RISKS INCURRED.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXVI, Issue 17779, 30 January 1920, Page 6

RISKS INCURRED.

BY THE UNITED STATES. . IF TREATY IS NOT RATIFIED. Writing from Washington to the New York Evening Post, Harold Phelps Stokes says:— If the United States should decide not to be a party to the Treaty of Peace between the other Allies and Germany it will raise a number of questions, particularly in regard to the Reparations Commission and our participation in its work and benefits, which are already beginning to give responsible Government officials much anxiety. They relate to such matters as payment of the army of occupation, our share in the distribution of dyestuffs and other products handed over to the Allies under the terms of the Treaty, damage claims of our nationals, and even possibly that most delicate of all pending controversies, the distribution of ships. No similar body in history has ever had such power and responsibility as that bestowed by the Treaty on the Reparations Commission. When it comes into being it will act practically as a receiver for Germany, to the end that German public assets may be conserved to reimburse the Allies as far as possible for their losses during the war. Recognising the supreme importance of having the United States represented on this Commission, and represented at the outset, President Wilson asked the Senate for permis. tion to go ahead and appoint the American member while the Treaty was still pending, but this Senator Lodge refused to allow him to do. The Government may find some way around the situation created should this country fail to ratify the Treaty. It would be argued that even though the United States were not a party to the Treaty it could claim its proportion of the benefits under the reparations clauses as one of the ‘‘Allied and Associated Powers” to whom, and not to the contractual parties, those benefits run. The question is whether the country wants to be one of Germany's creditors merely, with some of its claims perhaps shaded, or one of the receivers having full power to act. PLEDGE BINDING ON GERMANY. As soon as the Treaty comes into force through its ratification by Germany and three of the Allied Powers, all assets of Germany available for payment of reparation will be pledged to the commission for distribution, and that pledge will be binding on Germany, even if the Un'ited States was not a party to the Treaty. What is agitating officials here is the question just what consideration the Reparations Commis. sion would give this country by way of settlement of its claims should the United States so fall to ratify. They are wondering, for instance, to take one small point, how the United States would receive reimburse'ment for the expenses of her army lof occupation. By the terms of the iTreaty those expenses, from the Ar(mistice on, are payable through the (commission as the first lien against reparations. Moreover, dyes and other articles are handed over under the Treaty to the commission for distribtuion, and some . doubt has arisen in the minds of those who have studied these provisions as to whether the United States could maintain any claim to further distribution of the dyes, for instance, after the Treaty comes into force, even in the face of the present agreement by which the country is to receive dyes through the pre-execu. tion of the dye option in the Treaty. In regard to America’s claims for German ships the Treaty cedes ships which sailed under the German flag to the Allied and Associated Governments through the Repatriation Commission. But by an agreement, which it is understood was part of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty, that Commission was bound to distribute the ships in a certain way. All the ships requisitioned in our. ports, for instance, were to go to the United States. Some experts here fear that this arrangement might be at least interfered with to the prejudice of the United States should this country fail to ratify the Treaty. It also seems doubtful to some of these experts whether, in the event of non-ratification, this country would be able fully to satisfy its claims for damage to persons and property of the United States before or during the war. Damage claims before the war are payable by the terms of the Treaty from German assets held by our Alien Property Custodian, whose acts it was felt highly desirable, if not necessary, to have receive the sanction of the Treaty. Claims for damage during the war would, in the natural course of events, he satisfied from assets ceded to the Reparations Commission. CUSTODIAN’S OFFICE WORRIED. The Allen Property Custodian’s office is also worried lest property of American citizens in German territory might he seized by the German Government in the event of the Senate’s failure to ratify. The Governments of Germany and Austria moreover, are holding valuable assets of American life insurance companies whose return might be handicapped should the United States not be represented on the Reparations Commission. All loans made by this Government or private individuals to Ger. many must receive the approval of

many will be unable even to pay interest until the repartitions lien is satisfied — a significant illustration of the long arm of the commisison. Through German’s desire to conserve her own assets this power could easily affect credits to private German individuals, as this authority extends to commercial relations with any of the former Central Powers. Its exercise might afford opportunity for discrimination against the trade of the United States. All these instances are in some respects insignificant compared with

the larger question involved, a question partly of selfish interest, partly of solemn obligation. That larger issue is whether the United States wants to stand behind and through the reconstruction of Europe or prefers to let Europe try to extricate herself from her present morasses alone. Just as a single instance of the working out of this great problem, those who have been giving it attention here during the past few weeks point to the fact that unless we are a party to the German and Austrian treaties the commission will be materially handicapped in devising a plan to solve the economic problem in Austria. Starvation and anarchy th Austria will be a menace to the peace of Europe, and will hinder in a great degree that economic restora. tion of Europe which is incidentally of such vital Interest to our foreign trade. Non-representation on the Reparations Commission will, in the opinion cf experts here, make it extremely hard from a political and practical standpoint to evolve a coordinated plan to solve Austria’s difficulties.