How Goes the Fight?

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12086, 15 August 1917, Page 2

How Goes the Fight?

KOTES m THE I®, THE POSITION iiMLYSED, CHRISTCHTJRCH. August 15. The report from Rumania is dis. tinctly more encouraging in tone and in fact this morning, though there is still room for doubt as to the position east and north of Focsn.ui. M. Marcol . Hutin. who is generally woll informed, declares that von Mackensen has received between twenty and thirty fresh divisions to give weight to a new thrust that has been in preparation, and the statement naturally puts a very different complexion on the whole situatiou. Hitherto it has been assumed that the enemy was operating on the Moldavian front with his normal strength, and that at most he bad received a few divisions of reinforcements. It was perfectly obvious that strong new forces had boon thrown into the attack on the Russians, particularly in the wooded Carpathians and south of the Dniester, but there was no positive indication tlhat an offensive on a.u olal>orato scale had been organised in Rumania. Yet an elaborate offensive cannot bu sprung on tho Allies as a surprise if tho intelligence service is working satisfactorily. The Russians and Rumanians are bound to have had some information as to von Mack on sen's preparations, since divisions cannot be concentrated by the score in a few days. It would bo a considerable "undertaking for the enemy, with all his railway facilities, to bring twentyseven new divisions into Moldavia in ten weeks, though ho might hold them at convenient distances, of course, and rush thorn forward in shorter time. But armies cannot bo increased without preparation, for stores and dumps have to be provided, additional transport organised, and if tho reinforcements are to go into reserve arrangements must be made for putting them in billets. Clearly if von Hindenburg planned a. new offensive on the Moldavian front it would be impossible to keep all information from the Russians and Rumanians, yet no hint of such a develop, raent has previously been given apart from certain anticipations which appeared to be prjrelv speculative and to have no reliable backing. The conditions are not like those in France, of course, where the arrival of a. new German division is speedily known to the Allies. It is true that, the Germans maintained areat secrecy in regard to their concentration against Verdun, but tho French had warning even of chat movement, although the enemy was able to make all the iproliminary preparations at Metz. In Rumania he is operating in a hostile country, and secrecy must be virtually out of the Question, so that the Rumanians ought to have had warning of von Mackensen's general intentions. When stationary warfare cease 3 and tho armies begin to manoeuvre, however, fresh divisions can be brought into the operations without the obvious preparation that is necessary under existing conditions, altliougn even then an efficient intelligence sor- I vice will know of their presence in the zone of operations.

The twenty-seven divisions that aro said to be reinforcing Mackensen will have a total strength of about three hundred thousand. They will give the enemy an emphatic superiority in numbers of men and in numbers of i divisions, which is perhaps of greater importance, and the Allies will need I all the support thov can derivo from ; their rivers if they are to hold off attacks and maintain ah unbroken front. ' With such added strength von Mackensen could confidently, enter on an | invasion of Bessarabia, because he could afford to sacrifice the men necessary to win the passage of the Sereth and the Pruth. And possibly the enterprise might be worth the price, if it gave the enemy possession of the unharvested crops. It goes without saying, however, that the Russians and Rumanians would destroy tho crops and grain stores as they retreated, so that the.booty which the enemy needs so urgently would be comparatively scanty. One is therefore driven to find another motive for von Mackensen's threatened great offensive, and, of course, it is not difficult to imagine. By striking heavily before tho Russian J reorganisation is complete and before

the moral condition if the Russian army is fully restored the enemy may hope to inflict such losses as to render recovery even in the coming summer improbable. Indeed, his hope may be to force a separate j eace now The whole question turns, however, on the accuracy of M. Hutin's information. The day's communique from Petrograd shows that the Rumanians, now with Russian support, are counterattacking effectively in the Okna and Slanicu area, the sector, that is, between the Trotus and the Casin. Between the Casin and the Putna the enemy, according to his own report, continues his advance, and has occupied PancTu, tho terminus of a small branch line running west from Morokeshti (Marashesti). His immediate objective, presumably, is tho Morokeshti junction, the loss of which would deprive the Rumanians of their only direct link between the Serpth railway and tho eastern and southern systems of Moldavia. There is no other railway bridge over the Sereth until Pascani is reached, a hundred miles further uq tho river. Tho German report, by the way, records that the Russians offered desperate resistance at Panciu. Further south, too, the Rumanians are said to be counter-attacking strongly. A very interesting note on the work of the American division in Franco has been sent to the. '"Daily Chrojiiclu" by its Paris correspondent and has been repeated to Australian newspapers. "The American army in France," says the correspondent, "makes its own docks, harbours, and roads, and has rebuilt the. railway from the. port of arrival to its vast training ground inland, and is running American locomotives on it. The toy railways of Europe will he dwarfed by tho roal thing. Tho new army's activity surprises the Old World. American officers, wishing to acquaint Paris of their arrival, on June 27, attempted to telephone to the capital, but, on learning that they must wait an hour, they lowered their ships' cables, attached thorn to the telephone wires ashore, and sent their ir-essage direct. The seriousness of the Americans, and their high efficiency, are already 'being commented upon. To their student-like attitude, betokening a desiro to benefit by the experience cf others, is joined a deep admiration of the British, both for their achievements in the field and their miracle of army organisation. They have ten trained baseball adepts at bomb-throwing and their airmen aro equally adept. On thfir great new ' training ground the latest appliances of science have been placed at their disposal. America's first contingent brought six months' food supply, hence the fears of the peasants of France, lest thoy would he eaten out, are groundless. Preparations are in progress ic envisage an American army of one million men. It is email wonder that Jacques, in tho trenches, 'is greatly comforted at tho prospect of this of early victory. America's army, which will be autonomous, co-opera tin;; with France, is the response to Marshal Joffre's prayer at Washington.''