SEA-BORNE TRADE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 34, 10 February 1937, Page 10

SEA-BORNE TRADE

DEFENCE AGAINST AIRCRAFT BRITISH NAVY CONFIDENT LONDON, Jan. 2S. “On the whole, the outlook for British sea-borne supplies is considerably more reassuring than might be supposed by pessimists who believe that the coming of the air weapon has completely subverted the canons of strategy exclusively to the detriment of British countries,” declares Mr. Hector Bywater, the naval correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, in an article on the air menace to supplier in wartime. “Many points of detail remain tc be considered,” Mr. By water ados. “They include the diversion of traffic from ports within easy air range of the enemy to others more remote, and the accumulation of stocks, such as grain and oil. They eie receiving attention. “But the real soluticn lies, first, in the provision of adequate naval and military air forces; and, secondly, in the just allocation for and co-ordina-tion of the three services for pursuit of common objectives.” Mr. Bywater points out that since the war trade defence has become the chief pre-occupatioh of strategists. “Realisation of this,” he says, “is implicit in the recent creation of a food defence plan department under the Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defence. “It is no secret that the authorities concerned are concentrating not merely on the broad problem of protesting seaborne trade in war, but particularly on the safety of shipping incoastal waters or in port. Control of Merchant Fleet. “The Navy is confident of its powers to keep the trade routes open provided it is supplied with the necessary ships and men. At the first serious threat of war the entire merchant navy will doubtless become subject to Admiralty control, to be given evasive routes or placed under convoy, as circumstances dictate. The naval view is that the international laws governing the treatment of merchant shipping would generally be respected, at any rate in the early stages of hostilities. “Thus, so long as the Powers respect international engagements, a recurrence of unrestricted submarine warfare need not be feared. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that the Admiralty’s plans for trade defence allow for the contingency of a hard-pressed, desperate belligerent breaking the law and staking all on a policy of frightfulness, even though the experience of those who tried this policy in the last war was not encouraging.

[ “Full attention has been given to 'he risks of air attack upon merchant vessels entering or leaving

port and in coastal waters. This form of attack has become a bugbear in certain quarters, where it is proclaimed to be the worst menace Britain has had to face; but the argument ignores both legal and physical difficulties. Difficulty of Distinguishing. “It would be extremely difficult for aircraft to distinguish between neutral and an enemy vessel, since to do so it must approach so closely as to expose itself to attack at point-blank range by anti-aircraft guns. Yet to bomb at sight would be to incur the certain enmity of neutrals. “For this reason alone, the aircraft menace to merchant ships at sea is not accepted in official circles as a probable contingency. Ships in convoy would offer a more promising target; but in this case the aircraft would have to reckon with the powerful anti-aircraft batteries of the escorting warships. The Navy, in fact, is confident that, given the needful resources, it can protect merchant ships from every peril, including air attack, until they reach harbour.”