A GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12244, 16 February 1918, Page 4

A GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

TO CRUSH PRICE « Wifi THE WE BLUES MUST KOLB OK TILL JSiEW IS REABY.

‘Eighteen months more of war, and then certain victory for the Allies Sub i-ere is a proviso which is very significant, and it is tins—provided that the Ailed armies can resist the furious onslaught for which the Germans are now preparing, and ‘ hold the fort ’ until America’s embattled millions are m France, striking the blow that will ensure triumph for the cause of Liberty and Justice.” Such is the deliberate and reasoned opinion expiessed by Mr Frank H. Simonds, author of “ The World War,” etc. In an article in the New York “Tribune” in December he said:—

Rather more than a year ago I expressed the opinion that the war would last at least four years. The recent progress of events satisfies me that we are to see a struggle at least five years long, and that no decision is likely during, 1918, nor until such time ns the United States can put a million of men on European soil, with proper provision for maintaining this number in the firing line. The conviction that the war will go at least five years rests upon the change in the situation resulting from, the complete disappearance of Russia from the battle line. Allied victory in four years was conditional upon the mutual efforts of France, Britain, Russia and Italy, all operating at full power against the Central i ewers. But now Russia has disappeared,. Rumania must disappear, and the war becomes a contest between the groups of Powers, comparatively equal in numbers, and will remain so until the United States is able to break the deadlock by supplying sufficient num-bp'-s to give her Allies the numerical superiority' permanently. The first effect of the Russian defection must be recognised in the events which have taken place in Northern Italy and m Northern France. The' Russian collapse has provided Germany vitb a. strategic reserve which has been lacking to her ever since her failure before \erdun. This strategic reserve has enabled her to take the offensive m Italy and carry on n cnunter-offeii-•sive . before Cnmbrai—both of them more considerable offensive efforts than '»■ II, « Germans in nearly two years.

Allies. Not only do the European enemies of Germany possess an equal number of men, but they have behind them the resources and man-power of the United States, which, now that Russia has disappeared, is the greatest of all countries in the war. If the Germans tail to achieve a decision, if they fail to accentuate the war weariness in France sufficiently to bring the French to a separate peace by their offensive of next spring, they will bo in a far worse state than at any moment during the war. because they will have used up that strategic reserve supplied by the Russian defection, and they will have no reserve at. the moment when the American Army is taking its place, at least a million strong, on the western battle line. But for the arrival of that army the Allies must wait, and during the period in which they are waiting they will unquestionably have to face the fiercest German attack of the war. Moreover, it seems to me that wise policy would dictate that the. Allies should wait during 1918, and in the main carry on a defensive war, because there is the obvious danger of a complete prostration of France if France lias to undergo another Weeding like that of Verdun. Germany cannot afford the losses which she would hare to bear singly when they are balanced by losses on the. other side, divided between the French and the British. This would mean a rate of attrition for her which would be murderous. But since France has lost proportionately almost as heavily as Germany, the German can exchange casualties with France safelv.

GERMAN PURPOSE CLEAR. In my judgment, the Allies may be compelled to stand on the defensive tinonghout the whole of next year while every sign points to a renewal of the German effort to achieve a decision in advance of the arrival of the main masses of the United States armies. If is necessary to understand the German purpose Luclendorff expressed it very clearly the other day when he said that in modern ovar-that. is, in a contest between whole peoples—a military decision on the battlefield is nnlikel". Hie real victory is attained by the weanng nut of the will and the spirit of the weaker nation by the stronger. Ibis has happened in Russia. This he Gennans hope will happen in Italy They expect, that defeat will break the spirit of Italy, that disintegration within the Savoy monarchy will Si°L the ’Tc° f - tllo in the Romanoff Empire, and that domestic revolution and disorder will brin* itafy to a_ separate peace as they have brought Russia. I„ such a Cas ' e it * certain that the next German operation will ho directed against the French. A DESPERATE FINAL DRIVE. In the course of 1917 Germany has captured an enormous amount of war material from the Russians, mid equally vast amount from the'ltalians. She has added greatly to her stocks of munitions and of guns. All these, resources will enable her to make a desperate final drive against France this winter or next spring, while the Austrian troops will suffice to hold the gams in Italy, to check Sarrail’s army in the Balkans, and probably to supply certain Austrian, German and Hun ganan divisions of picked troops for the western campaign, The population of France, Italy and Great Britain, including the British white colonies, is about canal to that of the Central Powers, without Turkey, while the native troops of British and French colonies about offset Turkish numbers. But the Italians can use only a minor percentage of their numbers on their present'front, and are unlikely now f to consent to the tansfer of Italian troops to France, while the French and the British are handicapped by the necessity of sending many "of their troops to save Italy. , All thincs considered, it seems to me certain that the next campaign will see Germany on the offensive on the western front, where all military authorities, German and Allied alike, agree the war will be. won and lost. °

