The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1944. THE KIEV SALIENT

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 88, Issue 5, 7 January 1944, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1944. THE KIEV SALIENT

Russians have turned what was a bulge in their own front into a salient in the front of their opponents. In itself, this is an achievement, for the Kiev sector is of first-rate importance to the whole of the German campaign in the east. It isstill impossible Io assess the value of recent successes, for the Russians have accomplished the most important of all tasks, they have disintegrated the enemy's line. The Germans were on the defensive in the Kiev salient. True, they mounted an offensive which drove back the Russians for a time. Theit object was not to go over to the offensive, in a general way, but. to stay the forward movement of their opponents. This they hoped to do by disorganising his frontal establishments. Their method was to throw in large numbers of tanks on a short front in the hope of making a break-through and following this up by cutting the cordon of supplies and communications. In this determined effort they failed because the Russians were able to counter each lank attack with adequate tire-power from fast-moving field artillery. This, in itself, is no small achievement in organisation. The fire-power being present, on the front where the Germans were exhausted by their attack efforts, it was natural for General Vatutin to go over to the offensive. The capture of Korosten gave Vatutin freedom of movement in that his right eotdd rest upon the Privet Marshes which was, and is, as good as resting upon a sea coast. He could then develop a swinging movement to the south with Korosten as a pivotal point. This he did by taking Zhitomir and then concentrating upon the segment of the enemy’s front, which lay between these two points. The drive is now proceeding in the direction of Sarny, which means that the Germans arc being pushed off the side of the Pripet Marshes. The campaign to the south has two main features which merit notice: it is the unwillingness of the Russians to make direct assaults upon the German prepared positions on the Dnieper Hcnd except at important places like Cherkasy and Kremenchug and Krovoi Rog, where important gains have been made in that the enemy’s lines of communications are interfered with at important railway centres, and the evident determination of Vatutin to cross the Bug as he crossed the Dnieper, namely, near to its source where it does not present a major obstacle. Probably the Dniester River will be treated in the same manner. The advantages of the Russian campaign are obvious: they represent an avoidance of heavy losses in frontal attacks on wide rivers and if the wide enfolding movement proceeds as it now promises, the Germans within the Dnieper Bend will either have to retreat into the Balkan Peninsula—with disastrous effects on the political situation from the German standpoint—or they will have to accept battle under the most unfavourable of terms—that is when they are surrounded. The Germans realise that their position in the east has deteriorated. and they have admitted that the same development has occurred in the Balkans. Even though they had not sent more troops into the Peninsula they have been compelled to meet an increasing challenge from the Yugoslavs. The success of these forces and the inability of the Germans to put. down this danger has led to the latest developments in Bulgaria. This outbreak, following so closely upon the Turkish declaration that the Turks will fight when the lime comes, if need be, points to the two events being connected. Can the Germans mount an offensive against the Russians’ Unless they are willing to accept, a major defeat in this eastern area and to see'their hold on the Balkans dissolve they must mount an offensive, cost whatsoever it may. With a lively anticipation of events to come to them from the west they may be very unhappy about sending reserve divisions away from the Western to the Eastern Wall. The probability is, however, that they intend to run this risk. The fact that they are so assiduously publicising their belief that the Western frontal attack will come within the next fortnight points 1o their taking the gamble on mounting an eastern offensive. They would reason that if they publicise that they expect the invasion in the west in the course of the next fortnight it will be delayed in order to avoid their own anticipations being fulfilled. In the northern sector further developments are to be expected in the near future, for the Russians have consistently followed any major movement in the south with a drive in the northerly sectors. The reverse course has also been followed when occasion offered. If the invasion effort is launched in Western Europe in the very near future it, will in all probability be preluded by twin attacks on the Eastern Front and those attacks will probably be maintained until the western attack is in actual operation.