GERMAN FLEET’S SUICIDE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12717, 12 August 1919, Page 6

GERMAN FLEET’S SUICIDE.

BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN. (From Our Special Correspondent.) . . LONDON, Juno 23. It is quite possible that in scuttling the German fleet at Scnpa Flow, Admiral von Reuter imagined that lie would give a nasty twist to the Lion’s tail, and without endangering his own sxm win a niche for himself in the Teutonic Temple of Fame as a “ hero ” j reat ar- Fie may also have had an idea that he would in some way embarrass the Allies. But as a matter of fact he .has saved them from having to face a position which might possibly have _ caused embarrassment, and maybe friction s later on. The question of what should be done with these vessels had not been squarely faced. It is understood that the notion favoured by the British and American naval authorities was that i the ships should be taken out to sea and consigned to the care of Davy Jones’s I very deep water safe deposit. But if we have interpreted rightly remarks appearing in the French and Italian Pre=s from time to time, the naval authorities of those countries were rather inclined to add a pronoHion of the surrendered ships to their own navies, and were in favour of a distribution of the spoil among the Allies. In that event, the larger share would presumably have fallen to Great Britain, for it is impossible to conceive of any other basis of division than a ton-for-lon policy in accordance with the losses sustained during the war. as adopted in regard to merchant shipping. The divergence of views between the Allies as to the fate of the German men-of-war might, under certain circumstances, hare developed into differences between the various parties not easy to compose. This would have been particularly unfortunate, for the Gorman shins, as a rule, would not have been suitable for incorporation in any other fleet owing to their peculiar types ol guns, torpedoes, ammunition, etc. Admiral von Router has. at the expense of his honour and dignity, ruled out this possible clement of discord among the Allies, and possibly posterity may feel disposed to regard ns almost praiseworthy what, we to-dav arcvituperating tersely, or with a wealth of mordant additions as temperament dictates, as a “low-down, dirty German trick.” Perhaps it wac as well that, Admiral von Reuter should at this particular juncture in the Peace parleying«. afford us yet another illustration of Teutonic mentality; yet another proof that those who place any reliance on the good faith of "the Germans are, to use a homely, hut fullv expressive phrase, “ simply begging for trouble.” Our naval _ authorities were sufficientlv wise to tins fact to arrange for the anchorage of the German ships in quarters where, if they -should happen to sink, they would not interfere materially with navigation in Scnpa Flow. They did not insist on having any British guards on board as a precaution against trickery, which fact may be regarded in some quarters as a trifle suggestive, but the omission was no douby due to the fact that our naval authorities, having taken care not to subject the Germans to the temptation of trying to “bottle up” our own Fleet at Scapa, did not contemplate the other eventuality. The German Admiral pleads that ho understood that the armistice was at an end and that in sinking the ships he was merely carrying out the order issued at an early stage of the struggle that no German ship should be surrendered. The vessels, however, were not at his disposal. In accordance with the terms drawn up by the Allied Naval Commission in Paris, they were interned pending the preparation and signing of the Peace Treaty, which would decide their fate. The Peace Treaty had not yet been signed, and the armistice was still “in beging” when Admiral von Renter gave the word for the scuttling. And the ships had already been surrendered in the tamest possible manlier. Defeat had been admitted, and for seven months skeleton crews had remained on board the interned vessels pending the decision of the Allied Powers as to their disposal. Under such circumstances the Admiral’s plea is worse than stupid, especially in view of the fact that orders of a recent date relating to the scuttling programme, and signed by him, have been discovered by our naval authorities. "Whether von Reuter acted upon instructions received from Berlin since the Armistice or not we do not know, but in all probability he acted upon his own initiative.

These ships were not prisoners of war,' he said. “I think it is an ac-! cepted thing that the crew of a captured ship can rise and roe-apture it if they can. But these were not captured snips. They were sent over by the Germans themselves to a. particular locality in a demarcated area, in accordance with the terms of the armistice. Therefore the ships were not held by prize crews. We depended upon the honour of the Germans and the engagement they had made at the armistice. The sinking of the ships is a very serious breach of the laws of war .ind of honour. My belief is that the officers and men would he properly liable to trial by court-martial, and that the offence which they have committed is a capital offence. The most suitable pnmshement, on conviction, would bo a long term—say 15 years—of penal servitude.” The general view of the Navy concerning the occurrence is that it’is the best thing that could have happened, and will save endless worry and bickerings later on. But it is agreed that Germany should ha saddled with the cost of clearing the Scarpa Flow anchorage which they have rendered unuseable.