The Wanganui Chronicle. "NULLA DIES SINE LINEA.” TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1924. POST-WAR HISTORY

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXXI, Issue 19050, 1 July 1924, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. "NULLA DIES SINE LINEA.” TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1924. POST-WAR HISTORY

Five and a-half years ago the worldwar having come to an end rather abruptly men and women in many countries were discussing the future in terms of the past. Ex-President Wilson’s famous phrase about "making the world safe for democracy” was on many millions o£ tongues ami people of most nations were hoping and believing that the peace which was to be made would be a peace which would register the triumph of democratic ideas and open the way to a world dominated by liberal conceptions. The thing did not turn out as people hoped and believed. Instead all the great democracies of the West were swept by a wave of reaction. Events in Russia materially contributed to the character of the postwar governments chosen in western nations and even more to the policies pursued by western democracies for jthe first years of peace. Aside from Russia the first nations to "go” democratic or perhaps more exactly radi- ; eal were Germany and Italy. How 'far the German change was real, how far a deliberate effort to deceive the conqueror and invite easier terms is a matter for debate. Certainly tho reality fell short of the appearance. At the outset only Italy seemed to have gone the whole distance and to have invited Socialism in a form which had direct inspiration from Moscow. Then, by an odd coincidence, at least, the countries which had gone radical began to turn conservative. We saw the coming of Mussolini with his Faeismo, seizing power by something closely approximating a revolution but a revolution made by the Bight, by the conservatives and finally legalised by the still 'recent Italian election. Then we ■ saw the drift to right in Germany 'moving steadily and impressively until

it culminated in the recent election, which was a transformation the extent of which remains difficult to measure but the direction of which was and is patent. Meanwhile, beginning with the "Khaki Election” jof December, 1918 and lasting right down to the’ general election of last autumn, a period of five years, reaction dominated in Great Britain and, following the Bonar Law election late in 1922, its control became absolute. The situation in France was measureably different. Clemenceau was a radical, but in the last analysis he was Clemenceau and he dominated by virtue of the fact that he was Clemenceau. When he retired, after the Treaty of Versailles, he was denied the Presidency because he had refused to follow the advice of Foch and Clemenceau in making the treaty of peace. But the French Parliament chosen in 1919 was a reactionary parliament. It was Parliament committed to maintaining for France the fruits of the victory. It began with a Millerand Cabinet, but Millerand shortly after became President of the republic; then came a Leygues Cabinet, which was but a makeshift, then came Briand. Now Briand is by political habit a conserva-. five radical. He started as a Socialist of the extreme type, as did Millerand; but,, like the President, he has been marching to the right all the time he has been climbing to the top. But, all things considered, he is a moderate —vastly more moderate than the Chamber of Deputies, which for a time sustained him; far more moderate than Poincare, who presently overturned him. Briand fell because the French people as i whole, and the French Chamber in particular, felt that Lloyd George was steadily depriving France of the fruits of her gigantic sacrifices and playing a German game against her. It became a settled conviction of the French Chamber that only Poincare could cope with Lloyd George. So finally Poincare was called. Poincare proved able to cope with Lloyd George, and less than a year after he came to power Lloyd George fell largely because of the skilful manoeuvring of Poincare. The occupation of the Ruhr, however, permanently alienated Britain from France while Poincare remained Prime Minister. British hostility to Poincare promptly took on the national character that French hostility to Lloyd George had long had. When, however, British power passed to Ramsay MacDonald, a new situation arose. Britain had definitely “gone” liberal—radical—what you may please to call it. In any way it had broken with-the war and. the war policy; it had chosen a pacifist, policy; it had chosen a pacifist as Premier, and this pacifist was, in turn, committed to a policy of pacification. On the other hand, he disclosed the fact that he was animated by no hostility to France, that he was honest, straightforward and simple. Before he had been in office many weeks he had a good press in Paris and was popular in France as Lloyd George had not been since the end of tho war. As Jong as the case seemed to Frenchmen to be one of supporting the French claim against a world which sought to deprive France of her rights, of security and reparation, which appeared to be willing to let Germany go scot free and France fall into defenceless bankruptcy, France —all parties or enough of the members of each party —stood by Poincare. But the Dawes report for the first time gave the French financial claims and French reparation rights a satisfactory international foundation on the economic side. It declared that Germany could pay largely and provided ways and means for the payment. The debate over the ability of Germany was ended, French claims vindicated not iu a political court but in a conference of economic experts. Poincare had said Germany could pay, he had held his ground in the face of all the arguments that Germany was bankrupt and reparations a figment of the imagination. But when the Dawes Committee had vindicated the Poincare claim, then the real usefulness of Poincare had terminated. France had turned to Poincare in 1922 as she had turned to Clemenceau in 1917, not because of any popularity—neither man enjoyed popularity iu the ordinary sense of tho word, save ;u» Clemenceau won it with tho war and for a moment —but because in each ease these seemed the necessary men. But in the end she dropped Poincare as she had denied Clemenceau the presidency because the necessity had passed and the asset had become a liability.