HOW GOES THE FIGHT?

Star (Christchurch), Issue 11755, 20 July 1916, Page 4

HOW GOES THE FIGHT?

NOTES ON THE WAR. THE POSITION ANALYSE!). CHEISTCHURCH, July 20. Mr Asquith's announcement that the Imperial General Staff objected to the publication of the reports concerning the expedition was to be expected. A discussion in Parliament one is now promised for Thursday—will be of doubtful value in view of the suppression of official statements, and in all probability the result will be merely to give publicity to a number of allegations of questionable accuracy. At any rate that is the common rule with military debates in the House of Commons. Parliament, of course, always wants to discuss such matters and is not always reasonable in its demands for information concerning incomplete operations. There is no really safe basis on which a debate of the kind could be conducted, but the least dangerous would be to submit official reports on certain definite points and to confine the debate absolutely to those points. The danger involved in a public discussion is shown by a passing remark of Mr Asquith's that the troubles recently complained- of in connection with Mesopotamia arose from the fact that seven divisions were hurried up the river in the hope of relieving General Townshend, and that the transport arrangements had been made only for two divisions. Even that .simple statement could not be made without giving the enemy information, and though no doubt he had it already it is obvious that a debate could not proceed very far without revealing military details that ought to be secret.

Up to tho time of the occupation of Kut-el-Amara by General Townshend tho expedition had been conducted on sound lines and with no very serious blunders. The events immediately following the occupation of Kut have been a good deal under discussion, and the responsibility for the advance on Bagdad is still the subject of controversy. Some of the papers relating to that development were published in London a few weeks ago and were referred to in the Ofble messages. General Townshend's position is explained by an "appreciation" dated October 3, 1915, in which ho explains, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, the conditions governing an advance beyond Kut. The state of tho river had prevented him from pursuing the defeated Turks to Bagdad and the hope of entering the city on the heels of the enemy had disappeared. The Turks had been reinforced and were entrenched in a strong position at Ctesiphon. There was a risk in attempting to capture Bagdad with a small force which might be driven out by Turkish reinforcements. The object of the expedition so far had been to secure Kut and consolidate the occupation of tho vilayet. Further operations, General Townshend showed, depended on political considerations.

The commander At Kut went on to say that if the Government did not desire the capture of Bagdad tlio best course would be to consolidate the position at Kut. "Should it not be considered politically advisable by Government to occupy Bagdad at present on account of doubtful situation at Dardanelles, and possibility of our small forces being driven out of Bagdad by stronger, forces from Anatolia, which would compel us to retire down a long line of communication, teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile, whose hostility would become activo on hearing of our retreat, then I consider that on all military grounds we should consolidate our position at Kut." In the alternative, if the Government desired to occupy Bagdad, then, said General Townshend, "unless great risk is to be run, it is in my opinion absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be carried out methodically by two divisions or one army corps, or by one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of. the garrisons of the important places of Nasiriyah, Aliwaz and Amara. It is now quite impossible for laden ships to go up."

General Townshend's contention is that having submitted his views in this report it would have been contrary xo discipline for him to "protest" formally, and that thereafter he simply carried out his instructions. Sir John Nixon's comment is that he provided General Townshend with certain reinforcements and communicated to him the news that two divisions were to be cent from France. Sir John considered that this satisfied, the conditions set out in General Townshend's "appreciation" of October 3, and ho also believed that General Townshend himself was satisfied. He mentions that MajorGeneral Kemball was sent by aeroplane from Kut to confer with General Townshend on October 19 and November 5, and that this staff officer on his return " gave no inkling that General Townshend was in doubt as to the adequacy of the force.'' From these documents it would appear that the decision to advance on Bagdad was due to political considerations, but that the Government took no action without the advice of the responsible officer; and further that the responsible officer, who was Sir John Nixon, gravely under-estimated tho difficulty of the expedition, in spite oi tho fact that he had had a frank '• appreciation" from General Townshend. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that all the subsequent troubles in Mesopotamia arose out of this farreaching blunder.

The communiques from the western theatre call for little detailed comment, because they are concerned for the most part with German counter-at-tacks, and therefore involve no fresh ground. Against the British the main attack has been delivered at the apex of tho new salient, where the British were endeavouring to extend their' gnins beyond LonguevaJ and towards Gnillemont and Glnchy. The particular point of the attack is decided by various considerations. In this case Longueval is the centre of a particularly menacing thrust, but it also happens to be a point of weakness, because tho actual front on which the British could attack is narrow and advanced positions could be held under fire by the enemy from two sides and possibly from three. The support that could be afforded to such positions is comparatively restricted by the same considerations. Moreover. Longucval is close to the

right flank of the British sector, as 3 the Germans may have counted on a failure of British and French to cooperate as closely as two British forces would do. There is still another and an important reason why the enemy's counter-attack should be espected at Longueval. Roads from Bapaumo and Combles converge there, and the light line from Peronne to Combles and on to Albert touches Guiilemcnt and Crinchy and passes close to Longueval itself, so that it is at this poiint that' reserves could most easily be thrown into the fight.