OFFENCE AND DEFENCE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 79, Issue 66, 18 March 1936, Page 6

OFFENCE AND DEFENCE

fl sc-'ms icmarkablc. yet apparently it remains true, that the moans of defence keen pace with flic instruments of offence, •lust how this approximate balance is maintained is not to bo explained. save by the fact, that the need calls for the remedy. Of particular interest is the revelation made by Admiral do t hair that the Admiralty had a device which enables a ship I-, operate a refleofor ray on to any submarine which ventures inside the range wherein it could discharge a torpedo cl'l’erlively, causing the submarine to suffer instant destruction. This information. coming out at a time when it is learned that the 1 nitod Kingdom has numerically few submarines, indicates that the delay in the enlargement of the Navy has been a blessing in disguise. There is no denying the fact that the submarine jtla.ved very little part in the Navy's programme during the Great M ar. Phis, of course, was because the British Navy held command of the sea and the German navy, save for a few brief sallies, remained in port. The submarine is an instrument for offence, although it is possible to regard it as a defensive weapon. France persists in so regarding it. believing that with a fleet of submarines adequate to her coastline am! to her traus .Mediterranean traffic, she could make it inconvenient for any nation to interfere with her shipping or harry her eoasts. Russia's 96 submarines gives her a dominance in this arm which is overwhelming in so far as she is concerned, because these submarines would only be called upon to operate in the Baltic Sea on the west. M hen the Eastern area is surveyed, however. the situation changes. Russia would find the submarine, not a defensive weapon, but. a deadly weapon of offence. From \ ladivostoek she could dispatch them to harass the shipping of Japan and would fin,] i n the many islands of that area opportunities for laying in wait for possible victims. In fine. Japan would occupy a position similar to that of Great Britain, while Russia would take the place of Germany. 1 he construction of an anti-aircraft ship capable, in Admiral de ('hair’s words, “of a terrific volume of fire in defence of a hat’bour or other ships.’’ provides a counter to the aerial attack upon the battleship. But this does not tell the whole of the story. There has to be added the increased efficiency of the antiaircraft gun. This unit of defence is calculated to have been improved since the war to the extent of 250 per cent, in efficiency. Nevertheless, it should not be taken for granted that the balance of offensive and defensive units have kept pace with each other in all respects. That can only bo found out under wartime conditions. Until the various units have been tried out under other than experimental conditions, the prospect of a faHor being overlooked cannot bo loft out of account. It will be remembered that at the Dogger Bank fight fhe German navy experienced the piercing of the gun turrets by shells, and fhe travelling of the shell flash to the magazines, causing the ship to blow up. This defect was remedied before the Battle of Jutland. and as the Royal Navy had not found out this defect in nnval construction the losses of the British Royal Navy were much greater than they would have boon had that knowledge ! been known beforehand. In the business of offence and defence the unexpected is to be expected simply because each side is endeavouring to catch Ibe other side unawares.