RED DEMI-GOD

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 84, Issue 5, 6 January 1940, Page 2

RED DEMI-GOD

POWER OF PROPAGANDA STALIN AS SOVIET SEES HIM PRE-WAR CONDITIONS According to the wit of our party the following is an extract translation of the Great Thought and theme song of the U.S.S.R.—but I cannot guarantee it:— Our Stalin is tophole, Our Stalin is okay; We'll live and die for Stalin, And love him more each day. 'fhus writes Rohan Rivett, a member of the literary staff of the Melbourne Argus, who recently visited Moscow in July and August of 1939. He continues: — Still, when you have found these sentiments enshrined in stone and brass wherever you go and hear them poured forth from kinema, radio, and platform—you do feel inclined to enshrine them in something yourself, and doggerel seems as good a medium as any. Nevertheless, there is uo doubt of the sincerity of the Russian citizen s regard for the leader in the Kremlin. You might expect the continual eulogies and ceaseless tributes to produce a certain cynicism. Yet one finds the Russian praising the foresight and wisdom of his leaders in a way that suggests that the propaganda machine of the Government must be the ablest in Europe, or that Stalin must be something of a superman. The cult of Lenin has now been augmented by the cult of his disciple and successor, an idea deliberately fostered by the sculpture and paintings of the two men together, which one finds continually in public places. It seems probable that Stalin’s great popularity may be attributed to three things. He is first and foremost a man of the people—a humble Georgian with a heroic revolutionary record. His manner of unadorned, rather rugged speaking touched with dry wit and a hint of satire, has a general appeal. Finally, there is the extreme simplicity with which he lives, and his vast daily labours which only a man of excepitional physique and ability could ac- 1 i complish. Blind Faith Those who speak of the possibility of dissatisfaction and unrest in the Soviet over the attack upon Finland fail to appreciate the absolute confidence in his Government which seems to fill the Soviet citizen. He trusts! implicitly his own press and radio, and will think and feel only what these Government-controlled organs maintain to be the truth. The Soviet bogy is to-day, as it has been since the revolution, the fear of an invasion by the allied capitalist States from east and west. This is a eral and genuine fear throughout the Union, and it is not difficult to imagine the Russians whole-heartedly concurring in any steps taken to forestall what they will be taught to regard as capitalist intrigues and preparation for attack. The Soviet is still in the midst of the most gigantic national reconstruction in history. She has her full share of absorbing internal problems. Hatred of War For the solution of these, freedom from external aggression is one of the essentials. There can be little doubt that after their experiences of 1914-20 the people cherish a hatred of war as strong as that of any European nation. But no one who has been in Russia recently would doubt tnal the Kremlin will be able to carry the mass of the people with it in the conviction of the righteousness of the Soviet’s case in any war embarked upon. The power of the Government over the formation of popular opinion has to be felt to be appreciated. At the end of July and in early August, when our party was in Moscow and Leningrad, there was still no rumour of the Soviet-German pact, and no hint of all that has followed as a sequel. The interest of all with whom we talked was upon internal problems and progress. You felt rather as if you were at the end of a long and powerful telescope watching the excursions and alarms of London, Faris, Berlin and Warsaw as if they were those of the peoples of some other planet. Power Politics To the man in the street in the western capitals the war threat, never far removed, was moving ever closer. As the attitude of the Keich towards the Poles grew increasingly truculent, the sense of exasperation at the .perpetual crises had deepened the feeling that war must come. In Moscow there was strong feeling with regard to the Fascist aggressions of the preceding months, but there was little or nothing that could be described pro-democratic feeling. Desire was expressed for a pact with the democracies as a means of ending the threat of German attack upon the U.S.S.R. Yet no attempt was made to conceal the distrust of the democratic Governments with whom negotiations were proceeding. Now, it is clear for all outside the Soviet to realise, despite the waves of idealising propaganda, that the Soviet Government is no atom less grasping, nor more scrupulous, about the rights of small States, than the Nazis themselves. The truth would seem to be that, given a remarkable opportunity, the chiefs of the Kremlin have seized the occasion to playpower politics to the top of their bent. Yet it is purely wishful thinking to imagine that the wholesale disillusionment of many former friends outside the Soviet will find any echo within. If Stalin involves Russian in general war you will find as unanimous a people behind him as the heart of any totalitarian ruler could desire. The Red Army At this time it is of great importance to appreciate the enormous confidence in the Red Army and the Red Air Force, which has been built up within the Soviet. All citizens are conscious of the sacrifices which have had to be made in the national economy on behalf of the R.ed Army. They are fully cognisant of the way in which consumption industries have lagged behind. While in the earlier stages all their best efforts were flung into capital industries, to-day it is the demands of national security which are