The Wanganui Chronicle. Monday, AUGUST 11, 1941. RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 85, Issue 187, 11 August 1941, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. Monday, AUGUST 11, 1941. RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS

GLANCE back over Ihc run of events makes if appear clear that. Russia had plenty of practical justilii-alion in acting as she did in 1939 when she entered part of .Poland and the whole

of the Baltic States, despite Hie absence ut any legal .justification. The practical jiislilicafion lay in the lad that it Russia did not i.nler into possession of I his strip of |< ri itory Germany would have done so, and that there would have been nobody to prevent Ihc Nazis from doing so. The logical action from the Russian standpoint, was to enter into possession of this “no man’s land’’ (using the term in a military sensei, in order io hinder as much as possible the then anticipated invasion movement by Germany.

Il is of interest to recall that when it was proposed, at the Versailles Conference, Io set up these Baltic States the British statesmen, with an eye Io practicality, discouraged the idea be cause these Baltic States, occupying positions between two large and powerful countries, could only remain in existence on sufferance from their larger neighbours, for military aid of an effective nature could not be provided in their hour of need. Consequent upon the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson Ihc Baltic States were brought into being, but the experiment has proved itself Io have been premature.

The position of Poland was .substantially different from that of the Baltic States. It had behind it a long and honourable history; its people were definitely and deliberately conscious of their distinctive place in European culture. The national character had been formed ami had withstood the century of su ;j pression of the national spirit that followed on the dismemberment of the country. That Poland did not succeed in operating democratic institutions immediately the country emerged from the house of bondage will cause no surprise to any .student of history and polities. It was treading the difficult path to selfrealisation with a minimum of political experience and a lack of administrative knowledge. The German invasion put too severe a strain upon this young tree and it bent before the great onslaught of the mechanised military machine. France was to go down before the same organisation, so Poland will hardly lie blamed for succumbing so quickly. What is of great interest, however, is that despite the country having been overrun, no Quisling Government has been possible and no Polish Laval or Darlan has appeared on the scene. Poland may lie enslaved but there is no element in the country to follow the Vichy precedent and “co-operate” with Germany.

Russia could have maintained the attitude which she adopted when the debacle caused by the German invasion dissolved the Polish State. She could argue that there is to-day no Polish Government with which she could treat. This has not been Russia's line of conduct. It has been to recognise, tlie de facto Government which is at present constituted and functioning on British soil. This Government in exile is a Government which all Poles have recognised as the repository of their national authority. In making a treaty with the Polish Government the Russians recognise the continued existence of the Polish Staff', which implies (without reference to the terms of the treaty) a restoration of the territory of Poland.

The treaty has satisfied the leaders of the Poles concerning the future re-establishment of their country, and this treaty, although written ami signed under the dark shadows of war. augurs well for the future peace of Northern Europe.