Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1940. GERMANY’S NEED OF HELP.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 23 December 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1940. GERMANY’S NEED OF HELP.

TN view of the general trend of the war, and not. least of the shattering blows lately struck against Italy m i iya ana in Albania, as well as in her own territory, it is natural, that Hitler and his fellow gangsters should be looking• around anxiously and eagerly for some means of beating «P additional support. The recent dealings of the Nazis with both Fiance and Japan command attention particularly from that standpoint The aim of the Nazis in France ot course is to gain control of the French Mediterranean colonies and ot what is left of the French fleet, with other French resources and it is clear that in their attempts to gain complete control over the Vichy Government they are restrained only by the fear that an open and unrestricted use o"f brute force would drive into revolt every Frenchman, in the colonies or elsewhere, to whom any liberty is left. The Nazis are just as obviously seeking to make use of Japan as of France. As an American correspondent in Berlin wrote recently:— It is frankly recognised in all German quarters that the main purpose of bringing Japan into the Axis camp on a military basis was to reduce the weight of American aid m the European military balance, or at least to prevent that weight from increasing beyond its present degree. The actual purpose of the pact was more than just to present the United States with Japan as an inevitable enemy in its rear if it should decide to enter the war.... There was also the hope that in the immediate future it would cause the United States to reduce its shipments of munitions and aeroplanes to England, both because of the greater need foi American home defence from the increased Japanese tin eat and because of assumed' reduction in British prospects.

The news of the weekend shows that the German dictatorship is either entertaining or pretending to entertain hopes that Japan may allow herself to be made use of in this way. Nazi charges against members of the staff of the American Embassy in Paris, the declaration of a Nazi spokesman that American aid to Britain is “unsupportable and no longer tolerable and reports that the recent speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister —a speech in which Mr Matsuoka declared that Japan would be loyal to her allies and that her policy henceforth would revolve round the Three-Power Pact—has been hailed in Berlin, are all significant from this standpoint. Nazi Germany of course would be delighted beyond words if Japan went to war with the United States, or with both that country and the British Empire, but even an element of saying sense should be sufficient to deter the rulers of Japan from gratifying that desire. Taking account, amongst other things, of possibilities of commerce raiding, Japan- admittedly could do a good deal, for a time at least, to assist Germany. On the other hand, she has no hope whatever of getting assistance of any kind from the Axis Powers and in entering the war would invite both the destruction of her economic life and overwhelming attack. Presumably nothing but the hope of being able to pursue a course of successful and profitable aggression would induce the militarist oligarchy now in control of Japan to enter the war. For that course of aggression Japan enjoys some initial advantages of position and her rulers have in a measure prepared the way in their occupation of parts of French Indo-/ China and their intrigues in Thailand, which they may regard as opening a corridor for attack by land on Singapore. Given the opportunity, the men who now control Japan undoubtedly would like to lay hands on the Dutch East Indies—it is considered probable that* these have been allotted to Japan in a secret clause of the Three-Power Pact—and they could hardly hope to do that without capturing Singapore. Against any aspirations on these lines that the Japanese militarists may cherish, however, there are some very formidable facts to be set. Although no formal treaty has been concluded by the English-speaking nations, it is not in doubt that tliet United States and the British Empire would act in close concert against an extension of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. As a measure of intimidation, the Three-Power Pact has been a most complete failure. While they are carefully leaving it open to Japan to abate her aggression, Britain and the United States have made their attitude clear in the extension of further aid to China and the United States has imposed embargoes on the export to Japan of some vital materials, including aviation spirit and scrap metal. Entering the war, Japan would lose at a stroke the greater part of her export markets and would become at once wholly dependent upon such reserves as she has been able to build up of a large proport ion of her principal war and industrial materials. The position has to be considered also with the fact in mind Hint Japan s. military and economic resources, as a writer in the “Christian Science Monitor” observed not long ago, are heavily mortgaged for the campaign in China, in which roughly 1,000,000 men, a considerable portion of her shipping anc much of her air force engaged. As to the military and naval position which would confront Japan if she entered the war, it is tolerably certain u u ” _ 11S would include the establishment at Singapore ot a s long American battle fleet, to supplement "whatever naval oiccs Britain was able to spare for the Far East. An important detail aspect of the position concerns relations with Russia. The Japanese, militarists pel nips , welcome an opportunity of attacking Russia in the d J ‘’ while Germany attacked her in Europe. Unless ,e -' * tirely reckless, however, the rulers of Japan aie ■ consider the possibility that the deleat of mn j partners might leave Japan very much at the lUC !\ "p ‘ ‘ On the whole, there seem to be reasonably gooc » ' hoping and believing that, though Japanese po ic. ■ • tinne, in Mr Matsuoka’s phrase, to revolve round II ee--I’ower Pact, Japan is hardly likely [° make i( P > » . , war with the United States and Ihe British Empn evne i . , and his gang would so much like her to ina ve. eimanj s undoubted need of additional support in ** se ’ <1 l ) ‘ 111 ie best possible reasons for abstaining from hasty and foolish action.