DENMARK'S DIFFICULT POSITION.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 11670, 10 April 1916, Page 4

DENMARK'S DIFFICULT POSITION.

Very little bus been heard about the Danish attitude towards the terrible struggle (<yiys " Stead's Review"), but it. is generally assumed that Denmark, because of her hatred of Germany, who, nearly luilf a century ago, stole her provinces, would join tbo Allies, if nob at once, then when the right time cunie. Geoffrey Pyko, who evidently knows the Danes well, says, in the ''Fortnightly Review,'' that "a closer examination of tho problem and hotter knowledge of the facts would possibly have caused a different opinion to hold the ground." "To contemplate hostilities against Germany, when Sweden might by .identical motives bo drawn into hostilities against Russia, made it essential for the Danish Cabinet at any price wha.tr soever, apart from any other considerations, to maintain their neutrality. All considerations of ultimate policy had to ho abandoned or postponed to the Fabian policy of staving off annihilation from the hordes of Prussia. Added to this was the fact that if the restoration of Northern Schloswig was going to create as a neighbour a Germany yearning for rovenge, the Danes would do anvthing on earth not to have their 150.000 brethren united to them. It they were forced to choose between the two, they would infinitely prefer to see the latter persecuted than to have to defend thorn." MINES".IX THE SOUND. Immediately war broke out, says Mr Pvke, tbo German Government sent a peremptory Note to Denmark demanding that'she should mine the Great and Little Belts and the Sound. "In the event of her refusal the German Government Announced its intention of laying mines in-these waters itself. Now had it been desirable at this juncture to do so, the British Government had the power to force the Danish Government to show their hand and to declare either for or against our enemies. . ~ . " Tbo Sound, though only a mile and a'half broad at Helsingor (Elsmore), is nevertheless not a strip of purely territorial water, for since the commutation of the tolls wo, in common with all other Powers, havo the "right of innocent passage," Or, in other words, the right to send through them ships, whether war-vessels or merchantmen, as long as no acts of hostility arc committed during the passage. Now, for the Danish Government to place mines m these waters with the view of obstructing tho passage of English ships ot any sort would havo been a grave breach ot their duties as- a neutral towards Great Britain. It would havo been not mereh\the violation of a specific treaty, but of a right sprung from, the common law of nations." No answer was sent to the German Government, but Great Britain was at onco informed of the German demano.. Tho Homo Government replied- that they placed no obstacle in the way'oi Denmark mining her own waters. Had England insisted upon her rights of "innocent passsage," Germany itouH no doubt have compelled tho Danish Government into acquiescing m what would have been a gross breach of territorial rights. England did not insist, for she could not have.helped! Denmark, and her insistence -sVould havo merelv given the Germans- an opportunity of making another Dardanelles of the Sound. EVERYTHING TO FEAR. w Poor Denmark had everything to fear. She not only feated Germany immedJatelv, but the unknown factor of Sweden's relations to Russia added an other though more remote terror, lo the reader of this article in London it may seem strange, absurd and outrageous, according to his disposition, that by no means a. far-away reality to the Dane was the fear of.England. Denmark had not forgotten the Germaiuo onslaught of lfc<>4, nor tho English desertion of her in the face of it. It was impossible for thorn to forget that they had' gone into the struggle against what were then obviously two of tho strongest Powers in Europe, in tho fira belief that tho British Government wore co-mins; to their aid. In 1801 Sir Hyde Parker had bombarded Copenhagen, and m 1807, with but the flimsiest justification, we demanded the surrender of both tho war and mercantile fleet of thin seafaring people. They refused categorically, and! faced us with as ranch courage and nobility as thev faced the Prussian, but the memory" has nob faded from their minds, and -notwithstanding 107 years, and several «renerations, English foreign policy is regarded as being somewhat fickle and untrustworthy in Copenhagen, though its sincerity m later voars is uauallv admitted.'' * Danish relations with Norway are cordial, with Sweden almost unfriendly. Yet in the grave danger all neutrals were placed, the three, drew together, and the three King? met at Malmo and formed a union, embryonic perhaps of a vast neutrality league composed of all the smaller Powers whom this war among their elder brethren is gradually crushing. MEANS TO AN END. " The likelihood of German attack is never very far from Danish minds, and the fact .that hitherto they have been spared does not detract in the eyes of the Dane from its possibility. They realise with perfect clearness that their future safety lies on the water. It is obvious that the trend of events on land will not affect their political or military position so much as the fortunes of war on the sea. The higher naval command at Berlin has followed the policy of hoping their battleships safe at all costs. It has been somewhat that habit of the Englishman, with the memory of Nelson arid his tactics in taekljng an enemy's fleet more powerful than his own, to scoff at the German policy. But surely a moment's consideration will show the German policy to be not merely the only one to pursure in tho eirc'uiustauccs, but tho one that Nelson himself preached and practised. Nel-

