The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1943. MEDITERRANEAN WARFARE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 65, 19 March 1943, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1943. MEDITERRANEAN WARFARE

THE Germans desire to maintain a spoiling hold on the Mediterranean and to this end are maintaining their armies in Tunisia. While these armies are in being the Axis air power on the narrow passage between Tunisia and Sicily acts as a cordon around the centre of the inland sea, preventing the Allies from freedom of action on east-and-west lines. ’When the Tunisian campaign is ended it will be possible for the Allies to move their ships more freely between Suez and Gibraltar, because the danger from air attacks will be greatly reduced. The Germans realise that the time is fast approaching when they will be unable to dominate tlie Sicilian Strait and that then, the role of the Axis Navy will differ from its present one of inactivity. It must then be used as a raiding force, particularly during the period when the hold on Sicily is maintained. The Germans have therefore moved to secure control of the Italian Navy with the object, no doubt, of being ready to pursue an offensive role, the Italian Navy by itself not having the will to tight. The dominant sentiment of the Italian Navy is favourable to the British and unfavourable to the Germans, and on previous occasions when the Germans have sought to second officers to the Italian Navy the efforts had to be abandoned because the Italians displayed too much overt resentment for good naval discipline to be maintained. ’ Whether the seconding of German officers to the Italian Navy will prove to be successful under the pressure of prospective disaster remains to be seen. The probability is that the results will be negative, to a degree at any rate.

In the meantime the Italian Grand Fleet is immobilised and is hampered by the preoccupation of its destroyers in convoy duties. The armies in Tunisia are in need of supplies, and while it is possible to send ships across the Sicilian Strait with these supplies it is still necessary to have them escorted by destroyers. These are being attacked regularly by the Allied air forces and their numbers are being reduced. New launchings may not be sufficient to replace the losses. All that can be said at the moment is that the present escort preoccupation of the destroyers prevents the fleet from active operations. German destroyers have been reported at southern French ports on the Atlantic coast, and this may indicate that the Germans find it necessary to transfer some of their strength to the Mediterranean to stiffen up the Italian Navy for action. It should also be expected that the Germans will rail destroyer parts to Trieste and assemble them there for use in the Adriatic. With this possibility in view it is essential for the Allies to deny to the enemy the effective use of seaports in southern Italy. The active bombing of these ports from Naples southward must, therefore, be part of the Allied plan of action in the immediate future. If these ports are put out of action, then the enemy destroyers will be placed under handicap when acting as escorts to the Italian capital ships. What is the role which the Axis may be expected to require of its fleet? Obviously it is to hamper an Allied landing in Sicily or in southern Europe. It is improbable that the Axis would risk the employment? of its fleet in a major engagement in the Sicilian Strait: the conflict here will be waged chiefly by the enemy air force, which will be opposed by the Allied opposite number. Should Sicily be occupied by the American and British troops, then the Strait of Messina would become unhealthy for the employment of the Italian Navy, and so it may be assumed that the Germans will use their influence to bring the Italian Navy to Genoa or Trieste, whichever suits their strategy best. This will depend upon circumstances which will be dictated by the larger strategy.

If the Allied campaign prospers, then the occupation of southern Italy can be envisaged. The Germans are acting upon this assumption by planning a defensive line in the north. With southern Italy in their control, the next obvious step for the Allies is to aid Yugoslavia across the Adriatic. The Italian Navy could be used in a last desperate throw here, in which case it would be unsatisfactorily placed for anything else. It would be one hit and out for keeps. The Germans, however, are anxious to prolong the war as long as possible in order to exhaust the Allied fighting strength. . With this end in view the probability is that the Italian capital ships will be removed to the western coast of Italy, there to be used as opportunity offers in conjunction with anv ships of the French Navy which can be salvaged in Marseilles"Harbour. Between Marseilles and Genoa the enemy fleet would enjoy the maximum of air protection as well as shore protection. This disposition would carry with it some disadvantages, in that the whole of the eastern Mediterranean would become an English lake facilitating a campaign in the Balkans. But the Germans are prepared to concede ground here in ease of need and have already made their dispositions to do this.

The assumption, then, is that the future of the Mediterranean warfare will be located iu the western end, and that with that end m view the Italian Grand Fleet will not be used in any theatre of war which is distant from north-western Italy.