SLACK JURIES

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 75, Issue 177, 29 July 1932, Page 8

SLACK JURIES

A JUDGE SPEAKS OUT LEVEL CROSSING FATALITIES SHOCKING LOSS OF LUK WELLINGTON, July 28. The great responsibility devolving upon juries who have to try cases in which there has been loss of life through the alleged negligence of a motorist was referred to Dy Mr. Justice Keed to-day in the Supreme Court, in his direction to the jury at the conclusion of the trial of Janies Thomas Rutherford, a bus-driver. “A duty is cast upon juries to see if it is possible to reduce this shock iag loss of life by insisting upon a high degree of care,” said His Honour. Comment was also made by His Honour tn the non-observance by many motor 'sts of the compulsory railway 11 stop’’ notice at level crossings. His Honour said that every case involving loss of life was of importance, but where in a case of loss of life a motor-vehicle was concerned, it assumed a great importance because of the appalling loss of life occurring in the Dominion to-day through the negligent handling of motor-cars. It might be safely said that 90 per cent, of the cases was due to negligence. He said without hesitation and with some experience of such cases that fully 90 per cent, actually was due to negligence, and probably 10 per cent, to inevitable accident. Speed was often blamed, but His Honour said his own experience was that speed was not often a factor. One was safer in driving with a careful driver at a high speed than he was driving with a careless driver at a less speed. A careful driver took no risks. A careless driver often would take a risk. You need only walk round the streets here to see a careless driver often in operation, and by luck he escapes a serious accident. These eases involving the death of human beings through collisions with motorcars are of extreme importance for this reason: that it is the juries of this Dominion that have to set the degree of negligence which they will excuse. If juries do as they have done in many cases and say, '‘Well, the accused is a decent fellow” —they generally are decent fellows— (i nothing against him before, and it is prettv hard luck upon him that he has killed this person, anil therefore ho will be excused,” that is quite the wrong wav of looking upon it, because a duty is cast upon juries to see if it is possible to reduce this shocking loss of life by insisting upon a high degree of care in the management of motor-vehicles. Deterrent to Careless Continuing, His Honour said that slackness on the part of juries in this respect did not afford a deterrent to the careless driver, and if juries were strict in the matter it did not necessarily follow that the person concerned should be punished severely It was of great importance, however, that a person should not escape being convicted where the jury was thoroughly satisfied there had been negligence, and the loss of life had been due to the negligent handling of the car. Juries in New Zealand should exercise the powers they had of convicting in cases where they were satisfied upon reasonable grounds that the death of a person would not have occurred had it not been for negligence on the part of the person in charge of the motor-car. The higher degree of" care demanded, the more deterrent there would be to the careless driver. These were general obsrvations, His Honour told the jury. The case they had to try had to be determined on the fact*’. The responsibility was with them. Compulsory “Stop’’ Notices His Honour also referred to the observance motorists paid toward the i ail way compulsory x * stop ’ ’ notices at level crossings. The compulsory stop rule in general, said His Honour, wa« made for the sole purpose of preventing accidents at crossing places. The rule was a stringent one, and it was supposed to be obeyed. He was aware that it was not obeyed—that persons would not actually stop—but at ail events it was a reasonable ground for exercising due care when approaching a railway crossing. The fact, however, that a person did not obey that rule was not conclusive evidence of negligence, but it was some evidence of negligence. If, under the circumstances,- thcie was a sufficient reason gisen. then it would not be actua negligence, but it would be some evidence of negligence. His Honour said he could not do better than read some observations on the subject of negligence by the late Sir John Salmon'* in a case which was very similar to the present case, and this His Honour proceeded to do. Still addressing the jury. His Honour said that Rutherford, had he stopped his vehicle, could have heard the train whistle, and he could have heard the noise of the train approaching. His Honour «aid he thought the jury would agree that a reasonable man, before going on to a level crossing, would look carefully to see whether a train was approaching, and that if he did not do so he was negligent. That was the broad point. ACCUSED ACQUITTED NEGLIGENT DRIVING CHARGE [ Per Pres* Association.] WELLINGTON, July 28. After a retirement of four hours the jury returned a verdict of not guilty in the Supreme Court case against Janies Thomas Rutherford, charged with negligent driving, thereby causing death. The charges arose out of a level crossing accident at Masterton on the evening of April 9, when a bus driven by Rutherford was struck by a train and one of the passengers, Frank Muirhead Gillespie, was killed.