GERMANY'S HEAVY DEMANDS.

son's object in sailing down Channel and out into the Atlantic to look for and fight the French fleet, wherever it might be, he was surely not dictated by the desire to perform something' glorious, or even to provide an occasion on which futuro English speakers might pour forth their streams of eloquence; surely it was-but. a single move in the world-light against Napoleon, just as much ns a German move against Serbia to-day is not undertaken for it* intrinsic value, but as a means to further ends. It was imperative upon Nelson's part to. destroy the French fleet, because the French fleet at that moment was preparing to act as cover and escort for a vast army whose- purpose was to invade England; and I nave tot the least doubt that if the sole hope of Germany in preventing the invasion of the, Valeriana" lay in her fleet coming out to fight the" superior British flfcet in the open seas, it would do so without hesitation. . At the moment the German Admiralty is pursuing the same strategy as Nelson m refusing to accept battle." THE NAVAL POSITION. Mr Fyke rather scoffs at our armchair critics who demand that the German fleet shall come out and be smashed, just as they insisted that the Boers should act the men and come from behind the rocks and be potted in open light—give our fellows a. chance at them. Ho says nothing about Mr Churchill's remarks regarding digging out the rates, but ho does not touch on what Balfour said. "Mr Balfour, in a. letter to the American Press, stated that tho object of a fleet was threefold—"l. To protect the countrv from invasion. "2. To keep open the trade routes on the high seas. "3. .To permit, and facilitate tho transport of troops. "The last of these Germany has no need for; the second cannot' possibly belong _to any, two opposing parties, and it is not surprising that it should go to the most powerful; and. the first Germany has most amply accomplished; not a single enemy has set foot off ship on German soil, despite her inferior fleet," At the moment the risk of sending our Fleet into the Baltic to face the German fleet alone appears, he says, to bo excessively great, but, once let the British attempt an entrance, or tho development of the Russian fleet become dangerous, and Denmark will be ordered to close tho Sound. Non-compliance will mean war. Would Denmark under the circumstances risk destruction to please the Allies? In the great Germanic scheme the Sound k the Dardannelles of the north, and fulfils the j same purpose. Germany would go to any lengths to close it. should need over ! arise. At present the necessity is not imminent, because tho German fleet is supremo in the Baltic; but it may come any day. j IF WAR- SHOULD COME. j Mr Pyke points out how vulnerable Denmark is to German attack. Presumably simultaneously with a deolara-i tion of war from Berlin, would come the offer of assistance from London. There is no doubt that headquarters in Germany have made their plans accordingly. "Should the unfortunate issue arise and Denmark be subject to aggression, the strategic position would divide naturally into<tnree possibilities: One, a situation in which Denmark fights alone, or in which assistance cannot be rendered immediately with the declaration of war; secondly, when assistance is rendered, but after the lapse of some time; and, thirdly, in which substantial help can be■ rendered and sent immediately.' The peace strength of the Danish Army is only about 14,000 men and officers, but a national militia system in which exemptions are very" rare, somewhat after tho Swiss style, is in vogue. Immediate mobilisation would bring the number within a few davs to about 150.000; eventually 250,000 might be raised." Mr Pyko, with the aid of a map, goes over the possible happenings which would follow the outbreak of war. Either the Danes would abandon ah the mainland and concentrate on thlV defence of Copenhagen, or they would at once attack tho Germans on tho frontier. Unfortunately, though, the enemy would have a great strategic advantage owing to railway lines and natural defences. Still the Danes would no doubt try to assume tho offensive on tho frontier.

"It would probably be at least four days before we should be able to got an expeditionary force into the firing lino,, even if it is fullv prepared at ths declaration of hostilities, and during that time the Danish Army Would have to defend the frontier task that apears, if the enemy should be organised in his usual maimer, to lie almost insurmountable, and one demanding generalship and l euduranco of the very first class." After what happened in Belgium, at the Dardanelles and at Salonika, ono cannot but havo the very gravest doubts about the ability of the British to throw a really useful sized army ashore in Denmark in four days. If they could not, then tTie Danes would be crumbled up like the Belgians and the Serbians, and vd?.en our troops diet finally try to land they would discover the Genians in possession.