HANDS BENEATH THE SEA.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume XLIX, Issue 12593, 6 September 1905, Page 6

HANDS BENEATH THE SEA.

CASE FOR THE CHANNEL TUNNEL.

(By George Lynch in the "London Daily Chronicle.")

To-day in the House of Commons Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice will ask the Secretary to the Board of Trade if any communications have recently taken place in regard to the Channel Tunnel between the British >and French Governments, and if it is proposed to continue tho prohibition which has prevented the progress of the work on this sido. The question will be fkit at an opportune moment. Never were the relations of Great Britain and France more cordial than they are at the present time. At Brest a few days ago M. Collingnon, prefect of Finisterre, when greeting Admiral May in the name of tho French Government on board the King Edward VII., said, in an eloquent speech, "The friendship of the two great peoples who have the longest and ifcost glorious history, and who are devoted to tho same ideal of peace and civilisation, will be the greatest and happiest event of the century which is beginning." The development of this friendship is a great factor making for the maintenance of peace. It can best b-> cultivated by facilitating the intercourse between the peoples of the two countries. Considering the distance that separates us, it is quite extraordinary how little we see of our nextdoor neighbours. The number of tourists from France who annually visit our shores is ridiculously small. The horrors of the double journey across the Channel are mainly accountable for this. Tho risk of mal de mer is what deters tho thousands who consider a visit to England too dearly, bought at the price of a double dose of sea-sickness. OLD OBJECTIONS SILENCED. M. Cambon, in a speech on May 6th, said that he hoped the construction of a Channel tunnel would be the outcome and development of the growing friendship of the two peoples. At the time when the construction of this (project was last under serious consideration it was proved that so far from there being any serious engineering difficulties, the stratum of chalk which ran from one shore to the other ideal for tunnelling through; and the improvements in tunnelling work since then—during tho past quarter of a century—have made" tho proposition still easier.

It was mainly on military grounds that the scheme was at that time rejected. Since then, however, the means at our disposal for 'safe-guarding ourselves have been so improved and perfected that most of the objections put forward in 1882 may either be considered not to exist, or to have modified to such an extent as to merit careful reconsideration. Additional fortifications and a greatly increased garrison at Dovev wero then the chief safe-guard relied upon for the protection of the English encl of the tunnel. The greater part or the evidence given against the scheme dealt with the danger of having ihf-se fortifications surpised and cap-^ turod by an invading foice at a time of profound peace without any declaration or war, and although the chances ot carrying, out such, an exploit* under;the combination oi-f c^cumsiiances which 1 would be- necessary for its'successful accomplishment was admitted to be small, yet it was agreed by the select committeo that it was a risk that the country should not run. Although the means iov flooding or destroying the tunnel v ere then considered, they occupied only a secondly place, and it is in this direction that I consider that the conditions have been -altered. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. The means at the disposal of our engineers for both blowing up and floodisig tho tunnel now are such that they would be quite independent of the capture of the Dover end, and the strength of tho fortifications there would be a matter of altogether secondary importance. If the whole of Dover were in the hands of the enemy the tunnel could be destroyed and the thirty miles of its extent flooded with equal facility from Log don,'or from Edinburgh for that matter. It is childish and ridiculous to hold with the high and powerful explosives which wo noiv possess and the knowledge of how to use them, that we would not be able to destroy the tunnel in half-a-dozen places if we desired to do so. In fact it could be made such a...veritable death-trap that it is doubtful if the troops of any trmy in the world, unless, perhaps, the Japanese, could be got to enter it. As regards the obstruction of the tunnel, apart from its complete destruction, Colonel Majendie, C.8., R.A., in his evidence before the Select Committee, in 1333, said. "There are any number of ways of obstructing it; there is no difficulty about that; if you Im've warning, and you want simply to close tho tunnel, or temporarily to disable the tunnel, or to deny it to an enemy, there could be no difficulty in multiplying means which would be perfectly effective." The modes suggested for the temporary closing of the tunnel were various, from those of a merely .temporary nature rising to the higher class of those, which were called "temporary demolitions,"' which won id render the tunnel useless, and deny it to an enemy i'oj* a much longer period, on to iiie methods for destroying the tunnel utterly, when Colonel Majendie says "a hole might be made which would so effectively destroy the tunnel that it would do almost ay cheap or as easy to make. a new one as to repair the old one." (4,598, p. 414). ' .. As the means at oar disposal for the obstruction or destruction ci: the tunnel have been improved since the evidenco was given twenty-two years ago, it is reasonable to suppose that they will be still further perfected during the ten years that must elapse before it can bo completedA PROPITIOUS MOMENT.

Uncertainly 'appears that there is a fair case now i'or reconsidering the whole proposition. The mere mooting of this question hi England would be to hold out the hand of friendship in a way deeply significant of the genuineness of onj- feeling. There would bo something more permanent in it than tiio effervescent- sparkle of champagne in the glasses raised to cordial toasts. The engineering .skill of tho two nations W certainly oqinil to the task of closing the open door between the neighbours if ever the time should come when that will be necessary. To those who study the high politics of the world, arid K-;>k for the maintenance of. peace as the statesman's highest aim I appear, ami k*k is there anyL/nng t-nat stands out more luminously cle;v than tho essential importance of Franco and England becoming fast and genuine friends. Through Franco v."c may come to a rlnal unclevsfancUng with Russia. By our alliance with Japan our word cannot ho giun.sakl if wo say there shall bo peace in the Pacific. A similar understanding with France, and might wo not jointly ueclarf that Europe must have pc-ace? Ts not everything propitious at vliis mosnent for opening tho ueighhonrly door and giving the friendly neighbours t-hs o|)i>ortnnity of know ing ami understanding :nu! appreciating each oth.cr hotter? Has not the tnne come for the two great democracies or Europe—tho one not the less i>, democracy beennso Edward the Peacemaker is its King—to grasp hands beneath, tho sea?