THE COMMAND OF THE AIR.

Waipawa Mail, Volume XXXVI, Issue 7749, 15 July 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

THE COMMAND OF THE AIR.

An outstanding feature of tho successful Allied offensive on the .Western front lias been the valuable and effective work of tho British and Frenm aeroplanes. Tho cabled reports indicate that although our air fleets have not come through the ordeal unscatjud, they have certainly established their superiority over the enemy aircraft. As a military writer puts it is not to the actual number of machines lost by the respective bolligrents that we should look before arriving at conclusion, in this respect, out in tho nature of the results achieved. A comparison of the losses would pro** r.biy show a slight balance in favor ;t tho enemy, but this is only what wc n.’ght expect, when it is consider.! that, in order t< establish command o. the air along tho lino of advance :.*jr aeroplanes were also on the offensive. They had to push on over tho enemy’s lines, and meet not only tho attacks of tho opposing air fleets, but a'so the tire from tho German anti-aircraft guns below. It is a distinct military advantage if, during tho bombardment prior to an offensive, tho aeroplanes of tho attacking forces Are able to prove it enemy aircraft from intorefering with I tho work of tho artillery. Hostile machines over tho lines of an army delivering an attack are able to render great assistance to their own artillerv liv “spotting,’ as well as by collecting valuable information as to tho methods adopted by the attackers in bringing up fresh reserves, in order to continue the advance. It was, therefore, most desirable that the prying eyes of *Uo German armies between Arras and Roye should ho blindfolded both before and during tho course of the present ogelisive. This tho British and French airmen succeeded in doing ; a a recent French eommuniquo state J; —“Our aeroplanes have been master j throughout. Only nino of tho enemy have been seen; uomo has crossed our lines/’ while General Sir Douglas Haig’s report said :...“The Gorman aircraft made several attempts to taka the offensive, but were all driven buck. Subsequently the aircraft were held fa; behind the German lines.' These statements leave no doiiou as to who be d command of the air during the important first stage of the Battle of ,hc Somme. Tho efficiency of our ncxv*~ [ilanes and pilots should have a reassuring effect upon those who feared that tho Fokker and other German machines wero superior to the l>nt;sh type. That our airmen diave been able to dissipate any doubts which have been entertained on this subje.it is aU the more laudable when we remember tho initial difficulties against which our air service had to contend. In an article published in the “Quarterly Review” recently on “Aircraft in the War” tho wrier referred to some of these early disadvantages and tho methods of overcoming them as fallows: — “Speed and climbing power had been obtained in all our craft, not :y using big engines—for, unlike the Germans, wo had no big engines Lo use — but by iiorodynumio skill in producing wings of remarkab'o efficiency, bodies of low resistance to tho air, and propellers of tine design. The results thus achieved wero adequate to earlier conditions; but tho conditions chai.iged. It bocanio necessary to attach to the aoroplune externally devices which Logeth ;r constituted serious impediments to the free flow of air past a rapidly moving machine. Such obstructions included cameras, bombs, bombsights, wireless apparuus and aerial wires, ammunition boxes, machine-guns and thair mountings, and occasionally exfc-vi petrol tanks, wnile not infrequently the internal load was added to by observers’ magnetic compasses, maps, ind other sundries. Moreover, the necessity for frequent lighting in the air involved the removal of substantial portions of Lhe wings in order that tli* pilot and gunner snould not bo cut off from tho earliest-possible view of ; U approaching enemy aeroplane. The result was that much of the power formerly available for propulsion and speed was expended in thrusting against those large resistances and lifting these heavy weights, and thus the need ol higher powered engines became imperative. ... It was because of this ‘leliooit of power that wo fought with 7(J-h.p. and 80-h.p. engines, while, engines of over 160-h.p. wero available to tho enemy even before tho war began. . . . Jt was only tho clearly inferior aerodynamics displayed by tho German equipment which saved us lrom serious discomfiture >n tho air.” Tho writer then proceeds to mention somo of tho later machines, which arc fitted with higher powered engines, but states that it is not permissih'o to give details of those at present. Major-General Mir David Henderson’s statement, mentioned a few days-ago in tho cables, to tlui effect that Britain now has aeroplanes capable of flying to certain Zeppelin sheds and returning in seasonable weather, suggests that these later types are considered equal to requirsmnts.