CORAL SEA BATTLE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 111, 15 May 1942, Page 3

CORAL SEA BATTLE

FIRST MAJOR REVERSE FOR JAPANESE NAVY SEA-POWER ADVANTAGE (Specially Written for the N.Z. Press Association.) Apart from its immediate importance in disrupting the enemy’s plans, the great naval action in the Coral Sea is notable as being the first major defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy. Surprising as it may seem, it is, indeed, the first major reverse experienced by the modern Japanese Navy since its creation half a century or more ago. The predatory career of modern Japan and the building up of her sea power began in the early nineties of last century. In the wars with China 1894-95 and with Russia in 1904-05, in the Great War of 1914-18, in the China “affair” since 1937 and in the present war up to last week, the Japanese Navy had known no check or defeat. Always, hitherto, Japan’s success in war has been due to the success of her navy in gaining and holding command of the sea in the regions in which she has fought All that has happened in the Pacific since December 7 from the China Sea to the Indian Ocean and the approaches to Australia has shown that the Japanese well know how to exploit the advantages of sea power and modern tactics co-ordinated by sea, air and land. The use by the Japanese High Command of their command of the sea in the western Pacific has been masterly. They have not hesitated to move large forces across the seas they command. Their combined operations have been well organised, and almost uniformly successful. All their landing operations have been good examples of co-ordination by sea, air and land and afford complete proof of the celerity, the flexibility and.the baffling nature of amphibious warfare, oj which they have had a long and vast experience. The Japanese have als< learnt the importance of shore-baseo air forces and the last live month: have greatly strengthened and increased the wide area over which the\ have complete control. Expanding Air Bases. Last week’s action, developed fror. the renewed effort of the Japanese to extend their control towards the | south and south-east. For some months their efforts have aimed at exI panding their air bases in the Cora ‘ Sea region, but, as has been pointoc I out oilicially, our air force has con - sistently and effectively attacked duri ing the last six weeks, dislocating the i enemy 's plans by the destruction of in I staliaiions and aircraft. Meanwhile j the Japanese had been assembling j warships and transports for a grea ! co-ordinated attack by combinee i lori es which was initiated at the be ginning of last week. The long arm of Japanese sea powe. reached out across the Coral Sea, feeling its way into waters over which for the first time, it had not preponderant strength in ships and aircraft The Allied naval forces, well server in the air arm, attacked in intercep lion and the Japanese met their firs reversal. The enemy's long arm wai not severed, nor, indeed, paralysed, bu the clutching hand was badly maulei and forced to withdraw. It may wel be that the arm will be strengthens for another blow but most assuredly the Allied strength in those water: will be reinforced to meet it. Japan’; lirst naval reverse may have farreaching consequences. It seems to be definitely that the Japanese losses in the Cora Sea were severe while those of tin Allied forces were relatively light. I is oilicially announced that the enenm lost one aircraft carrier, one heav; cruiser, one light cruiser, two de stroyers, four gun-boats and twe transports sunk, and that one aircraft carrier, one heavy cruiser, one ligh cruiser, one seaplane tender and tw transports were more or less badi. damaged. The latter present, a. sctiou problem to the Japanese since the? are far from any dockyard or repaii base. Japanese Losses Due to the conditions under whirl the war is being fought in the Paciti. and the traditional Japanese policy o close secrecv regarding naval losses it has been difficult to assess with an. degree of accuracy what, price tin enemy has paid for his hitherto sue cessful advance to the southward. It the course of the operations agains the Dutch East Indies there were several clashes between Allied and Japan ese ships, supported b.y aircraft, not ably in Macassar Strait and the Javt Sea. That the enemy suffered lossc: of and damage to ships is certain, bu there was probably some overlappin: in the various Diftch, British am American reports. 11. has now beei oilicially stated in Washington Iha since December 7 44 war ver seis o. all kinds have been sunk, includin', two aircraft-carriers, nine cruisers, Idestroyers and six submarines. In addition one aircraft-carrier, four cruisers and five destroyers have beer probably or possibly sunk. More oi less damaged vessels include two air-craft-carriers, 12 cruisers and seevr destroyers. It was stated further that this list docs not include losses inflicted by the United States Army and by other members of the United Nations. The underlying strategy of the war in the Pacific'is to defeat the Japanese at. sea. When the Allied nations can cut Japan’s sea communications and regain command of the Western Pacific victory for them is certain Whatever the number of Japanese naval losses has been they represent something that the enemy cannot replace rapidly. Nevertheless it is going to be a long and difficult task to deprive Japan of her present commanding advantage which derive-: