APPEAL UNDER LICENSING ACT.

Wanganui Chronicle, 5 March 1901, Page 2

APPEAL UNDER LICENSING ACT.

At the Supreme Court an Saturday, before Mr. Justice Edwards, the case I'oole, appellant, and Cooper (Police), respondent, an •appeal no matters of fact and law from decision of the Stipendary Magistrate (C. C Kettle, Esq.), at Wanganui, was taken. .The appellant on the 11th February was cc.Evicted for permitting drunkenness to take place at his licensed premises at Aramolio on 31st December last, and1 he now appealed from such decision..

Mr. Barnicoat appeared for appellant, and Mr. Fitzherbert for the respondent. His Honor remarked that of course it w<is quite light that there should be provision for appeal from a magistrate's decision on matters of fact, but the magistrate being in quite as good as, and in some ciises probably a better position to decide on facts than ■ a judge, that the appeal should be to 'three judges instead of to one. Mr. Fitzherbert briefly opened the case, p.nd called witnesses, viz., Brider, Crilly, Gibson, Worseley, and J. Gatfield. ■ ' Mr. Barnicoat, for the defendant (applicant), called witnesses, viz,, Messrs. Poole, John Gibson, Paul Fremont, Francts, Lowe, H. Poole, and Cannon.

The evidence of John Gibson, Frederick Loato, and Henry Cannon was not given in the court below, and on that around Mr. Fitzherbert objected to it being admitted at the hearing of appeal. His Honour reserved the point.

Mr. Barnicoat, in addressing the court, said that the consequences of a conviction in this case were very serious to his client, inasmuch that the conviction must be endorsed on the license. In r this case the conviction was in consequence of an inference drawn from evidence which was very weak, and the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt. Several authorities were quoted to show that a publican cannot be rightly convicted of the offenca in question without there is guilty knowledge, connivance, or gross carelessness. Counsel also argued that within the meaning of the section drunkenness was not that state in which a person might be described as "merry," but more within the meaning of the term "drunk," as applied by policemen. Mr. Fitzherbert, in reply, said that in tl.-is case it was proved that at least one of the persons who were drinking on the premises on the occasion in question was shortly afterwards in a state of •drunkenness, and this was sufficient to convict. He quoted the case of Ethelstane v. Justices of Oswestry to show that the fact of a person who was supplied with liquor by a publican, shortly afterwards being found in a state of drunkenness, was held to be proof that drunkenness was permitted on the premises. _ -... ■ .

His Honor reserved his decision,