Behind the Headlines in the War News

Waikato Independent, Volume XL, Issue 3665, 8 February 1940, Page 3

Behind the Headlines in the War News

THE WAR AT SEA

GERMAN STRATEGY THE ARMY IN RESERVE Germany, with probably the moat powerful army in the world, is, after three months of war, still holding that weapon in reserve and is experimenting with the possibility of fighting England in England’s own element — the 'sea (writes an American observer in Germany). In the opinion of Germany’s military leaders, the experiment so far is working satisfactorily, although the army is being kept poised ready for instant use if at any time confidence is lost in the ability to carry out the attack on sea under the present system. While it is obvious that as yet there have been no sufficiently decisive actions to justify long-range conclusions, the fact remains that the German offensive against England’s 'sea power is the outstanding aspect of the war in the West to date.

It has unquestionably carried German control of the North Sea farther from Germany's coastline than it ever extended at any period during the last wax’, except, pei’haps, during those fateful moments when the decision hung in the balance of the challenge to the Bi’itish Navy made by Admiral Reinhard Sheer and Admiral Franz von Hipper at Jutland. German Sea Patrol. The fact is that to-day it is German, not English, ships which' are patrolling the eastern part of the North Sea and ranging along the coast of the Danish Peninsula, making it possible for the Gei’man merchant ships to carry on 'some trade with the Scandinavian ports and permitting many others, including those temporarily at Murmansk, to make some ports. In this way considei’able neutral trade from Scandinavian ports, which was quite impossible in the last war, i's being maintained. The sinking of the Rawalpindi off the coast of Iceland, while perhaps it had more of the aspect of a raid into enemy territory than any evidence of the extent of effective German control, nevertheless pi’esents striking evidence of the freedom with which units of the German fleet are roving far from their home ports. How permanent this German extension of naval power into the North Sea is must await the x’e'sult of the British counter offensive which has not yet developed. Bi’itain apparently is content for the time being to restrict German power at sea by flexible, long-range l’esistance, which' pi’esum-

ably is intended to maintain an effective blockade without subjecting British ship's to the full force of an air attack from land-based planes. But whatever qualifications must be made, the significant fact remains that the big military story of the war in the West—and the only military story of any importance—is this German offensive against British sea power which leaves Germany’s strongest military weapon unused and upon the result of which may depend the future character of the war. Germany’s Problems. This unexpected turn in the development of the war in the West is the answer of the German staff, at least for the time being, to the problem presented by the three military handicaps under. which Germany entered the war. It entered the war facing, first, a war on two fronts; second, a marked inferiority in actual naval strength; and third, the certainty of a blockade which would immediately and drastically reduce supplies of vital raw materials. Its first effort was directed at removing the war from two fronts and it 'succeeded —for whatever period of time the political situation in eastern Europe remains constant —in the swift, decisive conquest of Poland. With the conclusion of the Polish campaign, emphasis instantly shifted to meeting the problem of the second handicap. By combining a powerful air force with a small, but modern navy, the German high command has produced a military weapon which ha's delivered a series of hard jolts to Britain’s sea power and is to-day undertaking, by this new co-odination of air and sea weapons a powerful effort to win the war for Germany by breaking Britains’ might at sea and starving England by a counter blockade. The blockade was the least pressing of the'se handicaps and one which seriously concerned the high command only in the event of a protracted war. Its danger was reduced by the conclusion of the Soviet pact before the war started which, to the military high command, was an untarnished boon. It removed the threat of a serious war in the east and opened the prospect of enormous reserves of raw materials. The naval offensive against England is another blow at the blockade which, if successful, would prevent this handicap from ever developing. ; ,7 Thus, in the opinion of German military leaders the war has already witnessed the removal of the first handicap; it has seen Germany counterbalance the second handicap by 'supplementing its naval strength with air power, and is witnessing now a gradual progress against the blockade. The land war in the West unques-

tionably has been trivial. Some romanticised accounts in September and early October produced the impres'sion that the French Army had undertaken, a serious attack on the Siegfried line. Information now available, including a personal examination of the entire front by American correspondents, has made clear that the operations carried out by the French army in the sector from Luxemburg to the Rhine were almost exclusively of a reconnoitring character. At sea, only at sea, has Germany seriously pressed the war in the West. But in that element it has achieved, with its numerically inferior forces* some spectacular successes. Beginning with the sinking of the Courageous, on September 19, German naval and air forces have continually harried Britsh warships and merchantmen, apparently driving the former far back from the German sector of the Noi'th Sea. Captain Gunther Priens’ submarine attack in Scapa Flow, and his subsequent escape, provides one of the most daring exploits of modern naval history, although the toll taken in merchant tonnage is probably far more important. Whether Germany has paid a heavy price for these successes is a closely guarded secret here. The Naval Ministry announcement of October 28 . conceded the loss of three submarines up to that date. No admissions of losses have been published since then. Quick Decision Sought. The restriction of German offensive operations to an attack on Britain’s sea power by no means implies that German is settling down for a pro-, traeted war. On-the contrary every indication here points to a desire to seek a quick decision against England. The basic assumption is that England is the only real enemy and that if England can be weakened sufficiently the war will end on a basis satisfactory to Germany, with France withdrawing to the sidelines as a neutral spectator. The current strategy of using only sea and air attack against the British sea power has great advantages in avoiding many complications which must ensue if Germany decides to attempt to get nearer to .England, To obtain -nearer bases of operation against England would mean either forcing the French line, thereby carrying the war directly into France, which is still being scrupulously avoided, or going through the Low Countries, which means running the risk of causing a revision of sentiment in America which for the moment fs relatively harmless to Germany, although basically unfriendly. The German high command, well aware of these imposing reasons, is refraining from either the French or low countries route to England. It is this writer’s opinion that neither of these routes will be taken so long as the offensive at sea progesses to the satisfaction of the high command and the leaders of the Government. There have been rumours here continually of differences on the merits of this strategy. The only known fact, however, is that for three months Germany’s military strategy in the west has been to wage a naval war with naval forces supported by air power.