JAPS WITHDRAW

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 39, 17 February 1943, Page 5

JAPS WITHDRAW

DECLINED TO GIVE BATTLE CONTACT WITH U.S. UNITS (By Telegraph—Prene Association —Copyright) (Recd. 6.30 p.m.) New York, Feb. 15. The Japanese Fleet has again declined to give battle with the United States Fleet in the South Pacific. Simply by appearing in great strength the American Navy played an important part in the final phase of the conquest of Guadalcanar. Both sides believed a great sea battle was imminent on February 8, hut the Japanese withdrew after a day of reconnaissance and feeling out operations.

This news comes from Mr. Norman Bell, Associated Press correspondent with the South Pacific Fleet. He says:

“When the captain of the ship to which I was assigned issued alert instructions the crew cheered, but the enemy was not contacted. Later, an explanatory bulletin stated that the enemy came out in force, but when he found what he was up against he withdrew, making no attempt to reinforce Guadalcanar. The frequent presence of Japanese reconnaissance planes over our task forces indicated extensive scouting prior to the enemy’s decision not to risk battle.” There is considerable speculation in naval circles as to whether any trickery lies behind the Japanese decision to withhold their strength. It is reported that the only action involving American surface units during a fortnight’s tension was a night attack by enemy aircraft on a task force near Guadalcanar on January 29. “There is a school of thought believing that every bomber, every soldier and every ton of shipping which is used in the Pacific is an unnecessary deduction from the force which ought to be used against Germany.” writes Major Feilding Eliot in the New York Herald-Tribune. He adds: “Thosw arguing this way should examine their ideas in the light of the alternative if we had to take a strict defensive in the Pacific and had stood on the Dutch Harbour-Hawaii-Panama line. We would have lost Australia and New Zealand and left the Japanese Fleet to exploit these territories. There is no doubt that the Japanese by this time would have attacked Russia, and probably India. Viewing the accomplishments in Russia and North Africa, we must remember that the immobilisation of the Japanese sea and air power in the Pacific is largely responsible for these blessings.”

Major Eliot concludes: “There is now a new opportunity for taking the offensive in the Pacific, for which vast numbers of men, ships and planes are needed. We shall hear again that these are unwarranted detachments from our strength. Let us draw our instruction from lessons of the past.”