The Wanganui Chronicle WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1941. CONTEST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 85, Issue 123, 28 May 1941, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1941. CONTEST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

r pilE present conflict which is being waged in the Eastern

Mediterranean must, in the nature of things, be expected to ebb and flow; at one time favouring the enemy, at another time favouring the British. It is desirable, in consequence, to keep in the mind’s eye the whole conflict in a due perspective. The Eastern conflict is being waged in three, areas: in Libya, in Greece and Crete, and in Iraq. In each of these areas success has been attained and failure has been met. If is to be expected that this mixture of results will continue, and consequently reverses should not be regarded by themselves as indications of the way in which the contest, is moving. Taken on the whole, the situation in the Middle East is relatively satisfactory. The campaign in Libya has some encouraging Ik ature.s about it: the Germans are unable to capture Tobruk, they have proved to be incapable of dominating the Bollum area near (he Egyptian border, and consequently the.- British have been able to resume the initiative in localities of their own choosing. There has also been a successful blockade of the North African coast by the Royal Navy at. the height of the ,summer season, when food, water and other supplies would be most welcome. This insufficiency of supplies will cause the German and Italian troops in North Africa to deteriorate physically, and such deterioration affects morale, which cannot be recovered speedily. The Germans in this area have evidently been unable to make a further attempt to advance into Egypt, an effort which they would most, surely have made, had it been within their power to do so, while the attack upon Crete was at its height. The German attack upon Greece and Crete must be regarded as but one action. The Greeks were hard pressed and the British troops took up positions on the right wing of their allies, and so prevented the German troops from breaking through. This was essentially a rearguard action, and it is a rearguard action which tests most severely the discipline of troops. Being driven into a territorial cul-de-sac by the weight of numbers and the willingness of the German command to suffer heavy losses, the means of escape, particularly for the wounded, became inadequate, and in this area, a number of British, Australian and New Zealand soldiers have been taken prisoner. Their compulsory retirement from the conflict is to be regretted, but the Germans can be depended on to look after the wounded, while those who are uninjured will be placed in internment camps, and will find, in such close association with men of various degrees of culture and of many callings, opportunities for mutual improvement and consolation whereby to relieve the monotony and irksomeness of concentration camp life. Their contribution to the conflict, however, is not to be regarded as small, because active .service in the firing line extended over a few weeks. Their work in Greece was invaluable, in that it imposed on the German war machine an unforeseen task and put it oil its schedule. They did in Greece what the people in Yugoslavia did by resisting the invader: they compelled a reversing of the gears and the taking of a different direction. The German war machine was set to run into Western Asia, and this complicated piece of human and engineering mechanism had to be- prepared by months of effort for ils scheduled run. The. redirection of the machine against Yugoslavia and Greece has exhausted, in part, tin.- organisational effort, and thrown upon those responsible an additional task. A military manoeuvre of the magnitude of the Eastern campaign must be timed right, in order, among other things, that weather conditions shall be favourable. ’The delay for a few weeks may result in an operation having to be attempted without the maximum of advantage being contributed to it by weather conditions. The Eastern Mediterranean is subjected to violent, changes of conditions in consequence of nionsoonal influences, and in engaging in air operations over Crete, Egypt and Iraq, the. Germans first make a close si tidy of meteorological data, in order to avoid adverse weather conditions as far as possible. Hie delay 01. a couple of weeks only becomes a matter of importance for such operations. The attack upon Crete was possibly scheduled for an earlier date than that on which it commenced. The attack had to be very carefully prepared on the mainland, in the air and. last, but not least, on the sea. The organisation of the attack appears to have been very complete, and would have succeeded had sea communications been established: but even with the supremacyin the air in their favour the attackers were unable to break down the sea defences. Doubtless there have been casualties suffered by the Royal Navy, but these must be expected in view of the restricted area in which the Navy was operating. The defence of Crete has so far been sustained, and unless a newoffensive of even greater strength than formerly can be organised, and more ships are available to be used as transports, supported by air and sea. defences, the second attack upon Crete will also fail. Failure in this direction cramps German activities on the sea and makes too risky the dispatch of troop transports from Salonika to Alexandretta. If Crele fell info German hands the next step would be the capture of the island of Cyprus, after which, with the connivance of the Vichy clique, the way would be open to send troops by way of Alexandretta to attack the Mosul oil-bearing areas in Iraq; and to Beirut to attack the Jewish population in Baleslinc. am] thus enable Hiller to adopt the role of the ‘‘liberator” of fin- Arab populations of tlm East.

’I he situation in Iraq has been brought iinth r control fairly conveniently, but if is improbable that this would have been so had the defenders of Greece not caused the German war maehino to be deflected from its scheduled work. The rising of (he Iraqi rebels against the British was probably timed to conform with the original .schedule as plotted by the German High Command; but. Gentian aid was not fortheoiifing because lhe latter had 100 many unfinished tasks on their hands, and so the Quislings of the East found it convenient, to depart from their country for their country’s good.