The Wanganui Chronicle. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1943. STALINGRAD AND THE CAUCASUS

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 28, 4 February 1943, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1943. STALINGRAD AND THE CAUCASUS

QT ALINGRAD'S successful stand will go down in history as one of the greatest triumphs of Russian arms and civilian morale. For the Germans Stalingrad represents one of the major disasters in military history, brought about chiefly by the intervention of an amateur strategist, in the field of military activity. Lincoln once observed that, his best generals during the Civil War appeared to be occupying editorial chairs, and that had he listened to his Press mentors he would probably have not succeeded to the same degree as he did by giving General Grant his head. The same can be said of Castlereagh and his Parliamentary critics when the statesman backed Sir Arthur Wellesley after the latter had retreated from Portugal and laid the foundation of the success which closed the Peninsula War. Hitler, a successful politician, came to believe not only in his star but also in the voice which spoke to his inner car. He believed that his intuitive judgments were better guides to military operations than were studied decisions based on analysis of the known facts and an estimate of the probabilities by trained minds. Hitler may now believe that the odds are in favour of the trained man winning, but in the process of unlearning that luck is a dependable mentor half a million men ha,ve been lost at Stalingrad alone. This is part of the price that Germany is paying for its Fuhrer. Dictators, may be efficient up to a point, but they are expensive to an extreme degree. Stalingrad has been turned into a German graveyard, and that terrible fact cannot be hidden from German eyes. How many families have been bereaved by this action cannot be estimated even yet, but it is clear now that the sacrifices have been in vain. The German front is crumbling and the German people are being prepared for this future development. In the whole of the southern area the German troops are hastily withdrawing in the hope of being able to organise a sufficient defence to enable them to last out the winter. But the lost half a million men must be replaced by drawing on the reserves, and these can ill be spared. The only course open now is for the Germans to shorten their front line.

Before the front can be reduced in size it will b(*ne<»essary for the German armies in the Caucasus to be extricated. It. is not yet clear that this can be done. The Russian troops are moving very rapidly in this area and they may be able to impede the general withdrawal. The capture of Goryacblikvluch implies that the advancing troops are making for Novorossisk, which is a. Black Sea port to the south of the western tip of the Caucasus Mountains. From this point it would be possible to develop an offensive against the Kerch Peninsula and so close this neck of land to the advancing troops. The Germans evidently anticipate that they will have to fight a delaying action in the Caucasus before their armies can be withdrawn, and they have taken a pessimistic view of their task, seeing that they have commenced to fortify Bataisk, which is to the east, of and near to Rostov. Rostov has been regarded as the key to the Caucasus and the obvious strategy of the Russians is to isolate this area by wide sweeps north of that town, thereby cutting it off from supplies and reinforcements arriving from Germany. Then the troops which have been relieved from conducting the Stalingrad siege, with the heavy guns which they used in that operation, can be transferred along the railways to the Rostov region, there to repeat their successful besieging operations.

The problem which is poised before the Germans .is how to withdraw their forces before the Stalingrad investing troops become established in the Rostov sector. The Germans arc attempting to do this by the use of the railways and by abandonins much war material, men being now the more important asset, which must be saved at no matter what sacrifice of material. The month of February, with its bitter cold weather, is likely to prove momentous in this South Russian campaign.

If their previous tactics are to be accepted as a guide to the present operations, it is to be expected that the Russians will renew their attacks in the Moscow sector. Rjcv and Viazraa are likely to be the objects of further activity shortly, with the view of drawing off reserves from being sent to the south. Manpower is being used by the, Russians to the greatest advantage, and if their tactics can be assisted by the opening of another front somewhere in Europe in the near future the fruits of victory may not be far distant.