EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD FOR COLDS.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LX, Issue 17062, 15 August 1917, Page 6

EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD FOR COLDS.

Mr John W. Doyle, secretary of the Eight Hour and Labour Demonstration Committee, Sydney, writes: "It gives me much pleasure to state I have found Hean's Essence an exceptionally good remedy for colds. Its moderate orice and rapidity of action should make a special appeal to, workers with larjre families. Hean's Essence supplies"^ ; long-felt want in the home."

: Hean's Essence is obtainable from ■ chemists and stores, or post free to your j address on receipt of price, 25., from 'Hean's Pharmacy, Wanganui. Two shillings' worth makes one pint of finest quality Cough and Sore Throat remedy—as much as you can get of ordinary mixtures for 12s:

make it land where it is wanted, these weapons are primarily weapons of low velocity.

USE OF AEROPLANES

The extensive use of aeroplanes for aerial reconnaissance enables the exact position of all enemy trenches to be located on the map. This meana that the artillery get the exact range to all parts of the trench system. The development of heavy howitzers, which are short guns throwing their projectiles high enough into the air so that they come down in to a trench in very much the same manner a,s the proje^ tiles of the trench mortars, nas enabled the attacker in mo.;t cases, if he has an artillery superiority, literally to blow the trenches to pieces. If they are full manned.the loss of life is very lai'ge. If the personnel takes shelter in the bornbproofs the attacking infantry frequently arrives and catches them before they can get out. In other words, the capture of a aystem of trenches when air superiority has been gained, when the artillery is sufficiently powerful to make the preparation and when the infantry is suffiicently numerous and determined is practically a certainty. However, when line after line of trenches has been prepared, sooner or later one is ieached which has not been smashed, with the result that the attack breaks on it.

RIFLE CUMBERSOME IN THE

TRENCHES

In trench warfare the two infantries aro seldom more than a hundred yards apart, and except during attacks are out of sight in their trenches. Therefore the extreme range of the infantry rifle and its .accuracy are of no value. In hnnd to hand fighting in the trenches its length makes it awkward to hand! ft

What it> needed in all the infantry fighting iii which the two sides are never far from eah other is not accuracy of fire but great volume of fire, suddenly produced. Machine guns and hand grenades are therefore much more useful than rifle?.

In fighting in the open field the iniantry has to fire at long rangesl. Therefore the. long range rifle with its accuracy is the weapon of most importance. This accuracy, however, cannot be taken advantage of unless the individual soldier is trained to its use. Su>ch training takes much more time and care than does the training necessary to handle machine guns or hand grenades in trench warfare.

Trench warfare is fir at its simplest because it b most direct and most brutal, .because slider weight of personnel and material counts the most. This is true strategically, tactically, from the point of view of supply, and from the point of view of the work demanded of the general staffs in control.

In _ the first place, as the lines are definitely fixed, neither side has any doubt as.to ex:.^tly where the other side is. Aa one flank rests on the sea and the other on Switzerland, a neutral country, the question of a flank attack resolves itself into either the transportation of troops by sea or the violation of Swiss neutrality.

RISKY TO TUL.r FLANKS

The difficulties and dangers attending any attempt to transport a larga expeditionry force to be landed on a hoL'.ile coat under the conditions wlr-i now exist in the North Sea and in the British Channel are so great as to make it extremely doubtful that any such move will be attempted.

An attempt to violate Swiss neutrality means the prompt entering the line of several hundred thousand Swiss troops, who without any doubt could and would offer such resistance that nelp could reach them before the flanking movement could succeed. Therefore, under existing conditions, the only means of attack is- a frontal one.

Strategy is limited to trying to start such a.n attack at some, point at which it is not expected and in endeavouring to hold sufficient strategical reserves to meet any attack promptly wherever it may be made.

CENTRES OF RESISTANCE. As the-war has progressed it has become more and more the custom to establish, here and there throughout the entrenched lines, what are called -centres of resistance. A centre of resistance may be a village which ha.? been put in a str.te of defence, a small wood or a network of trenches, all within an outer trench roughly in the form of a circle or ah ellipse. The great advantage of these centre? of resistance is that the garrison occupying them can Pre not only to the front Out to the rear and/to both flanks. Where a position is defended by nothing but several lines of trenches once they are broken through the attacking force has nothing to fear from the rear *>r flanks.

However, if there are centres of resistance here and there alone t.'ie line troops breaking through between them are met by a fire from both flanks, if these centre? are arranged along one or more lines flanking each other, troops breaking through between two positions in the first line find themselves under fire from the second line to their front, and from centres rf to their front iand fa-om centres of resistance to their rear and both flanks. In other words, they are in what is generally an impossible situation as far as resistance is concerned. ' Theie centres of resistance have given more trouble and probably had more to do with the failure to break all the way through the entrenched linesl on tlif. Western front than any other thing.