GERMAN CAVALRY IN WAS.

Tuapeka Times, Volume XLV, Issue 6220, 12 December 1914, Page 4

GERMAN CAVALRY IN WAS.

' In view of the important part played i i>v ine 'vjuimuii cavairy during the i!IJ4 ill JjelglUlll, it is interesting to ilOtO 11iv loiluunig extracts ,I'row tienerai . von iiuriiliardi'.-i book on "Cavalry iu (.''mure Wars.'' ui"UiNu JlxOiilMaixliOA. i'reinaiure advance oi: the ravairy i.uaug uiuUi-iibaiioii and conceinrauou c;.u uiuy piocun. juloiiuatioii oi uluie or no Mupoi'i.iiiru, lor the oxibung raiiI ILL' UU'cL'U'OJi oi IdLO IrOiUiei'li, aiiu liu*. pcaeu-liivo di'StrtDuiiou ox the truopo jvvcat au L-ius to tire general hv.ai bcieiebanu. 'iiiese, together with iJic .HX-ret service, political comlitious ouiainmg at the uiijuicutj and press mv, jul M>inr degree ol precision. tlie genelojiigenco, wiii enable one to forecast I'ii.i Mtuauon. .lk.iUAu lIIJLUiiNKUAJj ADYAMJ& lite uo,im.\o purpose uniy beguu i wnuu imporiauD and potsiUie u\ska can nc gu'un. lo tile cavalry 1.0., •vviiuii the imati Oodles ol khe enemy become ready lor operations. iaeii u heroines our duiy to screen not only lJil j iUivaiit'i." oi our </ivn Hoops a.nd to secure to our ilk; advantages oi Doing able to advance Ui.uisLiir,in:Lt, uui the ci/uiax oi all these uiuies wilt be reacneu in tile lar more important duly, in ine jiow iuaispen.hray.e taali, oi securing liie widest uoo- • i.ue spnere oi intelligence. ttiiercuv* during tLe period of railway c-ouceiitraLion iJie iront ol tlie enemy was ojnditurned by Liie ends oi tlie imes , in bringing up the troops, i \v.uo in turn spread themselves out to uiui:-e the lvsounes oi ilio country (hence generally our patrols, id' sent one. would conic in. con tael ail along the threaiencu troi'uer or the enemy's i no or dotrainnient, with defended villages, eicj, li.c troops will now be drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group ineniftelvew together into cieany- I UCUIIL'U UULSbOS.

iluiu will therefore now arise boUci'ii ocparato poruoiiis of his army and. their hue* oi advances spaces unoccupied by troops, into wb.ioii our cavalry can penetrate. The heads and Hanks of his columns can now be <loicrniiiied, and (lie direction in winch tiiey are inarching, ikus ascertained, bi'coinew o) esseuiiai importance.

.vow is iho time wiiou tho cavalry must put, in its lull strength to discover the .sirengiJi and direction of -die enemy's movements, and the fact of tins concentration provides the cavalry wuh tlio opportunities necessary to solve tlie problem before it. On the results now obtained tlie success of tlie whole campaign may entiroly depend. At tliis climax 110 secondary consideration must be allowed to distract attention from the principal object. liven the desirability of screening the movements of one's own army, in so far as this duty is not fuliilled by she reconnaissance itself, must give way to tho attainment of tlio principal object in view, which is intelligence, not security. WilV UHLANS WENT TO GHENT. 'lo secure information—i.e., intelligence—requires concentration of force. The reconnoitring cavalry must beat their opponents out of the field in order to obtain opportunities foi discovering what is going 011 behind the enemy's protective* screen. To accomplish tnis tike cavalry must endeavor to work round' the adversary's fiaiiiks, and may in consequence have to leave the front 1 of its own army entirely uncovered. In what concerns the cavalry in the further course of the war, the necessity botji of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again; and in many cases, even after the enemy has been beaten out of tho field, these objects will still only be obtained 1 by fighting. Such cases will occur in tie duties at screening and security when the enemy I still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a reconnaissance with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves are engaged in. a. similar manner; also in all such cases in whicJi turning movements entail too much delay or are rendered iniipossible by the extension of tho enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their pa/rt renew offensive operations. CIVILIANS AND RAIDS. The necessity of breaking through the line of infantry outposts at order to

discover the whereabouts of tihe enemy's principal masses and the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise, and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly the civilian population. Further, our cavalry will be called on (or attempts against the enemy's communication! the strategical importance of which ihas been already discussed, and these will be all the more important in eases where the district we are I fighting is too poor to supply the enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris and Plevna, and it becomes desirable to hinder tihe use of the railways for tne transport of troops or evacuation! of supplies. Lastly, the oavalry may be called 1 on to occupy wide stretches of oouotry and exploit their resouroes, to nip »n their very inception the formation of fresh txxiies of armed defenders, or on the defensive, to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by flying columns of the enemy. Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy's armies, will frequently assume the character of "raids," in which the essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with the sacrifice of pll communications with one's own forces, to appear suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion of one« immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy cam bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant. The suocess of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the ranidity with which the opportunities ieeured by ®udh surprise are utilised, and on the other on the available fighting power which must sufffiioe to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.