwillingness to allow themselves to be rescued from the sea to be taken prisoner On other occasions they have sought to surrender and they have also shown a strong desire to continue to live. As the standard of the soldiery goes down, as go down it must, the decline is likely to be steep, not because of the lac-k of individual courage hut because of the general ineptitude of the present class to handle machinery and, mechanised fools such as machine-guns. To the foregoing (actors must be added the differences that always exist between the aims of the army and of the navy. Under stress the present, lack of e.o-operation must be expected to be an increasingly hampering factor to both services. There are also likely to he wider differences of opinion concerning the general policy which should be followed, and these divergent opinions will be expressed not in debate hut in hidden feuds. These hidden feuds go on in all armies and navies, hut there is in parliament a governor Io keep the balance. Tn dictator countries the dictator’s advisers decide the issue, and in Japan the Emperor is a nonentity in any ease, winch means that there is no personality capable of acting as the governor in the absence of parliamentary institutions.