The Star. MONDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1915. EDITORIAL NOTES.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 11509, 4 October 1915, Page 4

The Star. MONDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1915. EDITORIAL NOTES.

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|,f It must be apparent to everyone that the appointment ot :;n olHcial corI" , respondent to record tho doings of the \ Dominion's forces r,broad ha;? proved unprofitable. Air Ross appeared on tho scene in Egypt Into in the day. The L Homo authorities iiatl made arrangements regardi ig correspondents ami | there can bo no doubt that the New ; Zealand representative had a hard row to hoe. But, making liberal allowances for tho initial difficulties, the Dominion ¥' has -ot received a regular service from ■tho front and the long delays have been commented upon from time to xinxv This morning a letter from Gallipoli, dated July 30, was published, : a break of over nine weeks;, and it. • cannot be contended chat such a service is. of any valuo. News from other ' .sources has pre>v id?d details of the lighting weeks beyond that date. For instance, on August 31 tho local newspapers published Captain Bean's ao~ count of the operations at Suvla Bay, written on August 7. To-dav the same journals publish a- communication from The New Ze-iliad correspondent. It was dated % week earlier than the Australian correspondent's letter, but "is not avaiiab*o for publication until fire weeks later. .The value of such a news service is praevTcally nil, and if it cannot be improved it should bo abandoned. ; Tho very hostile reception accorded General Smuts when he went to ad- • dress y,- ibeeting at Newlands shows clearly with what bitterness tho general election iry South Africa is being fought. The Government 'of General Botha, after iivo years of strenuous, difficult work, is on its trial and, [ thanks largely to the venomous spirit of General Hertaog, the issues at stake are Doing lost sight of to some extent; clouded over b-v raoial animosities. In 1910 party distinctions were not clearly defined and more than ono observer of Capo polities has expressed ihc opinion that General Hertzog, by his uncom7>n>mising attitude, his bitterness, awl Jus anti-Imperial speeches, provided the one element needed to crystallise the parties and. make the party divisions clear-cat. In tho back veldt, and especially in /the Orange River Colony, Hertzog has secured a big following by posing as a Dutch patriot. He exjk pounded the doctrine that the Dutch Hi must be '•'baas" (boss) in South and carried out a campaign General Botha and his colHHpgue, General Smuts, that was whit© HHBot in its animosity. K .One result of this development has it been to drive tho Unionists into Gen- | eral Botha's, camp and tho prospects I of the Government's return to office are sa-d to be excellent. Many and I difficult have been the problems con- ' fronting the Government during the past five years, culminating in the recent rebellion, and they have shown clearly that the Prim© [Minister is a man of great strength. In this election campaign lie takes the field against the reactionary element in the ■ Union; he faces the desperate effort of Kruger'a disciples to seize the reins of Government. A Boer, he must oppose a party recruited entirely from among his own people; of one race he stands for the unity of two races. This is no ordinary election. It marks a critical period in the history of the South African Union. The powers of reaction are making a supreme effort to establish I>utoh dominance and racial issues are the weapons they are using. On the .other side General Botha leads a party wide in its outlook, ready and willing to let racialism die in order that the Union may benefit. In an interesting survey of the year's war operations, Mr Siwrnor Wilkinson, the well-known authority on military history, comments on tho fact that the members of the British Cabinet, with the exception of Lord' Kitchener, are laymen without a professional know-. ledge of military and naval strategy. I The conduct of a war in its large outlines, and in particular the direction , given to tho forces of any one State, whether it i* acting alone or in concert with other States, are always determined by the Government of that State. Mo doubt, a Sovereign or a < Cabinet takes tho advice of strategists i before deciding its course. But whoever the advisers, the decisions aro al- ' ways those of tho Government as a whole. I ■ 4 "No British Cabinet in iny time," j says Mr Wilkinson, " has ever had j among its members a strategist by pro- ] fession. The present Cabinet is the ] first for many years in which a profes- j .sional soldier as such has held office, t Earl Kitchener has been charged with * the organisation of the military forces | and the creation of new armies, a very > great task. It is not clear whether he \ has had leisure to think out the strate- t gical problems of the war, though no £ doubt he will bavo been consulted, and shares the responsibility of his col- t leagues in regard to tho decisions which t have been made. There is no other £ member of the Cabinet who can give a 0 professional opinion upon any strategical question. Yet for a war in which Vl tho nation's existence is at stake I I JiouM fiare expected tho Government c

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to have organised strategical knowledge or judgment from ifco The Committee of Imperial Defence i* not a professional commit-too. At least liall » its members «ro kyu?!»«, who can no I more hold the balance between profrs- ) t-iorutl men's opinions thon they could jn a. di&cusoion between surgeons.'' " "I. should have expected," continue Mr "Wilkinson, "the. Cabinet to have got together all -the recognised strategists, naval find military, and in- , ducod them to work together and snb- \ uiir. to the Government- on all thy larcro : questions the opinions to which they ' could all subscribe. Tim method rven!d J have kavert the Government sonu« disappointment- in regard- to the first operations in? the Dardanelles, ,-incl might have been of u.v> in sonrc other matters- ft would perhaps have led to suggestions for limiting the autocratic powers of tho Piy-vs Burt-a-u and of the censor, to the suppi\-inn of information likely to be of ti/e to the enemy. At. present tho Government presents the aspect of a committee of some twenty gentleuui. of whom one only has bepu appointed for his previous knowledge of war. a*;,tuning the responsibility for the direction ui fleets and armies and making en their <>olJectire authority deeUions upon any one of which the future existence of Groat Britain and her Kmpivo may depend. '' In war evevv Government has to make such decisions, and victory or defeat depends largely ou tiudr being rightly made. "What- puzzles tho-'v? who are not in (he secrets of the Cabinet is the .slight attention that semis to have been paid by the G-oveniment to strengthening itself for this all-im-portant branch of its activity by scaring as the basis of its deliberations the recorded opinions tt tlr- repre.-on- . i tatives of professional judgment.'* | The attitude of Bulgaria still remains enshrouded more or '.e-.s in mystery. Sh-p has mobilise!l be-,- a-rinr, but* she seems to be he»iiat-ing before making & decisive more. Tin: somi-ofßcial Press of tho country states rather vaguely that tho Government is pursuing its national policy. <-i mi' -will oniy resort to armed intervention after all peaceful methods are exhausted. Bnt instead of trying ail expedients to keep the peace, Bulgaria has given affront to the neighbouring Balkan States by inobilking her forces. Mobilisation in its'lf is not a e::.sus Isellt, but .such a step, when there is uo cause to fear aggression from outside, is certainly disquieting and menacing to the peace of neighbouring States. Greece, in. order to protect herself and in accordaitee with her treaty agreements with • Serbia, has J ike wise mobilised her ■ forces. Such an act on her part can only bo looked upon as a precaution ! and not as a hint at aggression. The situation is indeed critical, but war may yet be averted. Ferdinand of : Bulgaria, is a most astute diplomat, and he may be playing a reckless game for I a big stake. A few days, however, i should decide whether Greece and Bui- I garia aro to become participators in the great European struggle. I