The Wanganui Chronicle THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1942 THE VIAZMA ENCIRCLEMENT

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 66, 19 March 1942, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1942 THE VIAZMA ENCIRCLEMENT

THE importance of \ taznia in the German defensive operations 1 on Hie Moscow front was stressed in tins column soon alter the tail ol Kaluga. It was pointed out then that t;ic Germans’ position could not be regarded as serious until Viaztiia had fallen. Now it has been encircled. The Russians have placed their encircling line some twelve i miles to the south-west ol Viazma, which is very close to the centre of operations. If this encirclement is maintained as successfully as that which lias been established at Staraya Russa, then the town of Viazma will soon be subjected, at fairly close quarters, from all i sides, to an intensive artillery bombardment. Viazma has preJ viously been reported to have been prepared to withstand a siege, and this is probably correct, seeing that its strategic importance is so well appreciated. If Viazma falls, then the German front must fall back upon Smolensk, in which case the operations in the neighbourhood of Rjev would have to be abandoned by the Russians. Russian encirclement operations are now being maintained at Staraya Russa, Rjev and Viazma, each of which as an important railway junction, and the three constitute a right-angle triangle with Rjev at the angle. The failure of the Germans Io relieve two oi’ these bastions of their defence makes it appear improbable that they will be able to relieve Viazma. The question is whether the troops which are now'encircled will be able to break out of the cordon. If this is the desire, then it will have to be undertaken speedily, for the Russians have the ability to increase their stranglehold if they can gain the time to do so. if the German liigli Command determines Io pursue I he task ol relieving the bastions, they must throw into action the reserves of troops which were being prepared for the spring offensive. Even il the bastions hold out, the encircling operations which the Russians are pursuing with audacity are putting the Germans off their schedule for the lilt nre, and Io I hat extent assisting to an important degree in Hitler's overthrow. There is, however, good reason for entertaining the belief that (lie beleaguered divisions of German troops will have to either suiter defeat or capitulate before succour can reach them. The Germans have not lacked for men. munitions or transport facilities lo implement their counter-measures againsqtlie eneirclers, and yel. despile these advantages, they have, up lo the present, tailed to relieve one single point. Further, as more lengths of railway lim come under Russian control, its use is d< tried the Germans, who will he .faced with the task of reconditioning the lines if, and when, t hey again advance. This will involve the I iernttlns in the big task of re-establishing Iheir communications as they move forward. In Hie event of the bastions falling, large quant il it s of stores must pass into Russian hands. The Russian campaign is so vast and so adventurous that il would be impossible to say. on present evidence, how it will b< further developed. It may be that, the investing of the bastions will be pressed to finality, and although this appears to be the wisest course to pursue, it. may be that the Russian High Command. having a close appreciation of the enemy's strength, aim having a full knowledge of their own resources—which knowledge is possessed by none else—will decide lo make further infill rat ions into the enemy's front. This is the problem which is confronting the Girman High Command to-day. and the intuitive judgnieiits of Hiller are of small avail to solve il. If the Germans make a move it aids the Russians in determining what their next course of I action will be. and whatever the position was at the end of the I I year, at the present moment the initiative is definitely with (lie Rus- | I >ians. and is likely to remain so until the Germans can assemble a I I sufficient force at one point, and move it forward with such I . tremendous force that it paralyses the Russian offensive and defensive strategy. It. may In. that this forward drive is being sapped J now': it is possibly being delayed; it might be that, as Stalin has said, it will never be launched.