AMERICA'S BLOW WILL FALL IX 1919. There should be no mistaking tho fact in the United Slates that the defection of Russia has totally changed the whole situation, in that it has supplied Germany with a strategic reserve, that it has re-invigorated the war spirit of the nation, and that with newly acquired resources of guns and materials, captured from tho Russians, Germany is now able to strike, one more blow before wo can possibly become. an effective force on the western I rout.

During next summer we shall have some hundreds of thousands of troops in blance. Ve shall have a certain number of divisions upon the firing line. Wo shall have many more divisions behind the firing line, getting their training, but we shall be unable to take over any considerable portion of the Gorman assault in 1918—precisely as the British were not able to take ‘over any portion of the German assault imon Verdun between February and July 1916.

It docs not seem to me that these facts warrant any pessimism, although we are certain to have a period of depression growing out of the apparent inexhaustibility of German resources and the inevitable local successes of German arms, such ns the recent Cambrni episode and the more considerable success in Northern Italy. Germany is compelled again to make tremendous efforts and to gamble on an immediate decision with new assets to avoid that defeat which is inevitable when American numbers restore the balance destroyed by the Russian defection. The real decisive thrust of the war must. come from the United States, and can come only when tho United States has sufficient numbers at the front to deliver a great blow, It took Great Britain two years to train its citizen army and get it to France. It will not take ns any less. A WAR OF SPIRITS.

We five entering a new phase of the war. The campaign of 1918 will begin with a very clear perception on the part of all general staffs—cnemies and Allies alike—that the decision of the war will rest with the nations whoso spirit endures most steadfast, and that the real defeat may come not in a Waterloo or a Sedan, but in a collapse behind the lines, such as has destroyed the great Russian forces during the present year. It is rather a question no wwhether the German spirit or the now whether the German spirit is the

THE KAISER’S LAST CHANCE. T'ho element of time remains with the

first to weaken, and it is a moral certainty that if our troops arrive in Trance in time the ultimate advantage must be with the Allies. Nor does there seem to mo any reason to doubt that the French and British can bear what will lie the ultimate Gorman assault, made possible by Russia's revolution and the release of some hundreds of thousands of German troops to constitute a new German strategic reserve. Somewhere between half a million and three-quarters of a million troops have been released for the western field, and with her usual wisdom Germany is preparing to use this new reserve for c«e more attack, rather upon the spirit of her enemies than merely upon their trenchesPROTRACTED WAR. WEAKENS GERMANY.

The defection of Russia makes it unlikely next year, at least, that Allied armies will enter Germany. Allied resources in money and in food, and eventual resources in manhood when we get ready, are so much greater than Germany's, that from a war protracted into 1919 Germany must emerge more exhausted than any one of her three greater foes. Even though her. armies still maintain their positions behind the Scheldt and the Meuse, the exhaustion of Germany will be such that she will be unable to maintain her place or regain her place in the world in the next generation.

All this is clear to the Germans and has been revealed in their frantic campaign for_ a victorious peace. Russia has supplied them with the resources ol men, and Italy and Russia with the resources of guns, munitions and supplies. The object of the next campaign is France. The salvation of France will rest, in part at least, upon onr own country and upon Great Britain. If we get the men to France in time, andi if there l is no mistaking in France our determination and our will and our growing efficiency, the new German campaign will bo as great a failure as that of the Marne and of Verdun. But for the time bcinc; the word is with Germany. She will probably take the and she will stake her last resource in men and munitions upon an offensive designed to break the spirit first of France and then of the French Allies?