The Wanganui Chronicle. MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1943. FOOD SUPPLY AND WAR

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 61, 15 March 1943, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1943. FOOD SUPPLY AND WAR

yiiE cupboards of the nations are part of their war power, for modern armies cannot. Jive oft' the Jami as did I lie armies of Napoleon.

The first essential of success for a nation at war is that it shall maintain its food supply. In this respect the Allies have been more fortunate than have the Axis Powers.

In the September issue of the “Monthly Review ol' the Wheat Situation,” tJie Dominion Bureau of Statistics iu Canada comments on tlie exceptionally large Nortli American wheat crop forecast for 1942 as follows :

“Great wars and record-breaking yields of wheat in Canada and the United States would, seem to have an affinity. It was during the first World War that North America staggered the agricultural world with the production of an enormous wheat crop. The year was 1915 and the United States then harvested one billion bushels of wheat—a record which still stands—while Canada’s Prairie Provinces baffled even the most experienced agriculturalists with yields per acre overshadowing anything previously on record. “History has repeated itself in the second world war. The yield of wheat per acre in both Canada and the United States in 1942 has shattered the 1915 record, which stood for 27 years, while Canada lias reached new heights in the matter of production. The two countries liave between them a wheat crop totalling 1,597,000,000 bushels, of which the United States produced 982 million and Canada 615 million bushels. The previous best for Canada was the crop of 566.7 million bushels produced ou a larger acreage in 1928, while in the United States the new crop is only some 18,000,000 bushels below the record-breaking crop of 1915. “Both countries adopted measures in 1942 designed to reduce wheat acreage and thereby limit production, whereas in 1915 the acreage curve went sharply upward as part of the programme at that time to produce more wheat. In both cases, however, the weather factor intervened heavily on the side of production and the generous and timely rains experienced during the growing season produced a yield per acre of record proportions. “Not only has North America produced more wheat in 1942 than the average production of some 26 countries in Europe (excluding Russia) during the ten years preceding the present war, but the combined carry-over of old wheat, in Canada ancj the United States exceeded one billion bushels at the opening of the 1942-43 crop year, making a total supply on this (the North American) continent of more than 2,500,000,000 bushels of wheat, a figure difficult for the layman to comprehend. “Added to the tremendous crops of coarse grains produced in North America this year, this tremendous supply removes any fear of a shortage of feeding stuffs in the carrying out of wartime livestock programmes under way in both Canada and the United States. It serves also as a stockpile from which Russia and other members of the United Nations may be furnished needed supplies of bread grain.”

Dealing with the situation in Soviet Russia the World Economic Survey states;—

“The 1941 crops in Russia are known to have been good, but comprehensive figures are tacking. Part of the crops in the invaded regions was lost, mainly owing to deliberate destruction before the ground was yielded. Part, especially in the Ukraine, was hastily harvested, and a large proportion of the livestock is stated to have been brought safely into the interior. There would not appear to have been any severe food shortage in unoccupied Soviet Russia during the 1941-42 season. With the further loss in 1942 of rich agricultural regions in the Northern Caucasus, however,. the food prospects are believed to have seriously worsened despite the fact that good crops are reported* in Southern Siberia and Central Asia where recent large-scale irrigation works have extended the productive area. In the Ukraine (occupied by the Germans) there has been starvation.” ’

Recent German retreats in the Ukraine have not yet been sufficient to permit of the granary of Russia being freed in time for the spring sowing and it is improbable that this area, even if kept clear of Germans during the current year, will be able to contribute to Russia’s wheat supply. Her other sources of supply will be helpful but will involve a heavy demand upon her transport system, which is inadequate to the demands made upon it in auy ease. It is, therefore, gratifying to know that North American supplies are available provided they can be delivered to Russia. If these supplies can be delivered at Murmansk and Archangel in the north and at Sebastopol and Odessa in the south—assuming that these important points will be captured in the not distant future—the problem of distributing North American-produced wheat to the population of European Russia would be considerably eased. It is with these economic ends in view, coupled with the denial of coal and iron to each other, that the Russo-German campaign will be waged in the months immediately ahead and anticipations concerning military strategy may, with a fair degree of assurance, be calculated on the basis of these economic factors.