The Wanganui Chronicle WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1942 INDIA AND BURMA

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 65, 18 March 1942, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1942 INDIA AND BURMA

yin-: defence of India against the Japanese menace rests primarily upon Burma. But in Burma many natives arc not only auti-British, but, are also hostile to India. It should oecasiou no surprise, therefore, that the Japanese, have received native aid as they advanced into the country. For a long time the Burmese desired to be separated from India, by which it was administratively treated as a. province. By the Government of India Act of 1935, Burma was separated from India on April .1, 1937, and placed directly under the Crown, with a Governor and Legislature of its own. The financial nexus with India, however, remained, by reason of the Burmese becoming indebted to the Indian money lenders, who eventually became an absentee landlord class. This development did about as much damage in breeding discontent as was done in Ireland before the coming into operation of the 'Wyndham Land Purchase Act. Burma thus does not provide India with a bulwark, although it may constitute a buffer. The policy which India should pursue is to defend itself in Burma. The Indian Air I'oree has commenced operations in this area, and Chinese and Indian troops have been moving into the country. The maintenance of allied air supremacy in the Irrawaddy Valley is a I sine qua non of success, but land forces must be provided as well, for air forces cannot, hold territory. The fall of Rangoon provides the Japanese with another i base from which to attack or to isolate India from the sea. This is an important advantage which cannot be ignored. With Singapore as a main base and Rangoon as an advanced stat ion. the Japanese Navy is well placed to launch attacks against Indian ; shipping and to carry out operations against the ports which are | on the eastern coast of India. India's danger is decidedly a ■ pressing one. When the question of what the Indian population is likely io do under the threat of invasion is being considered, internal problems loom large. The small rang® of interest of the large mass el' the Indian people constitutes a harrier to a wide appreciation nl the danger. Mr. Gandhi's policy of non-resistance, preai-hed In a people subject io a paternal British Government which is anxious to promote Indian welfare, is another handicap on the giiwral realisation of Ihe nature of the danger which threatens the Indian people. Native opinion is certainly no! favourable to the Japanese, whose invasion of China, has no! 1 euninieiiili J itself In the Indian people. Bui the religious an j political rift remains constant in the Indian set-up. Tim Viceroy's policy of recruiting non-politieal members for his l?;ei iiti\ e Council, when he reconstructed it of late without regard to party representation, is likely to test out the strength of iinii-party political hilliienec in India. It may be <|iicstioned whether the political parlies are truly representative of political thought under pres- nf crisis conditions. Nevertheless political parties ajv supported by organisations, while non-politica i thought in the main is not. ‘‘The Congress Party,” says the Hound Table, "sought the estalilishnii-nt of a. National Government, enjoying the confidence of the elected members in fin existing Central Legislature. The Moslem League opposed the Congress demands, on the ground that their fulfilment would imply the subservience of the Moslem community to the Hindu majority. To counteract this, the Moslem League insists on equal representation with the Congress Parly in any central machinery which may lie established, or. Blternat ivdy, a substantial share in any Government from which Congress men may be abstiif. Other political groups have other proposals. Notable among them are the reeonnnendations made ny a group of prominent public men. not affiliated with any specific parties, but inclining to the Lilu ral school, who urge the formation of an Executive 1 Council responsible to the Crown but consisting entirely of nonofficial Indians. Not one of these proposals agrees with the original British suggest ions for expanding the Council, which implied that parly representatives should collaborate at tin centre under the existing constitHion.” I he visit <>l .Marshal I hiring Kai-shek Io India may have done much In engender a. more co-operative spirit, ami Sir Stafford Cripps’ mission will assuredly be assisted by the work done prior to his arrival by the Viceroy and the great ('hinese leader.