TEST CASE.

Star (Christchurch), Volume LXIV, Issue 940, 9 December 1933, Page 32 (Supplement)

TEST CASE.

Verdict Goes to City Council. HEAVY TRAFFIC LAWS. In a test case of Dominion-wide importance, the Supreme Court has held that the Heavy Traffic Regulations apply to the Canterbury Education Board and the motor vehicles owned by it. The case was heard by Mr Justice Ostler on November 27, when the Christchurch City'Council initiated proceedings to determine whether the obligations of the Heavy Motor Vehicles Regulations, 1932, applied to the board. It was then stated that the question turned on whether or not the board could claim the prerogative of the Crown. Mr R. J. Loughnan appeared for the City Council as plaintiff and Mr Lascelles conducted the case for the board ‘‘The contention on behalf of defendant board is that it is really a department of State, either a servant or a statutory agent of the Crown, and as such entitled to all the prerogatives of the Crown, including the prerogative of not being bound by a statute unless so provided in the statute.” stated his Honor. ‘‘Education boards are by the statute created corporate bodies with perpetual succession and a common seal, and it is expressly provided that they may do and suffer all such things as bodies corporate may do and suffer. This has been the legal status of education boards ever since the passing of the Education Act of 1877. In my opinion, if the legislature had intended that education boards should possess the prerogatives and exemptions of the Crown it would have used language very different from the words used in section 24 of the Act. No Crown Privileges.

‘‘l agree with Mr Justice Blair that the effect of section 24 of the Act is to constitute an education board a statutory corporate body separate and distinct from the Crown, so that it cannot claim any of the privileges of the Crown. I agree also with the reasons given for that decision. In that case an education board endeavoured unsuccessfully to set up exactly the same privilege as is attempted to be set up here—the privilege of not being bound by a statute. That case* is directly in point, and has remained unquestioned for five years. If an education board is in the same position as a department of State, then it has not only the privilege of not being bound bv statute, but it can equally claim every other prerogative of the Crown. One of such prerogatives is that the writ of mandamus will not lie against the Crown or its officers or servants, but I see no reason to doubt that a writ of mandamus could be issued against an education board if it declined to perform a mandatory statutory duty, and the Court has on several occasions issued injunctions against such boards.

‘‘lf education boards are entitled to the prerogatives of the Crown, school committees must be equally so entitled, for part of the authority for the management of State schools has been delegated to such committees. A claim by a school committee that it was not subject to the statute law unless the Crown was named would be both novel and startling. Moreover, if education boards are entitled to the exemptions of the Crown, harbour boards, hospital boards, and the numerous other boards established by legislation for the carrying out of public functions must be equally so entitled, but the tendency of the Courts in recent years in England has been to restrict the doctrine, and to distinguish between government functions and public functions. Corporate Responsibilities.

“The mere fact that /education boards are incorporated by our legislation is not in itself conclusive against its claim, but where the legislature has not only incorporated education boards, but has expressly provided that they can do and suffer all things which can be done and suffered by bodies corporate, and where in addition statutory duties and powers and discretions are vested in such boards, I think it is made sufficiently plain that they are not the servants or agents of the Crown, and are, therefore, not entitled to claim the prerogatives of the Crown. ‘‘ln my opinion the obligations created by the Heavy Traffic Regulations apply to the defendant board and the heavy motor vehicles owned by it. 1 assume that education boards have power to own heavy motor vehicles, for that point has not been argued before me. The defendant board? will have to pay the costs of the case, which I fix at £7 7s and disbursements.”;