Mr. Henderson's Resignation.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LX, Issue 17062, 15 August 1917, Page 5

Mr. Henderson's Resignation.

SPEECH IN HOUSE OF COMMONS

MR. HENDERSON'S VERSION.

Received. August 14, 7.15 p.m

LONDON, August 13. In the House of Commons, Mr Henderson, speaking from the Labour benches, said he intended to speak lengthily owing to the unprecedented and dangerous Press campaign anent his position in the Cabinet, and his actions at the Labour Conference. It would be almost impossible to find a precedent in the history of Ministerial resignations for the conduct of the Premier and his colleagues during the week-end. He received the first intimation of the acceptance of his resignation from the newspapers, though he was still working in the War Cabinet's Office. Mr Lloyd George, atter the Conference's decision, said his position as secretary of the Labour Party "was in-ompatible with his Cabinetship, and hi chose the former. He only wished Mr Lloyd George had emulated the character and spirit of his letter of resignation.

The full story regarding the Stockholm Conference could not be told at present. He would wart the time when it would be possible to state all the facts without injury to the national interests, but the press attacks had forced him to deal with certain events regardless of the consequences. He advised the 'Labour Party on the 25th June to accept the invitation to Stockholm. His visit to Paris was discussed at a special meeting of the Cabinet. The day before his departure he wired the Labour Party's decision to Mr. Lloyd George, who was then in Paris. Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues stood convicted of having intimated to the House that the arrangements for the Paris visit were made without their knowledge.

Mr. Lloyd George interjected: The only wire I received said you were coming to Paris with the Russian delegates and Mr. Ramsay Mac? Donald.

Mr. Bonar Law also interposed that Mr. Henderson's colleagues gave no intimation of his intention to visit Paris until the arrangements were made and they clearly expressed their disapproval ox the visit.

Mr. Henderson replied: That does not alter the fact tfcat the Cabinet at a special meeting discussed the visit. Proceeding, he said he announced at that meeting the Labour executive's decision to recommend the acceptance of the Stockholm invitation. The opinion in the Cabinet was sharply divided. All his1 colleagues were opposed to him. He offered to resign. He explained to Mr. Lloyd George his opinion regarding a consultative conference at Stockholm. After his return from Paris, Mr. Lloyd George invited him to a special Cabinet meeting. He was kept waiting outside a full hour and then Mr. Bafnes was sent out to make a statement. He (Mr. Hen^ derson) said to Mr. Barnes, "Do not. do business in this way," and he addggi that he was either a member of the Cabinet or not. If he were, then he would talk to the Cabinet. Mr. Barnes conveyed his message, and Mr. Henderson was admitted to the room. Mr. Lloyd George explained that he had been kept waiting out of regard to his personal feelings. He protested at the treatment, and complained he had not been given an opportunity to state in the Cabinet, his reasons in favour of accepting the Stockholm invitation. The Cabinet had already received the law officers' advice against participation, and he suggested the immediate announcement thereof if the Government proposed to act. on it. He also said he would resign if the Cabinet acted on it. The other Labour Ministers considered a Labour conference should not be fettered by the law officer's advice. Mr. Henderson denied that he had, been requested to announce the Government's position to Friday's conference, and said he would have resigned first. Mr. 'Lloyd George, in a letter, said if he were committed to the Stockholm Conference he ought, to have resigned. His speech on Friday was simply an impartial statement of the Labour executive's view. He spoke as a Labour secretary, and he contended that he gave the Conference a correct summary of the Russian Government's position. He had been censured for not stating that the Russian Government was opposed to a mandatory conference. He impressed that upon the conference. If a telegram had been received from Kerensky on Friday he had not received it, but while waiting in the Premier's secretary's room, after the close of the conference, he was told that Kerensky, m his telegram, disassociated himself from the Stockholm Conference. He had received the letter from Mr. Lloyd George on Friday, when quitting: the platform.

Mr. Henderson explained that he flid not read Mr. Lloyd George's letter to the Conference because he had ■already informed the Conference that Russia's position regarding the Stockholm Conference had been notified. "Cabinet was aware," he continued, "that I resolutely favoured the Stockholm Conference. Mr. Lloyd George's letter suggests that I should have resigned knowing the adverse view of my colleagues. If I had r«signed before the Conference the vote in favour of the Stockholm Conference would have been larger, enabling it to be raid that it was not a vote on the merits, but on Mr. Henderson's resignation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S REPLY.

Received August 14, 7.30 p.m

LONDON, August 13. Mr. Lloyd George said he did not intend to reply to *he trivialities comprising three-quarters of Mr. Henderson's speech. All the members of

the Cabinet understood that Mr. Henderson had changed his mind and intended to strongly oppose the Stockholm Conference and state the Government's position. If Mr. Henderson had done the latter, he would have greatly influenced the Labour Conference against the Stockholm Conference.

Replying to Mr. Snowden, Mr. Lloyd George refused to state who wrote the telegram received on Friday. His letter to Mr. Henderson on Friday was sent in good time and should have reached him in good time. At all events Mr. Henderson could have read it to the Conference before the vote was taken, and it would have made a substantial difference in the voting of the vast majority of the conference. Nothing was more fatal than such a" conference with the enemy at the very moment when the Russians' first step towards the restoration of discipline was to prevent the fraternisation of the armies at the front. The English, French, Italian and American Governments were agreed upon that and decided that peace terms, if discussed, must be discussed by the representatives of the whole nation. He was the last man to disparage Labour's powers, but Labour was not the whole people. When peace came to be made it must be made by the nation as a whole. Britain would not be doing her duty to her allies, especially Russia, If she concentrated (contemplated?) a sectional peace.